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ABSTRACT 
POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND DEMOCRACY 
Douglas M. Weck 
Supervisor: Stephen R. Perry 
 Political institutions and actors have a moral responsibility to secure the equal 
freedom of those subject to their rule.  It is in virtue of that responsibility that political 
authorities can possess certain moral rights to rule.  Here, I argue that such political 
authorities can possess moral rights to create and employ the positive law to secure equal 
freedom.  In doing so, I will address a number of common problems that theories of 
political authority face, including the subjection problem, the problem of consent, and the 
particularity problem, among other things.  I also present an account of the role that 
democracy can play in an adequately framed theory of legitimate political authority.
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CHAPTER 1 - THE PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY  
For a variety of reasons, it is unfortunate that the question of whether a state has 
political legitimacy — a moral right to rule — has become synonymous with the question 
of whether there is a general moral obligation to obey the law.  According to most theorists, 
that misfortune should be because we should not reasonably expect to be able to provide a 
theory that successfully establishes the existence of such an obligation.  Defending such an 
obligation is too difficult, even impossible.  First, there is the well-known concern that such 
an obligation would be at odds with an individual’s apparently more fundamental right and 
responsibility to be autonomous, to judge things for themselves and to take responsibility 
for their actions.  Authority, it is argued, requires an individual to give up their independent 
judgment about what to do and to make important moral decisions simply according to 
what others say.  Second, but related, is the charge that such an obligation could only be 
the product of a voluntary exercise of choice, such as consent or a robust willful acceptance 
of benefits from the state.  But, any obligation to obey the law, at least as the state sees it, 
is not contingent on such undertakings, and it is unlikely that most individuals do or could 
voluntarily undertake that obligation.  Third, it is quite easy to point to the legislative, 
executive, and judicial failures of the past, and we reasonably expect a future replete with 
additional failures.  The historical non-existence of such an obligation, even within modern 
liberal democracies, should reasonably cause us to be pessimistic about the possibility or 
likelihood of any such obligation existing in the future.  Fourth, many violations of law are 
apparently harmless.  The desert stop sign is a common example.  How can running a stop 
sign in the desert with no one else is sight be morally wrong?  No harm, no foul, the 
 
 
2 
argument goes.  Fifth, the notion that a moral obligation can come into existence simply in 
virtue of an act of law has been likened to pulling something out of thin air.  How can moral 
obligations arise simply in virtue of the law’s say so, rather than in virtue of whatever moral 
considerations independently support such obligations?  Finally, the philosophical 
literature is replete with failed attempts to establish or explain the possibility of a general 
obligation to obey the law: consent theory, associativism, the natural duty of justice, and 
the principle of fair play, to name a few.   
Ultimately, I will address each of those views at some point in this dissertation.  If 
we want to defend the possibility of politically legitimate states and related ideas, we will 
have to come to terms with many of those difficulties.  In any event, I want to begin by 
discussing how a general moral obligation to obey the law can actually be too easy to 
establish, with the goal of making a basic point about any plausible theory of the legitimacy 
of the state.   
Imagine a primitive state.  This state has de facto political power, meaning that 
individuals within its jurisdiction will generally acquiesce to what it says.  The state claims 
that individuals have a moral obligation to obey its law, and its subjects even believe that 
to be the case.  It backs up its law with force and punishes those who violate the law.  
However, this primitive state is unlike the modern states that we are familiar with.  This 
primitive state only has a single law.  That law prohibits individuals from intentionally 
killing other individuals absent self-defense.  That’s it.  It does not care to do anything else. 
 It seems fairly straightforward that there is a general moral obligation to obey the 
law in the primitive state that I just described.  Its single legislative act mirrors a basic 
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moral requirement that nearly any reasonable theorist would agree must be followed and 
upheld with force.  Any individual subject to that law is morally required to obey that law.  
The primitive state would have a moral right to secure compliance with that law by 
threatening to punish violators, intervening to protect individuals against attempts on their 
lives, and punishing those who violate that law.  If we believed that a general obligation to 
obey the law is a morally significant objective for theories of political legitimacy and 
modern states, states that have vast and complex legal structures and institutions, then that 
desiderata would be easy to achieve.  Modern states could simply eliminate all of their laws 
save for the prohibition against purposeful killing.  
 Any plausible theory of the legitimacy of the state should characterize the primitive 
state that I have just described as extremely defective.  It is illegitimate.  That is so 
notwithstanding that it obviously carries the mantel of a general moral obligation to obey 
the law.  And, no theory would recommend that modern states jettison all but that single 
legal prohibition.  What we should conclude is that the primitive state would not have a 
moral right to keep its job.  Why is that?   
The key to thinking about the legitimacy of the state and the moral rights that states 
have is that states have incredibly important moral jobs.  What I mean by that is that states 
have certain necessary moral responsibilities, or moral duties, that make up their job 
description.  At a minimum, we expect our states to do certain things and not to do certain 
things.  For the moment, I want to leave that job description undescribed.  But, needless to 
say, the primitive state that I have described would not live up to the job description 
articulated within anyone’s most basic political theory of the state.  We, and our political 
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morality, expect much more of our states and our political leaders than what the primitive 
state has to offer. 
 To deflate the import of the example, one might object that there isn’t really a 
general moral obligation to obey the law in the primitive state that I described.  Of course 
there is a moral obligation not to kill other people without provocation, but what the 
primitive state has done is merely reproduce what is independently morally required.  
When we talk about a general moral obligation to obey the law, we are referring to 
something different and more interesting, namely an obligation to obey the law because 
it’s the law.1  What that means is that the moral obligation to obey a particular law arises 
from the fact that it is a valid law and not, or at least not completely, because the action 
that the law prohibits is independently morally prohibited.  That is the so-called 
requirement that any moral obligation to obey the law be a “content-independent” 
obligation.  Such an obligation is supposed to be morally binding because it is a valid legal 
obligation, not because of the independent moral merits of the content of the law in 
question.   
Throughout this dissertation, I will have more to say about the moral purpose that 
content-independence serves.  Nonetheless, the primitive-state example can be 
reformulated to accommodate that point without altering the basic argument that political 
                                                          
1 Cf. Stephen Perry, “Law and Obligation,” The American Journal of Jurisprudence 50 
(2005): 270 (“[T]he most theoretically interesting justification for a general obligation to 
obey will . . . begin with the fact that we are dealing with a system of directives and then 
ask which moral property or properties of the system, considered as a whole, might give 
rise to an obligation to obey each of its directives regardless of their individual moral 
content.”).  
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legitimacy in some sense involves a threshold satisfaction of a certain, perhaps minimal, 
job description.  Many defenders of the idea that legal obligations can be morally obligatory 
have focused on the moral importance of certain kinds of coordinated social activities that 
only states have the capacity to bring about.2  Such coordination is achieved through public 
decision making by the state.  
We can simply reformulate the primitive-state example in terms of a legal 
obligation that is addressed to bringing about some sort of morally important coordinated 
activity.  Let’s say that the primitive state, instead of legislating that intentional killings are 
prohibited, legislates and enforces a law that requires all individuals to drive on the right 
side of the road.3  That again is all the primitive state does.  Coordination of activity on 
roads is a morally important end, and the law’s arbitrary insistence that individuals drive 
on one side of the road rather than the other serves that end.  Coordination is achieved 
because individuals can simply look to the rules of the road to determine how they should 
drive.  The moral obligation to abide by the legal rules of the road, in this case a single 
rule, is perhaps one of the least controversial examples of a content-independent state-
created moral obligation that one can come up with.  And, the previous point still holds 
true.  A primitive state that makes a single demand that all those subject to its authority 
drive on the right side of the road would have satisfied the requirement that there be a 
                                                          
2 E.g., John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 1980), 231-
33; Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1986), 49-50; Stephen 
R. Perry, “Political Authority and Political Obligation,” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of 
Law, ed. Brian Leiter and Leslie Green, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
57-58. 
3 If another example of morally necessary coordination would be preferred, it can easily be 
swapped in, and the argument can proceed along those lines. 
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general obligation to obey the law.  But, it should not pride itself in that because it surely 
has no legitimacy; it has no moral right to keep its job.  Instead, it must do more. 
One of the points I will make in the chapters that follow is that the state is morally 
necessary and has a morally necessary job because of its capacity to solve certain wide-
scale coordination problems through the issuance of legal rules despite reasonable moral 
disagreement between equal moral persons.  The state’s coordinative capacity and its 
ability to serve as an arbiter of disagreement are morally necessary to secure a life in which 
individuals can live independently of each other in ways that are consistent with each and 
every individual’s freedom to live their own lives.  The state’s job description, therefore, 
is to secure equal freedom amongst its citizens.  That job includes solving certain moral 
problems that would arise without a state and coordinating systematic legal solutions to 
moral problems that arise from living amongst one another, including creating and 
maintaining legal solutions to private law, criminal justice, healthcare, the environment, 
the economy, basic constitutional rights, and so on.  Rightful coordination demands that a 
legal rule bind primarily in virtue of its status as a valid law that resolves reasonable 
disagreement, rather than it bind simply in virtue of some sort of independent assessment 
by individuals of what they believe is the morally best approach.  Toward that end, I build 
off certain ideas found in Kantian political theory.4 
                                                          
4 While at points I rely heavily on ideas in Kant’s political philosophy, the arguments are 
not meant to be explications of Kant’s own writings.  Instead, the goal is to present a view 
that is Kantian in spirit but that relies on and engages with modern day disputes within the 
jurisprudence and political theory literature. 
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This dissertation proceeds in the following chapters.  The present chapter focuses 
on the basic question of what it means to say that the legitimate state has a moral right to 
rule in cases in which the state, like any modern state that we are familiar with, is not 
perfect.  I assess several models for that right in light of the notion that a theory of 
legitimacy needs to be responsive to the idea that state’s have certain moral responsibilities 
in virtue of which they are enabled with the rights that they can legitimately possess.  I 
argue that a minimal conception of legitimacy will invoke the notion of a threshold 
responsibility in virtue of which the ruler can claim a modest right to continue in the 
position of performing the moral task. 
Chapter Two focuses on the moral right to equal freedom of all persons, a right that 
is inherent in all liberal political theories.  I argue that a fundamental aspect of the idea that 
persons are free and equal is that they have a moral right to equal freedom, which means 
that each individual must have legal rights that secure their capacities to pursue their own 
ends in a way that is not subject to the will of another.  I argue that moral indeterminacy 
and reasonable disagreement necessitates an authoritative legal order that publicly defines 
and coordinates our personal rights.  Basically, it is the state’s job to exercise its moral 
authority through the law to secure equal freedom by publicly and decisively defining, and 
coordinating our rights.  I maintain that the law is up for the task and that rights cannot 
serve their practical purpose of protecting individual equal freedom absent laws and legal 
actors to systematically define and secure our rights.  Law serves the dual purpose of 
securing our rights and a form of equality.  Chapter Two emphasizes the static character of 
some laws, with a focus on the law’s ability to secure and to coordinate legitimate 
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expectations.  Chapter Two also addresses the voluntarist objection that legitimate political 
authority requires consent.   
 Chapter Three emphasizes the dynamic character of legal authority and the broader 
collective tasks that legitimate political authority serves.  There I argue that the law plays 
a fundamental role in coordinating the behavior of individuals subject to its authority for 
the purpose of achieving large-scale collective objectives in a fair manner.  Specifically, I 
maintain that securing equal freedom is a collective project in which we can be forced to 
share responsibility in a fair manner.  In the course of doing so, I address several 
comparable accounts that ground the authority of the law in both the need for coordination 
and the principles of fairness. 
 Chapter Four explains the broader idea of specificationism that was in the 
background of the discussions in Chapters Two and Three.  I argue that the law’s task is to 
publicly define what actions count and do not count as being consistent with the freedom 
of other individuals.  The law legitimately serves that function when it mandates a 
specification that is drawn from a larger set of reasonable interpretations of what freedom 
demands.  I draw on several examples to explain how freedom can be consistent with a 
variety of ways in which we might order collective living and responsibility. 
 Chapter Five is about democratic authority and its relationship to equality.  Here I 
argue that where popular political control can effectively secure equal freedom, then 
political authority must be democratic to be legitimate.  Otherwise, those who are in 
political power would be treating those subject to their rule as inferiors and subjecting them 
to their own private purposes.  Here, I discuss several competing accounts of democratic 
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legitimacy, concluding that there are a range of “democratic” forms of government that are 
consistent with the underlying requirements of equal treatment. 
 Finally, Chapter Six briefly addresses the particularity objection.  A number of 
theories of political authority falter because they cannot explain the particularity or 
specialness of the relation between a state and its citizens.  For example, in the everyday 
case, Pennsylvania citizens are required to abide by the laws of Pennsylvania, not the laws 
of New Jersey or France.  In Chapter Six, I articulate the basic problem.  Then, I explain 
why it is important to distinguish between particularized authority in contrast with 
particularized obligation.  That distinction, I argue, allows us to avoid the problematic 
conclusion that individuals only have political obligations to their own state or their own 
citizens.  In the end, I argue that particularity is primarily grounded in instrumental 
considerations about the ability of a given state to coordinate behavior and secure rights.  
National borders, in a sense, serve as proxies for a state’s effectiveness rather than limits 
on its responsibilities.    
1.1 - The Moral Task Framework  
As the primitive-state examples indicate, states have huge moral responsibilities — 
jobs — that go well beyond merely satisfying a general moral obligation to obey the law.  
Any adequate theory of political legitimacy will have to grapple with that fact.  The idea 
that states have jobs and that their doing or not doing their job impacts their legitimacy 
suggests a specific form of argument that theories of political legitimacy should follow.  
First, any adequate account of the state’s political legitimacy will have to offer an 
explanation of the state’s job description in broad or specific detail.  Put in different terms, 
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it will identify the legitimate state’s moral role, responsibility, function, purpose, point, or 
task.  Part of that explanation will address the issue of why the state, rather than some other 
human institution, is uniquely suited and/or morally necessary to do that job.  One upshot 
of this first requirement is that the legitimacy of any given state can be measured by the 
extent to which it is doing its job.  Accordingly, its legitimacy may be partial rather than 
an all or nothing thing.    
Second, a theory of political legitimacy will then explain why the state has a 
legitimate claim to any of a broad range of moral rights in virtue of its job and its 
discharging its moral responsibilities.  We can ask why the state’s job demands that it be 
enabled with certain moral rights.  Those moral rights are what John Rawls refers to as 
“enabling rights,” rights that are had so as to “fulfill certain duties that are prior in the order 
of grounds.”5  The upshot of that latter point is that the nature and scope of a state’s rights 
should be determined by its underlying moral responsibilities and the extent to which it is 
living up to its job. 
According to some, the state’s right to rule is a right to command and be obeyed.  
That is best understood as the claim that the state is enabled with a moral power to impose 
obligations on those subject to its authority.6  But a moral power is not the only category 
of enabling right that the legitimate state might claim to possess.  Wesley Hohfeld has 
explained that there are four distinct species of right, with each species of right having a 
                                                          
5 John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2007), 144.  See also Leif Wenar, “The Nature of Claim-Rights,” Ethics 
123, no. 2 (2013): 206-07. 
6 For this point, see Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 24, and Perry, “Political Authority and 
Political Obligation,” 1. 
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distinct logical form.  The basic framework is captured in Hohfeld’s table of “jural 
correlatives”: 
Right: Claim Right Privilege Power Immunity 
Correlative to: Duty No Claim Right Liability Disability7 
 
The top row captures the four different species of rights.  The columns designate jural 
correlates, namely pairs of “incidents” that logically entail one another.  To say that the 
state possesses a general moral power-right to obligate its citizens is to say that its citizens 
are generally morally liable to have an obligation imposed on them.  That liability is 
essentially what any individual’s purported moral obligation to obey the law actually 
consists in.8  States of course claim to have the moral power to change their citizens’ moral 
situations in any number of other ways.9  For example, the state might have a moral power 
to confer rights or take them away.  What that means is that a state’s citizens are liable to 
be conferred rights or have them taken away.  Nonetheless, the state’s enabling right to rule 
might consist in any number of Hohfeldian rights adequately described, such as a claim-
right to use coercion, a privilege-right to do the same, or simply a claim-right to continue 
in the role as ruler.  I will have more to say about those rights later, but suffice to say that 
there are a host of distinct, non-mutually-exclusive enabling rights that the state might 
                                                          
7 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning,” The Yale Law Journal 23, no. 1 (November 1913): 30.  The basic 
Hohfeldian scheme is described in Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Harvard 
University Press, 1990), 37-60, and Leif Wenar, “The Nature of Rights,” Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 33, no. 3 (2005): 224-37. 
8 Perry, “Political Authority and Political Obligation,” 1. 
9 Ibid. 
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possess in light of its moral responsibilities.  What is most important is that any candidate 
theory of political legitimacy must explain the nature and scope of the Hohfeldian right 
invoked and do so with reference to the state’s moral responsibility.   
The structure of argument that I have just described is not novel and can be broadly 
described as a “moral-task framework” of political legitimacy.  Elisabeth Anscombe 
described the general form of such a theory, in which rights arise in those who bear certain 
necessary moral tasks: “If something is necessary, if it is, for example, a necessary task in 
human life, then a right arises in those whose task it is, to have what belongs to the 
performance of the task.”10 
The moral task framework is appealing because it isolates and connects two central 
questions in political philosophy.  First, what is the moral point of the state?  There is no 
shortage of candidates, often explicitly identified as such but often not, in the existing 
literature: 
Hobbes: “[T]he procurement of the safety of the people . . . [and] by safety 
here is not meant a bare preservation, but also other contentments of life, 
which every man by lawful industry . . . shall acquire to himself”11 
Locke: “[T]he enjoyment of [] Properties in Peace and Safety.”12 
                                                          
10 G.E.M. Anscombe, Collected Philosophical Papers Vol: III (John Wiley & Sons, 1991), 
145.  Leslie Green describes such accounts under the heading of a “task-efficacy account.”  
Leslie Green, “The Duty to Govern,” Legal Theory 13 (2007): 179.   
11 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1994), 
ch. XXX, ¶ 1.   
12 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), II, ch. XI, § 134.   
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Hume: “[P]reserving peace and order among mankind.”13 
Kant: “Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s 
choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in 
accordance with a universal law.”14 
Rawls: “[S]ociety as a fair system of cooperation over time, from one 
generation to the next.”15 
Raz: “[T]heir role and primary normal function is to serve the governed. . . 
. It is to help them act on reasons which bind them.”16 
Finnis: “[C]o-ordinating action to the common purpose or common 
good.”17 
For any candidate moral purpose, we can ask: Is that really the state’s job?  Is that all the 
state has to do?  Is that exclusively or specially the state’s job?  And, why?  The role of the 
state in liberal society is obviously an important question.  Once those questions are asked 
and answered in the abstract, then we can begin to ask of any actual state whether it is 
doing its job and what that means for its legitimacy.  
 The second component of the moral task framework asks another important 
question: What moral rights do states have in light of their jobs?  That is in part an inquiry 
into how the state must or can go about doing its job?  As noted above, such rights are 
                                                          
13 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp 
(Oxford University Press, 1998), § 4 (emphases omitted). 
14 Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 387. 
15 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993), 15. 
16 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 56. 
17 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 232. 
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“enabling rights.”  The basic idea is that certain moral rights are crucial for the state to 
discharge its moral responsibilities.  Insofar as those rights aid the state in fulfilling its 
moral purpose(s) those rights are minimally instrumental in nature.18  This view fits well 
with the idea in jurisprudence that the law, through which the state exercises its moral rights 
to rule, is in part a tool with a moral function or purpose.19  Scott Shapiro has emphasized 
this recently in his “planning theory” of law.  According to Shapiro, the law, which he 
understands to be a kind of massive shared plan, is a tool, a technology even, that can be 
used to manage decisions, motivations, and social activity more generally.20  The state 
obviously has other tools at its disposal, such as printing presses, traffic lights, police 
vehicles, and construction equipment, among other things.  But the state’s capacity to 
utilize those tools fundamentally boils down to its being able to rightfully exercise its moral 
authority through the law.  Taxes are raised through laws that impose obligations to pay 
taxes.  Budgets are passed with laws, and money is ordered to be directed to certain 
agencies.  State workers build roads after they are ordered by other state workers who have 
the authority to tell them what to do.  The state’s moral right to rule therefore pervades 
                                                          
18 That is not to say that such enabling rights cannot also have intrinsic value.  Later, I will 
argue that a state’s right to rule, especially a democratic state’s right to rule, and law more 
generally, can have intrinsic value insofar as those elements (partially) constitute the value 
of equality amongst persons. 
19 E.g., Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 3-9; Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law in 
Jurisprudence and Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 29-36; Joseph Raz, 
Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 166-81; Scott J. Shapiro, Legality (Harvard 
University Press, 2011), 213-14  
20 Shapiro, Legality, 36. 
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even the most tangible aspects of statecraft.  Understanding the nature of that authority is 
therefore paramount. 
  Any adequate theory of political legitimacy cannot work outside the moral task 
framework.  That is in part exhibited by looking at theories that attempt to do so.  Before 
addressing such accounts specifically, lets look at another example of how easy it can be 
to generate a general moral obligation to obey the law, an example that fails to address the 
two moral task questions.  An easy way to assume an obligation to obey the law is to 
promise your mother that you will always obey the law.  We can imagine a number of 
reasons why one might do that.  Perhaps your mom has anxiety about you going to jail, 
perhaps she just happens to be a supporter of the state that you both live under.  The reason 
does not very much matter.  Insofar as we can agree that individuals have a moral obligation 
to uphold their promises, one would have a general obligation to their mother to abide by 
the law. 
 The difficulty with the scenario just described is that although it has offered a moral 
ground for your obligation to follow the law, that ground has nothing to do with the 
legitimacy of the state or the law.  It tells us nothing about what job we expect the state to 
do.  It tells us nothing about the rights the state has with respect to you.  It tells us nothing 
about why the state exercises its authority by issuing laws.  It does not even tell us whether 
states are good things generally or whether your state in particular is any good.  We’ve 
only described a moral relationship between you and your mother.  You very well could 
have promised to abide by the demands of someone else, such as the local psychic or life 
coach.  The account in no way addresses the state, or its rights and responsibilities with 
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respect to you at all.  What is more, the obligation in the above case is not even any of the 
state’s business.  It is not its role to make sure that you uphold your idiosyncratic promises 
to your mother.  It is your mother’s right to hold you to account if you break the promise.  
It is her business, not the state’s, at least according to the promise-to-your-mom account of 
the obligation to obey the law. 
 A number of contemporary theories of political legitimacy face a similar difficulty 
largely because they fail to connect the two issues that form the core of the moral task 
framework.  Instead, they seek out sources of legitimacy in places that have very little to 
do with the state or the law.  In doing so, they fail to offer any apparent account of what 
moral rights the state has and for what purpose it has them.  Take Ronald Dworkin’s well-
known associative-obligation theory of political legitimacy.21  Dworkin is rightly 
motivated to offer an account of the obligation to obey the law.  He maintains that “no 
general policy of upholding the law with steel could be justified if the law were not, in 
                                                          
21 It is interesting that Dworkin conceives of the problem of political obligation as a part 
of his more general theory of the nature of law.  Dworkin thinks that a rule or principle is 
law if “[it] figure[s] in or follow[s] from “the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural 
due process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal 
practice.”  Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press, 1986), 225.  Yet, 
neither his theory of law nor his theory of political legitimacy identify any apparent 
function for legal rules, legal systems, or the state, aside from the purposes of those values 
more generally.  Moreover, Raz thinks things are even worse for Dworkin’s account insofar 
as Dworkin’s theory of law is at cross purposes with what Raz believes is actually the moral 
function of legal rules, namely to mediate between person’s and the reasons that apply to 
them.  See Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford University Press, 1994), 225-
26.  For a critical but sympathetic account of Dworkin’s view, see Stephen R. Perry, 
“Associative Obligations and the Obligation to Obey the Law,” in Exploring Law’s 
Empire: The Jurisprudence of Law’s Empire, ed. Scott Hershovitz (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 183-205.   
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general, a source of genuine obligations.”22  That is an important claim, which I will return 
to later on.  Dworkin conceives of the obligation to obey the law as an “associative 
obligation,” which is an obligation that arises within human associations that satisfy certain 
conditions.  He observes, correctly I think, that membership in certain social groups, like 
friendships and families, can generate obligations between members.  Those obligations 
are not necessarily a consequence of choice or consent, which makes them appealing 
candidates for political obligations given the political reality that not many people willfully 
choose to assume such obligations.  Instead, they depend in some way on the moral value 
of participation in specific categories of social groups.  Dworkin then identifies what he 
believes are the common features of those membership-based social practices, features that 
can ground special obligations amongst members of those social groups, with the goal of 
explaining political legitimacy along those lines.  Dworkin explains that “the members of 
a group must by and large hold certain attitudes about the responsibilities they owe one 
another if these obligations are to count as genuine fraternal [or associative] obligations.”23  
Those attitudes must exhibit four features.  First, members of the group must view their 
“responsibilities as special, holding distinctly within the group, rather than as general duties 
its members owe equally to persons outside it.”24  Second, “they must accept that these 
responsibilities are personal: that they run directly from each member to each other 
member.”25  Third, “members must see these responsibilities as flowing from a moral 
                                                          
22 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 191. 
23 Ibid., 199. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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general responsibility each has of concern for well-being of others in the group.”26  Finally, 
“members must suppose that the group’s practices show . . . equal concern for all 
members.”27  If those conditions are met in a political community, like friendships and 
families, special obligations will arise amongst and between members of the political 
community. 
 The initial difficulty is that it is not at all clear how attitudes about moral 
responsibilities amongst group members can generate actual moral responsibilities.  That 
difficulty would apply to how the account explains any associative obligations within any 
social group.  Instead, we need a moral argument for why those attitudes amongst members 
are morally justified or reasonable, or even morally required.  Those issues aside, the state 
does not seem to condition its exercises of authority or its doing of its job generally on the 
existence or not of certain attitudes amongst its citizenry.  Thus, it is unclear how the 
presence of such attitudes is supposed to address any state’s general policy of employing 
force. 
Nonetheless, there is a larger problem, which returns us to the point made earlier 
about addressing the specific moral responsibilities of the state and how the state has 
certain moral rights in virtue of those responsibilities.  Dworkin’s account of political 
obligation does not explicitly address the moral point of the state or the law.  Based on his 
associativist account and his writings more generally, we might reasonably assume that the 
state’s primary responsibility is to secure equal concern for the well-being of its members.  
                                                          
26 Ibid., 200. 
27 Ibid. 
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Or, to protect rights.  Or, to act with integrity.  But, it is not at all obvious how those moral 
tasks or goals inform the question of what enabling rights constitute the state’s legitimacy 
or why the state needs any such rights in particular.  In likening political obligations to 
obligations that exist amongst friends or family members, Dworkin effectively declines to 
explain why states play fundamentally different roles in our lives.28  States have distinct 
moral jobs, which do not include acting as a friend or family member.  They claim distinct 
rights, foremost of which are a right to tell people what to do and a right to force them to 
do it.  The relationship between parents and young children aside, friends and family do 
not claim such rights.  States also are comprised of and operate through often highly 
complex legal systems.  Those features of the state need to be explained and legitimized in 
their own right.  Otherwise, we have not offered an account of political legitimacy but some 
other social phenomena that might arise in social groups.  Although parallels may be 
drawn, friendships, families, and other forms of human association have distinct normative 
characters.29  
                                                          
28 I will note one benefit about Dworkin’s argument.  Many theorists urge that political 
authority and political obligation are problematic because they are not voluntary.  But if 
Dworkin is correct about certain forms of human relationships, we cannot insist that a lack 
of voluntariness is automatically morally problematic.  Pointing to analogous obligations 
can address certain objections even if doing so is not sufficient as a stand-alone account of 
political legitimacy. 
29 Although not the same point, my point here overlaps with parts of Rawls’s argument that 
the “basic structure” of society is the primary site of principles of justice.  Rawls, Political 
Liberalism, 257.  On Rawls’s view, distinct normative principles must be addressed to the 
basic structure of society because it plays a fundamentally distinct role in our social lives 
by securing the background conditions for social cooperation.  Ibid., 265-69.  Another way 
to put Rawls’s point is that a theory of justice has to address and be responsive to the special 
role that the basic structure plays.  My point here is that we need to think about the 
legitimacy of the state in a similar way: what special role does the state play?  Rawls’s 
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 Other prominent views face similar difficulties.  Take the principle of fair play as 
initially propounded by Rawls as an account of the conditions under which one can have a 
moral obligation to obey the law.30  The basic idea behind the principle of fair play is that 
individuals who “accept” the benefits of a fair cooperative scheme have a responsibility to 
do their fair share in the scheme.  To follow the law is to do one’s fair share.31  The principle 
of fair play has obvious difficulties.  The first is that in most states that we are familiar 
with, people simply do not choose to accept the benefits that they receive from the state in 
any normatively meaningful way.  So, it is hard to see how any state would satisfy the 
principle of fair play as a broad or narrow matter.  The second problem is that it is not clear 
why doing one’s fair share requires one to follow the law.  It would seem that a duty to do 
one’s fair share is just that: a duty to do one’s fair share.  That duty can be discharged in 
any number of ways besides following the law.32   
A larger problem is the problem noticed earlier.  The principle of fair play in no 
way addresses the special responsibilities of the state, why it has those responsibilities, and 
why those responsibilities give it certain rights.  To be sure, Rawls conceives of the state 
                                                          
arguments about the importance of the basic structure are actually more suitable as a theory 
of the state.  
30 John Rawls, Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Harvard University Press, 1999), 
117-29.  The principle of fair play is often attributed to H.L.A. Hart, but it is unclear why.  
Hart’s brief fairness-based account, which is based on the idea of mutuality of submission 
and obedience, is quite different than the view that Rawls and other fairness theorists have 
described.  See H.L.A. Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?” Philosophical Review 64, 
no. 2 (1955): 185.  I will discuss Hart’s view in Chapter 3.  
31 Rawls, Collected Papers, 128. 
32 Such should be clear from the fact that Rawls thinks voting is a duty based in fair play.  
Voting is not even a legal obligation in many democracies.  Therefore, actions other than 
legally mandated actions are capable of satisfying the principle of fair play. 
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as a system of fair social cooperation.  Fair social cooperation is its purpose.  The principle 
of fair play fits with that purpose.  Yet, the principle does not identify any benefits, 
cooperative or otherwise, that are exclusively provided by the state, benefits that at least in 
some way would make the state distinctive and warranting special rights to achieve those 
benefits.  The state just looks like any other cooperative enterprise, like a baseball team or 
a prom committee, enterprises that do not share the state’s rights.  Our laws may reflect 
many of the political obligations that the principle of fair play would suggest.  Yet, nothing 
in the account indicates that we could not get rid of states completely and, in their place, 
participate in non-state social cooperatives.  Thus, to explain the legitimacy of a state, the 
principle of fair play is inadequate.33 
  Stephen Perry has made similar points under the heading of what he calls, “the 
reverse-entailment problem”: 
[T]he proposition that a right to rule entails a general duty to obey does not 
itself entail, certainly as a matter of logic, that a general duty to obey entails 
a right to rule.  Moreover, we can easily imagine circumstances in which 
there is a general obligation to obey the law, at least in the sense that there 
is an obligation to conform one’s conduct with each and every legal 
directive, but we nonetheless remain, at best, uncertain as to whether or not 
the state has a right to rule.  Let me call this the “reverse-entailment” 
problem.  Its essence is that the existence of legitimate authority logically 
                                                          
33 Later, I will discuss Rawls’s principle of liberal legitimacy, which rests on a more 
accurate conception of the state and its peculiar role in securing compliance with the 
principles of justice.  
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entails an obligation to obey, but an obligation to obey does not logically 
entail the existence of legitimate authority.34 
One genesis of the problem is the failure of political theorists to recognize that when the 
state has legitimate authority it has a moral power to change the moral situation.  The state’s 
right to rule, insofar as it has a moral power that it can exercise, instead is fundamentally 
dynamic.  What one subject to authority has is a political liability rather than a static moral 
obligation.35     
 The problem, however, is deeper.  We can’t address the problem simply by 
switching gears and talking about moral liabilities.  Return to the example above with your 
mother.  In that case, you promised your mother that you would always follow the law.  
You assumed not just obligations currently in existence but a liability to have your moral 
situation altered when the state issues a new legal directive.  Hence, even if the state ends 
up with an actual ability to change your moral situation, there is no sense in which we have 
offered a moral argument that directly addresses whether the state possesses a moral right, 
even a moral power, to do so.  For any moral right to rule, whether it is a power, claim, 
privilege, or immunity, the relevant Hohfeldian relationship must exist between the state 
and whoever is subject to its rule.  The moral task framework will satisfy that requirement 
                                                          
34 Perry, “Political Authority and Political Obligation,” 10.  A. John Simmons and Stephen 
Darwall have made comparable points.  The gist is that even if one has a reason to go along 
with what the law demands, that fact does not entail that the state has any moral right to 
make those demands of you.  See A. John Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays 
on Rights and Obligations (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 122-57, and Stephen 
Darwall, Morality, Authority, and Law: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics I (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 142-50.  
35 Perry, “Political Authority and Political Obligation,” 4. 
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because it is focused directly on what rights the state possesses with respect to those subject 
to its rule and why.36 
 
 
1.2 - The Forward-Entailment Problem, Coercion, and Legitimacy Light 
 Ultimately, I will argue that states can possess expansive moral authority over their 
subjects to alter their moral situations in a variety of ways through the law and to enforce 
its demands to secure equal freedom.  Such rights enable the state to discharge its moral 
responsibility of coordinating our moral rights and responsibilities to each other in a way 
that decisively resolves our reasonable moral disagreements about what those rights and 
responsibilities should be.  Legal rules are necessary to secure a relationship of equality 
between persons.  That is a relationship in which no person has the unilateral authority to 
decide for others how we are to live together and secure freedom.  It will be helpful, 
however, to consider another scenario that brings us back both to the lingering difficulty 
of establishing a general moral obligation to obey the law and the concern about tethering 
the state’s right to rule to such an obligation.   
Imagine in this example that a modern, complex state, with all of its laws, lives up 
to whatever standard is set by your ideal moral or political theory of the legitimate state.37  
                                                          
36 Instead of speaking about enabling rights, we could just as easily speak in terms of 
enabling relationships, where those are Hohfeldian relationships that exist between the 
state and those subject to its authority. 
 
37 Those who think it is completely impossible to legitimize states presumably would be 
unable to engage in this thought experiment.  But, it should be doable even for the more 
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In such a state, there is a general moral obligation to obey every law.  This state is that 
good.  Now, assume that the state then issues an obligation-imposing law that is in plain 
conflict with whatever your ideal moral theory requires.  It makes a single mistake, and 
there is no longer a general moral obligation to obey the law of that state.  How does that 
affect its legitimacy?  A realistic theory of political legitimacy should say, “not much.”  
That is especially so when we compare the state just described with the perfect, but 
primitive, single law systems described above.  The primitive state that lived up to its 
responsibility once could not be more legitimate, or legitimate at all, when put up next to 
the nearly perfect state that makes a single mistake.  A theory of legitimacy that identified 
the perfect primitive state as legitimate and the complex but slightly imperfect state as 
illegitimate has gone awry.  What that means is that any requirement that the state’s legal 
directives morally bind in all cases so as to satisfy the generality requirement will have to 
be relaxed. 
That conclusion makes sense.  If states are so important and have such important 
moral jobs, as we should argue, we should not expect their legitimacy to be undermined so 
easily.38  Hobbes and Hume were correct that political institutions are for the most part 
artifice, products of human invention.39  We would not create such enduring enterprises 
that are so easily undermined.  Of course, legitimacy determinations all depend on how big 
                                                          
libertarian types who demand robust forms of consent to legal governance.  Consent would 
just need to be assumed. 
38 Certainly we do not think of the rights of human beings any differently.  Persons are 
never fully stripped of their rights notwithstanding substantial moral failures. 
39 Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. XVII; Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, 
§ 3. 
 
 
25 
of a mistake the law makes, how often its makes mistakes, and whether there are reasonable 
procedures in place to remedy such mistakes.  But, mistakes, honest or not, around the 
edges ought not undermine the legitimacy of a particular state on any realistic theory of 
political legitimacy, even though those mistakes would seemingly undermine a general 
obligation to obey the law.  That is, states, political officials, and political institutions 
should be legitimate in some sense even if the over-demanding expectation of a general 
moral obligation to obey the law is not met now or ever.  The thought is that legitimate 
states are not just possible but are practical.40 
The upshot of that point is that a judgment that an authority is politically legitimate, 
that it has a right to rule, should not automatically entail that there is a general moral 
obligation to obey the laws of that authority.  Call this the “forward-entailment problem.”  
The problem is that we can imagine political authorities that are legitimate even where they 
do not satisfy the demand of a general moral obligation to obey the law.  
Here I want to discuss that problem, how it has led a number of theorists astray, and how 
the problem is best addressed. 
To start, notice what happens if we think that forward entailment is not a problem.  
Many theorists accept forward entailment: that the state has a right to rule entails that it has 
the general moral power to impose obligations on those subject to its authority and, 
therefore, that there is a general moral obligation to obey the law.  As Raz has articulated 
the view (and the forward-entailment problem) as follows: “If there is no general obligation 
                                                          
40 For a similar point, see William A. Edmundson, Three Anarchical Fallacies: An Essay 
on Political Authority (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 8. 
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to obey the law, then the law does not have general authority, for to have authority is to 
have a right to rule those who are subject to it.  And a right to rule entails a duty to obey.”41  
So if we accept forward entailment, we accept that a judgment that a state is politically 
legitimate requires an inference that there is a general moral obligation to obey the law of 
that state.   
Forward entailment has created significant difficulties for defenders of the state.  If 
we accept forward entailment, we also have to accept that if there is no general moral 
obligation to obey the law, then, by modus tollens, the state is not legitimate and has no 
right to rule.  Exploiting forward entailment has been the basic strategy of anarchist 
thinkers over the past four decades.  For example, Robert Paul Wolff famously argues that 
a moral obligation to obey the law is at odds with the moral requirement that “we 
acknowledge responsibility and achieve autonomy wherever and whenever possible.”42  
Wolff uses that requirement to defeat any general moral obligation to obey the law and 
therefore any possibility of a politically legitimate state: 
If all men have a continuing obligation to achieve the highest degree of 
autonomy possible, then there would appear to be no state whose subjects 
                                                          
41 Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, 341.  Raz’s own view is reasonably interpreted as 
being that the right to rule and legitimacy need not be general but can be partial in the sense 
that those moral attributes of the state are the function of the number of people over whom 
the state has authority and the extent to which it has authority over those individuals 
considered one-by-one.  For an explanation of Raz’s view to that effect, see Perry, 
“Political Authority and Political Obligation,” 8.  A view that recognizes partial moral 
authority like Raz’s and my own can avoid the forward-entailment problem even though it 
accepts the entailment relationships that exist between Hohfeldian correlates, which I will 
explain later in this chapter. 
42 Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (University of California Press, 1998), 17. 
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have a moral obligation to obey its commands.  Hence, the concept of a de 
jure legitimate state would appear to be vacuous . . . .43  
A. John Simmons also exploits the apparent logical relationship between political 
legitimacy and a general moral obligation to obey the law and legitimacy.  Simmons’s 
argument is straightforward: None of the traditional accounts of political obligation can 
explain why any or all citizens are obligated to obey the laws of their state.  In light of 
those failures, we are forced to “deny[] that there are any governments which are legitimate 
(or which are legitimate with respect to a large number of citizens).”44 
 Defenders of the state have attempted to rescue the possibility and actually of 
political legitimacy by severing the forward-entailment relationship between political 
legitimacy and the moral obligation to obey the law.  The basic strategy is to articulate a 
less robust conception of political legitimacy, one that does not rest on a general moral 
power to bind one’s subjects.45   The strategy of rejecting forward-entailment is a viable 
                                                          
43 Ibid., 19. 
44 A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton University 
Press, 1979), 195-96.  Simmons thinks that a robust form of consent could ground an 
obligation to obey.  But, it is unlikely that any and definitely not all citizens consent to such 
a thing. 
45 Scott Shapiro has described this strategy as “weakening the concept of authority.”  Scott 
J. Shapiro, “Authority,” in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, 
ed. Jules Coleman and Scott J. Shapiro (Oxford University Press, 2002), 393-94.  
Edmundson also seems to understand the matter that way. Edmundson, Three Anarchical 
Fallacies, 35-44.  One might quibble that this is more a weakening of the concept of 
political legitimacy, not political authority.  Nonetheless, as will be urged below, the 
paradigm understanding of authority is a moral power to change the moral situation.  See 
Perry, “Political Authority and Political Obligation,” 1.  Some of the watered-down 
conceptions of political legitimacy still attribute moral powers to legitimate states, just not 
the general moral power to obligate.  Thus, it would be fair also to describe them as 
conceptions of political authority.   
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strategy because the right to rule is not a univocal concept.  As I noted earlier, there are a 
host of Hohfeldian rights that might constitute the legitimate state’s right to rule. 
A common proposal is that the state’s right to rule does not consist in a general 
moral power but instead a general moral right to use coercion to enforce the law.  Theorists 
seem to differ on the precise Hohfeldian nature of such a right, either a privilege-right or a 
claim-right.  Here, I discuss some of those views with the goal of showing that they are 
both conceptually and morally problematic.  They may be conceptually problematic to the 
extent that such accounts inadvertently invoke moral powers and thereby face most of the 
same problems that they seek to avoid.  They are also morally problematic insofar as they 
commit to the view that the state can force a person to comply with a law, and even punish 
them for disobeying such a law, even where the person had no obligation to do so.  
As noted, in Law’s Empire, Dworkin argues that under certain conditions there is a 
moral obligation to obey the law.  Recall that such an obligation is an “associative 
obligation” that arises within human associations that satisfy certain conditions.  Before 
Dworkin presents that account, he explains why the question of the moral obligation to 
obey the law is so important for questions about the legitimacy of the state: “no general 
policy of upholding the law with steel could be justified if the law were not, in general, a 
source of genuine obligations.”46  Call that Dworkin’s Point.  Dworkin’s Point is that the 
question of whether the state has a right to use coercion to enforce a law cannot be separated 
from the question of whether individuals have a moral obligation to abide by that law.  If 
an individual has no obligation to follow a law and does no moral wrong in violating that 
                                                          
46 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 191. 
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law, then the state cannot be permitted to coerce them to do so.  The state cannot rightfully 
uphold the law with steel unless it has some moral right to demand one’s compliance with 
its law.  Thus, a general moral obligation to obey the law must be part of the basis for any 
general moral right to force compliance with the law. 
Dworkin is correct.  Building off Kant, my view is that the moral right to equal 
freedom makes legitimate political institutions morally necessary.  In light of their purpose 
of securing equal freedom, those institutions must be enabled with a variety of rights, 
including both a broad moral power to alter our moral situation through the public issuance 
of laws and a moral right to extract compliance with those laws.  Any right to employ 
coercion therefore cannot be legitimized separately from the state’s moral power to bind.  
As Arthur Ripstein has put the point in presenting the Kantian view, “the state’s claim to 
authority is inseparable from the rationale for coercion.”47 
In light of the sustained and mostly successful attacks on the idea that there could 
be a general moral obligation to obey the law, a significant contingent of political theorists 
have come to reject Dworkin’s Point.  According to such theorists, a state’s political 
legitimacy consists in its holding a general right to uphold the law with coercion without 
its holding a general moral power to create morally binding laws.  Christopher Wellman 
summarizes one variant of the view as follows: 
[P]olitical theorists often suppose political legitimacy and political 
obligation to be inseparable insofar as they are logical correlates of one 
                                                          
47 Arthur Ripstein, “Authority and Coercion,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 32, no. 1 
(2004): 2. 
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another.  This is a mistake.  The correlative of a state’s right to coerce is not 
a citizen’s moral duty to obey: it is a citizen’s lack of right to not be coerced.  
Political legitimacy entails only the moral liberty to create legally binding 
rules, not the power to create morally binding rules.48   
A moral liberty is just another term for a Hohfeldian moral privilege.  Political legitimacy, 
on this account, does not entail a moral power to change the moral situation through the 
issuance of legal rules.  Rather, it simply consists in a moral privilege to enforce valid laws.  
The legitimate state can have a right to force you to comply with the law without you 
having any moral obligation to do what it demands.  The benefit is that such a view does 
not entail a general moral obligation to obey the law.  The expectation then is that such a 
view can avoid the pitfalls attendant to that sort of obligation, along with the modus tollens 
attack that undermines the legitimacy of the state. 
Versions of this view have been around for some time now.  Robert Ladenson was 
an early proponent, arguing that the state’s right to rule consists in a moral privilege, 
specifically a moral privilege to use force to uphold the law.49  On his view, the state has 
the privilege to uphold the law with force if it has uncontested de facto power to maintain 
peace and order.  Its possession of that privilege is justified by its ability to maintain general 
                                                          
48 Christopher Wellman, “Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation,” Ethics 111, 
no. 4 (2001): 741.  Adherents to variants of this view include: Allen Buchanan, “Political 
Legitimacy and Democracy,” Ethics 112, no. 4 (July 2002): 703; Christopher W. Morris, 
An Essay on the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 106; 
Robert Ladenson, “In Defense of a Hobbesian Conception of Law,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs, 1980, 137-38. 
49 More accurately, Ladenson says that the right to rule is a “justification right.”  Ladenson, 
“In Defense of a Hobbesian Conception of Law,” 139.  It is clear, however, that he is 
invoking a privilege right. 
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peace and order through sanctions.  Although the state is privileged to use force to uphold 
the law, no one else is so privileged.50  There are several perceived benefits of such an 
account.  First, where the state has a general privilege-right to rule it has no duty to anyone 
not to enforce the law generally or in specific instances.  Even if an individual does not 
have an obligation to obey a particular law, the state supposedly does not violate that 
individual’s rights when it enforces that law against them.  They are not wronged by the 
state upholding its laws with force.  Second, and more importantly, there is no general 
moral obligation to obey the law.  While the state has a privilege to enforce legal 
obligations, there is no automatic moral obligation to abide by those legal obligations.  That 
would only follow from the state’s possession of an equally broad moral power to impose 
obligations.  
Wellman’s account follows the same basic structure.  He conceives of the state’s 
right to rule in terms of a privilege to issue legal rules that are coercively enforceable.  Like 
Ladenson, he offers a substantive moral argument that identifies the moral grounds for that 
right.  Wellman dubs that argument “samaritanism.”  On the samaritan account, the state 
benefits individuals by rescuing them from the perils of the state of nature, a circumstance 
in which there is no security and no chance for a meaningful life.  That rescue is achieved 
by issuing and coercively enforcing laws, thereby providing political stability.  No other 
institution, for example, a private corporation or a free market, could realistically supply 
that benefit.  What is more, because individuals have a positive right to be rescued from 
the state of nature, legal actors (or primordial legal actors) with the de facto power to 
                                                          
50 Ibid., 137-38. 
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perform the rescue have a positive responsibility to secure that benefit for individuals.51  
They have a moral duty to exercise the privilege to secure the benefit.    
It is notable and commendable that those accounts straightforwardly fit within the 
basic moral-task framework I have outlined.  Legal actors are enabled with a general 
privilege-right to uphold the law with force in virtue of their moral responsibility and de 
facto capacity to secure peace and order.  In light of that de facto capacity, legal actors have 
a general moral permission and privilege to uphold the law with force because they have a 
general responsibility to maintain peace and order.  The argument is instrumental in 
character.  The core difference with accounts of the right to rule that entail a general moral 
obligation to obey, however, is that a different Hohfeldian element seems to be invoked. 
The privilege-centric view is subject to conceptual uncertainty.  There are two 
reasonable ways to interpret the privilege-centric view just described.  On the first, 
interpretation, although such views attempt to abstain from Hohfeldian powers, they 
unwittingly invoke such powers.  On the second interpretation, the state possess a general 
privilege to coerce its citizens and individual laws serve simply as fair warnings about 
when the state is going to use force.52  That view, however, paints a non-standard picture 
of the law.  
The privilege-centric account says that the right to rule is a privilege, not a moral 
power.  On the first understanding of what is going on, that is not the case.  To make that 
point clear, let me describe what happens on my own account when the state exercises its 
                                                          
51 Wellman, “Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation,” 742-47. 
52 I thank Stephen Perry for suggesting this alternative interpretation. 
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legitimate moral authority and issues a legal rule or directive, specifically an obligation-
imposing one.  In that case, the state is exercising its moral power by exercising its legal 
power to impose legal obligations.  When it does so, its obligation-imposing legal 
directives are morally binding and morally enforceable.  What does that mean?  The 
legitimate state’s exercise of its moral power in this case has several intended 
consequences.  First, the state has imposed a moral obligation in virtue of its legislative 
action.  But that is not all.  Second, the state now has created a claim-right to enforce that 
law.  What that means is that the state has a right against interference with the enforcement 
of that law and that individuals subject to the law now have a correlative obligation not to 
interfere with the enforcement of that law.  Finally, the state now has a moral privilege to 
uphold that law with force, meaning that it does no wrong in enforcing that law.53  Before 
its legal enactment, the state did not have that privilege.  
 Notice that the account that I have just described also invokes a moral privilege to 
enforce the law.  The moral privilege to enforce a law stems from the creation of that law 
and accompanies the moral obligation to abide by that law.  Also notice that the privilege-
centric accounts described above do not simply say that the legitimate state has a general 
privilege to use coercion to do whatever it desires, or even simply to bring about peace and 
order.54  Rather, any privilege to use coercion comes into existence as the result of a duly 
                                                          
53 I am not suggesting that there are not other changes in the moral situation that would be 
consistent with this account.  For example, we might argue that in virtue of that law, the 
state now has a moral obligation to enforce that law.  These, however, are the most relevant 
changes for the present discussion. 
54 Justin Bernstein has suggested to me that Ladenson is better interpreted as arguing that 
the state’s right to rule is simply a moral privilege to use coercion to uphold peace and 
order rather than a moral privilege to use coercion to enforce the law.  Ladenson’s view is 
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exercised power to create legal rules.  What that means is that the right to rule that Wellman 
and Ladenson would have described is not simply a moral privilege.  Instead, it is a moral 
power to create moral privileges through the issuance of legal rules.  So, even on the 
privilege-centric account, the state is exercising a moral power and changing the moral 
situation when it issues a legal directive.  When the legitimate state issues a law, it creates 
a moral privilege to enforce that law, thereby changing the moral situation.  Obviously the 
state is creating a moral privilege, not a moral obligation.  But, it is a moral privilege that 
is derivative of an antecedent moral power to change the moral situation.  Therefore, what 
Wellman and Ladenson would have described are really exercises of moral powers rather 
then simply moral privileges. And the products of those exercises are morally binding 
regardless of whether they are obligations or some other Hohfeldian incident. 
On the second interpretation, the state possess a general moral privilege the create 
laws and to coerce its citizens, a privilege that is justified generally by the need to secure 
peace and order.  On this account, laws serve merely as fair warnings about how the state 
is going to use force.  Hart described such a view as the “external point of view” of law; it 
is the point of view of the individual who is only concerned to abide by the law to avoid 
unpleasant consequences and the point of view of the person who does not believe in the 
                                                          
fairly abstract and therefore difficult to grasp, and that is not an unreasonable interpretation.  
Nonetheless, I think Ladenson is best interpreted as describing a moral privilege to enforce 
the law.  Such a moral privilege is justified in virtue of the state’s ability and need to bring 
about peace and order.  That interpretation is more plausible because Ladenson claims to 
be offering a “conception of law” that engages with views proffered by Hart and Dworkin 
about obligation-imposing legal rules.  So, he is offering an account of what he takes to be 
the conceptual core of legal authority and legal rules. 
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moral legitimacy such laws.55  The difficulty with the privilege-centric view, then, would 
be that notwithstanding whether the external point of view could be a plausible 
conceptualization of the nature of such laws, it could hardly be a plausible understanding 
of anything that looks like political legitimacy.  To some extent, political legitimacy has to 
be understood from the point of view of someone who believes that the state can actually 
be just, and the external point of view does not support that basic picture. 
With those more-conceptual issues out of the way, we can think more clearly about 
whether such a view would evade any of the criticisms faced by the general moral 
obligation to obey the law.  One difficulty had to do with the notion that such an obligation 
improperly involved being subject to the will of someone or something other than oneself.  
The first interpretation still faces that problem.  Moral powers, as a conceptual matter, 
involve the willful and intentional exercise of a right to change the moral situation.  A 
moral power to create a privilege runs into that same problem.  That difficulty attends to 
any exercise of authority by the state over its subjects.   
A second difficulty involves the claim that the moral obligation to obey the law 
requires individuals to act according to someone else’s judgment of what should be done.  
Later in this dissertation, I will say more about whether enabling the state with a moral 
power to impose obligations actually demands that individuals give up their own 
independent judgment, at least in any way that should be of concern.  Nonetheless, any 
privilege-centric view does not take us far from that problem.  On the privilege-centric 
                                                          
55 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, ed. Joseph Raz and Penelope A. Bulloch, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 89-91. 
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view, the state achieves its end of securing peace and order by backing up any demands 
with threats to impose serious sanctions for non-compliance.  People do not like jail or 
substantial fines.  The state gets people to do what it wants not by giving them a mandatory 
moral reason but by giving them a sufficiently weighty self-interest-based practical reason 
to follow the law.  With the use of either “technique,”56 however, the individual has no real 
option to act in accordance with their own independent judgment of what should be done 
because the state has demanded otherwise.  So, individuals would still not be permitted to 
do what they would otherwise do if they acted according to their own judgment of what 
should be done. 
The privilege-centric view also faces the same instrumental concerns faced by 
views that assert general moral powers.  Hume urged that we are bound to obey the law 
“because society could not otherwise subsist.”57  The plain difficulty with that view, 
however, is that the subsistence of society does not hang in the balance like that.  The law 
can tolerate some level of non-compliance without ending up in ruin, so complete or 
general compliance is not necessary to that end.58  Hume’s argument does not adequately 
                                                          
56 Green has emphasized that authority to impose obligations is simply one technique 
among others that the state can employ to get people to change their behavior.  Leslie 
Green, The Authority of the State (Clarendon Press, 1988), 63. 
57 David Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” in Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. 
Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985), 481.  Along similar lines, Hume 
wrote, “society cannot possibly be maintained without the authority of magistrates, and 
that this authority must soon fall into contempt where exact obedience is not paid to it. The 
observation of these general and obvious interests is the source of all allegiance, and of that 
moral obligation which we attribute to it.” Ibid., 480. 
58 As Leslie Green notes, “[l]aw does not in fact enjoy exact obedience, and disobedience 
in certain small or unjust things does not bring cities to ruin.”  Leslie Green, “Law and 
Obligations,” in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, edited by 
Jules Coleman and Scott J. Shapiro, Oxford University Press, 2002, 537. Edmundson 
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support a general obligation to obey the law.  The privilege-centric approach fairs no better 
on that score.  Although political stability is a laudable end, and the state might be 
legitimized in part based on its ability to secure that end, it is unclear why a general content-
independent privilege to uphold the law in all cases is necessary to secure that end.  It 
would seem that the state could still achieve that end without the privilege to enforce every 
law in every single case. 
 Recall the price that is paid by replacing the notion that the state’s legitimacy 
consists in a general moral power to impose obligations with the notion that the state’s 
legitimacy simply amounts to a general moral privilege to uphold the law with force.  
Privilege-centric views have to reject Dworkin’s Point that the right to use force has to be 
predicated on the moral right to demand compliance or some other basis for asserting that 
one has an obligation to obey a particular law.  The privilege-centric view does not really 
avoid any of the problems faced by the general moral obligation to obey the law and faces 
its own problem.  So, there is little reason to pay the price of denying Dworkin’s Point. 
 Before sketching a different deflationary account of the state’s right to rule, I want 
to press two points.  First, obviously it is important to keep in mind objections to the duty 
to obey when crafting one’s own view.  But the driving force behind any theory of political 
                                                          
echoes that when he says that, “[t]he main objection is that civilization as a we know it 
simply does not hang in the balance every time one of us jaywalks.”  Edmundson, Three 
Anarchical Fallacies, 28.  Neither is it the case that the resolutions of many important 
moral tasks, such as maintaining an adequate social minimum, are completely undermined 
without full conformity.  As Simmons remarks, “Legal systems tolerate quite impressive 
levels of noncompliance without performing the tasks in question interestingly less well 
(than they would with greater compliance).”  Christopher Wellman and John Simmons, Is 
There a Duty to Obey the Law? (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 136. 
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legitimacy should not be a desire simply to respond to possible objections.  We should 
always keep in mind that political legitimacy is about the state having a moral purpose.  
Any account of its rights should derive from that purpose, not the need to skirt objections.  
Second, in offering a competing conception of political legitimacy, we need to do more 
than simply craft a conception that looks different on the Hohfeldian surface.  We need to 
be sure not to face the same exact problems that we sought to avoid.   
Seeking to avoid the apparent difficulties with what I have described as forward 
entailment, William Edmundson also proposes a different conception of political 
legitimacy that emphasizes the coercive enforcement of the law.  On his account, the state’s 
political legitimacy consists instead in its possessing a general claim-right to one’s 
compliance with the direct orders of legal actors (e.g., “Stop the car now!”; “You are 
ordered to pay a $5 fine.”), in contrast with one’s compliance with more generalized legal 
rules (e.g., “Driver’s must stop at all stop signs.”; “The penalty for putting your garbage 
out before 5 p.m. shall be $5.”).  The legitimate state also has a general claim-right to non-
interference with such orders and the forceful administration of such orders.59  
Edmundson’s reasons for why such a view avoids the difficulties that attend to the general 
moral obligation to obey the law are opaque.  The primary reason seems to be that “[i]n 
general, it is harder to have an assurance of harmlessness when [disobeying] a traffic cop, 
rather than a traffic law.”60  Because of “the relative directness of administrative [orders],” 
“a train of consequences” “more firmly attaches to disobedience” of such orders.61  Similar 
                                                          
59 Edmundson, Three Anarchical Fallacies, 48-70.  
60 Ibid., 50. 
61 Ibid. 
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difficulties as those noted above face such a view.  That aside, Edmundson’s view faces 
difficulties.  First, what he has described is not really a claim-right but some sort of moral 
power to issue orders that require obedience and non-interference.  Thus, any apparent 
difficulties with moral powers should be reproduced here.  But, second, even if we assume 
that harmful consequences can stem from ignoring or violating a direct order, it is unclear 
that we should attribute such consequences to the lawbreaker rather than the legal actors 
enforcing the order.  If there is no obligation to stop at a desert stop sign in the first place, 
any harmful consequences that result from fleeing from police enforcing that law are not 
the fault of the motorist but rather the police.62  In fact, the account lays bare the basic point 
that Dworkin made: forceful administration of a law that one had no obligation to follow 
in the first place seems like a illegitimate abuse of de facto political power.63  It is a mark 
on the character of the state or its agents, not the lawbreaker. 
Next, I will outline a modest view of political legitimacy that strikes me as a more 
intuitive way to account for the idea that imperfect states can be politically legitimate, a 
way that does not demand that all of a state’s laws or actions be legitimized in virtue of the 
state itself being legitimate.  I will use views presented by Alan Buchanan and Rawls to 
articulate the position, and I will suggest that the model I propose is a better way of 
understanding their own views. 
                                                          
62 One might also object that reliance on the consequences of disobedience makes the 
account depend on the independent moral merits of the action proscribed by law. 
63 Perry has offered a similar critique of the argument that one should obey the law because 
to do otherwise is to set a bad example.  The problem is that disobeying the law only sets 
a bad example if one had an obligation to obey it in the first place.  Perry, “Political 
Authority and Political Obligation,” 19. 
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1.3 - A Threshold Model of Political Legitimacy 
 Most people do not do their jobs perfectly.  But, if a person does their job well 
enough, they have a right to keep their job.  For any given job, a person has certain defined 
responsibilities, and is provided with certain tools or abilities so as to effectuate those 
responsibilities.  If they do an adequate enough job satisfying their responsibilities, then 
they have a claim to stay in or keep the job.  They have a right to continue to use the tools 
and abilities provided to them in an effort to satisfy their responsibilities as best they can.  
That right is held against any individuals who would strip them of that job or severely 
impair them in their ability to do that job.  The up-to-par worker would have a rightful 
grievance or complaint if they were stripped of their job.  Something that rightfully 
belonged to them and that they deserved to keep was taken away.  
 The language of claims and complaints invokes the notion of a Hohfeldian claim-
right.  A claim-right stands in a correlative logical relationship with a duty.64  If A has a 
claim right against B to state of affairs X, then B has a duty to A to ensure state of affairs 
X.  For example, if Alice’s job is to stock shelves, and she generally does a good job, she 
has a claim-right to her job.  Others have a correlative duty not to strip her of that job.  She 
has a right to continue to take on her shelving responsibilities.  She would have a claim or 
                                                          
64 Stephen Darwall, following Joel Feinberg, seems to understand claim-rights in a more 
robust way.  According to Darwall, a claim-right includes a moral power to demand.  
Stephen L. Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability 
(Harvard University Press, 2006), 8.  Here, I understand claim rights along Hohfeldian 
lines. 
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complaint against anyone who would strip or try to strip her of her job.  That is so even 
though she admittedly makes mistakes.65  
 What does this have to do with a state’s right to rule?  As I noted earlier, states also 
have jobs.  In fact, states perform morally necessary jobs or services, and certain rights 
attach to them in virtue of those responsibilities.  Throughout this dissertation, I will speak 
more extensively about the different species of rights that states can posses in virtue of 
their specific moral responsibilities.  But suffice to say, a claim-right-to-keep-the job 
account of the right to rule is available.  In the chapters that follow, I will argue that the 
fundamental job of the state is to secure the freedom of individuals to live independently 
of each other in ways that are consistent with each and every other individual’s freedom.  
The state’s right to use the law for that purpose is crucial.  On the threshold account of the 
right to rule, insofar as the state, or whatever relevant legal entity, is doing an adequate job 
at securing freedom, meaning that it has satisfied a certain threshold for keeping the job 
that is specified by its job description, then it has a claim to keep its job. 
What I have described is a normatively weak notion.  The threshold account is 
normatively weak because there is no claim that any particular action of the jobholder is 
correct or that the jobholder has a right to perform any particular action.  The jobholder is 
not beyond reproach.  If the shelf stocker created a dangerous condition by leaving cans on 
the floor, then one would be able to pick them up and offer criticism.  Or, if a store manager 
                                                          
65 Another way of expressing the point is that the jobholder deserves to keep the job in 
virtue of doing what is an adequate job.  For example, we would say that a student who 
passes her courses deserves to continue in her major.  Or, someone who is a good but not 
great parent can still assert that they deserve to be a parent. 
 
 
42 
mistakenly told an employee to sell a product at an obviously incorrect price, then the 
manager should be corrected.  The same holds for the state. 
The fact that it was the rightful jobholder’s job should not cause us to ignore the 
jobholder’s mistakes.  Instead, there is simply a claim that the person lives up to the 
previously defined responsibilities of the job to a sufficient extent.  They have a right to 
keep the job in virtue of doing an adequate job, notwithstanding that they will do things 
incorrectly or irresponsibly at times, though within limits.66  There is a commonsense, and 
even reasonable, expectation that they will not be perfect.  We can say as much about states, 
the law, or political officials.  In such cases, we have to be careful about who or what we 
are attributing the mistake to.  A theory of legitimacy that demanded perfection for any of 
them simple to stay in the job would be unrealistic and unreasonable. 
The threshold model invokes a kind of moral right, which means that it is a 
normatively weak candidate for how we can understand the right to rule, or the legitimacy 
of a state.  So, the threshold model of legitimacy is distinct from a mere claim that the state 
possesses some less-definite positive moral value.  In the last few decades, A. John 
Simmons probably has done the most to dispel any beliefs in the general obligation to obey 
the law or the legitimacy of modern states, while at the same time deflating the moral 
significance of those conclusions.  According to Simmons, “the traditional notion of 
governmental legitimacy . . . is not really at the center of the important problems in political 
philosophy.”67  That conclusion does not leave us without any meaningful ways to 
                                                          
66 One virtue of the model is that it is flexible.  Where the state does make mistakes, we 
can assess either or both the quality and quantity of its mistakes.   
67 Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, 199-200. 
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distinguish between good and bad governments.  Governments can still broadly possess, 
or not possess, whatever political virtues we expect them to possess, for example, justice, 
fairness, goodness, integrity, and so on.  Those qualities, however, merely serve to 
distinguish between governments that deserve our support and those that do not, rather than 
between governments that have a moral right to rule and those that do not.68  
Built into Simmons’s point is his well-known distinction between the justification 
of the state and the legitimacy of the state.  According to Simmons, we provide a 
justification of the state “by showing that some realizable type of state is on balance 
morally permissible (or ideal) and that it is rationally preferable to all feasible nonstate 
alternatives.”69  Justification on Simmons’s account is comparative in nature.  The basic 
idea is that life in a state can be morally preferable to some other state of affairs, say life in 
a state of nature, or life in a neighboring morally less preferable state.70  One’s state can 
thus be morally justified even if it does not have all or any of the moral rights to rule that 
it claims for itself.  Simmons admits that states do morally important, perhaps morally 
necessary things, but whether they have any moral rights with respect to those subject to 
their laws and legal actions is quite a different story. 
A justification contrasts with a showing of legitimacy:  
                                                          
68 Ibid., 198.  This connects with Simmons critique of accounts of political legitimacy that 
rely on the natural duty to support just institutions.  We can have a duty to support a just 
state regardless of whether it has any right to rule. 
69 Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, 125-26.  
70 As well as the state/no-state comparison, a justification of the state might involve a good-
state/bad-state comparison or a good-state/better-state comparison. 
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A state’s (or government’s) legitimacy is the complex moral right it 
possesses to be the exclusive imposer of binding duties on its subjects, to 
have its subjects comply with these duties, and to use coercion to enforce 
the duties. . . . A state’s “legitimacy right” is in part a right held specifically 
against the subjects bound by any state-imposed duties, arising from 
morally significant relations . . . between state and subject.71   
That is the traditional understanding of the right to rule.  As should be clear at this point, it 
is not the only conception of legitimacy.  The traditional view is standardly associated with 
the related idea that individuals living under a legitimate state have a general moral 
obligation to obey the law and that the state has a general moral right to uphold all of its 
laws with force.   
Accounts of legitimacy in the literature often elide the distinction that Simmons 
draws.72  For example, G.A. Cohen contends that legitimacy is “the property that 
something has when, to put it roughly, no one has the right to complain about its character, 
or, perhaps a little less roughly, when no one has a just grievance against it.”73  Those 
characterizations, however, are too broad.  On the one hand, it seems over-inclusive.  An 
individual might have no right to complain because they cannot do anything to rectify an 
                                                          
71 Ibid., 130. 
72 Simmons has his own views about which theorists and theories elide the distinction, and 
discusses a number of such theories.  I do not agree with him in all cases even though I 
agree that he has articulated an important distinction.  For example, Simmons believes that 
Kant’s theory of the state is justificatory in nature.  The view that I present here is Kantian 
and definitely has the form of a theory of political legitimacy. 
73 G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays in Political 
Philosophy (Princeton University Press, 2011), 125.   
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unjust situation or because they may do more harm in attempting to do so.  That would not 
be legitimacy, and it might not even be a justification.  On the other hand, an individual 
might have a right to complain and have a just grievance because the state is acting beyond 
the scope of any of the legitimate moral rights that it has or is capable of having.  
Nonetheless, then the account does not explain what legitimacy is but merely identifies the 
types of attitudes or responses that are appropriate to direct toward the state when it acts 
outside of the scope of its legitimate right to rule.  
What is key to an account being one of political legitimacy is not the particular set 
of moral rights described by Simmons.  Instead, what makes political legitimacy distinct 
from mere justification is that political legitimacy invokes moral rights.  The state or a 
particular state is not merely justified when it has certain moral enabling rights to rule.  At 
the most abstract level, a state’s political legitimacy just is a right to rule.  But, as we have 
seen, accounts of political legitimacy can very dramatically according to what sorts of 
moral rights the legitimate state could or should possess. 
The threshold model of the right to rule is not a justification of the state but a 
normatively weak account of political legitimacy.  Notice, first, that it is not comparative 
in nature.  There is no comparison to a state of affairs in which the person performs her job 
perfectly.  Nor is there a comparison to a state of affairs in which the person does not 
discharge any of the responsibilities of the job at all.  Nor is there any comparison to a state 
of affairs in which someone else performs the job better.  Such comparisons would tell us 
whether some state of affairs would be better or worse.  But they would not tell us whether 
the jobholder has any claim to keep his job or not.  The job holder is assessed according to 
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a certain threshold standard that determines whether they are performing their 
responsibilities adequately or not, and therefore whether they have a right to keep their job 
or not.  Second, the account provides a moral argument for a specific moral right that 
attaches to an individual or entity that is performing a job.  Any account of political 
legitimacy has to identify the specific right or combination of specific rights that constitute 
a state’s right to rule.  The threshold model identifies a specific right, a claim-right to 
continue in the job. 
A claim that a particular state possesses some form of legitimacy serves to 
distinguish the legitimate state from a slaveholder or a highway gunman.  A mere 
justification of a state cannot do that.  Begin with the slaveholder, a benevolent slaveholder.  
The benevolent slaveholder is independently wealthy and runs a large farm that provides 
fresh produce for free to local families.  He uses slaves to get the job done.  The slaveholder 
rules over his slaves; he tells them what to do and lives off of their labor.  This slaveholder 
treats his slaves well.  The work hours are reasonable and the work is not particularly hard.  
The room and board is not just adequate, but downright luxurious.  The slaves live in the 
finest quarters and eat the finest food.  Nonetheless, if a slave disobeys or seeks freedom, 
the consequences range from beatings, death, or being sold off to another slaveholder who 
is not benevolent. 
There is nothing legitimate about the slaveholder.  He has no right to rule over those 
he deems his property.  His commands carry no moral weight.  They are “mere demand[s],” 
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as Joel Feinberg would say.74  But his slaves can justify living under his rule.  The 
slaveholder’s support of local families is of significant moral value.  And, the alternatives 
to obeying his demands are beatings, death, or becoming the property of an even worse 
slaveholder.  Yet, it does not matter at all that a slave is better off going along with his say 
so or that the enterprise does moral good for local families.  We don’t want merely to justify 
the state along similar lines because we do not want to place it in the same realm as the 
benevolent slaveholder. 
A gunman situation can also be used to prove the same point.  Hart famously 
deployed the case of the highway gunman to show that John Austin’s theory that laws are 
merely commands backed by threats mischaracterized legal authority as the gunman 
situation writ large.75  We can make a related point with respect to the moral authority of 
the state.  The gunman does not have any sort of right to force you to give up your money.  
Nor does the gunman have any sort of right generally to continue in the job of being a 
gunmen.  If faced with a gunman, however, we often have good reason to comply with 
their demands.  Giving up one’s money is a rational response when the alternative is death.  
And, there may be moral reasons to abide by the demand too.  Perhaps you have a child to 
care for.  Perhaps the gunman has informed you that he is going to use the money to pay 
for medicine for his ailing wife, and you would just spend it on beer.  Despite some 
justification, none of those reasons give him the right to your money though.  Defending 
                                                          
74 Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty: Essays in Social Philosophy 
(Princeton University Press, 1980), 152. 
75 Hart, The Concept of Law, 7. 
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the legitimacy rather than the justification of state action serves to insulate the state from 
the charge that it is really just the gunman situation writ large. 
The comparison between the state and a person with a job is not perfect.  There are 
a few important differences.  In fact, the state’s right to keep its job can be seen as more 
robust than that of your average worker.  For one, when we speak about the state we may 
be referring to a number of things that form part of a complex entity.  In the case of the 
state or the legal system, we are speaking generally about a complex organization of 
persons operating according to a complex set of rules.  To use David Copp’s helpful 
description, the state is a “system of animated institutions that govern [a] territory and its 
residents, and that administer and enforce the legal system and carry out the programs of 
government.”76⁠  To say that the institutions are “animated” is to say that “flesh-and-blood” 
people fill and act within the offices and roles that are necessary for governance by a legal 
system.77  Thus, we could sensibly speak about an individual legal official’s right to keep 
her job, or a political/legal institution’s right to keep its job, or the legal system’s right to 
keep its job, or the state as a whole’s right to keep it’s job.  That is not just a technical 
point.  States and legal systems are not monolithic things that we can only evaluate in 
totem.  We should not expect massive and complex modern states to possess robust forms 
of legitimacy that exist independently of the legitimacy of their parts.  That fact sits well 
with the threshold model.  There is no need to legitimize every single thing a legitimate 
                                                          
76 David Copp, “The Idea of a Legitimate State,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 28, no. 1 
(1999): 7. 
77 Ibid., 6. Similarly, according to Hart, law is a complex social practice that is in part 
constituted by a complex relationship between the behaviors and attitudes of legal officials 
with legal rules.  Hart, The Concept of Law, 89-91. 
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state happens to do.  Or, every single thing any individual legal official happens to do.  For 
any state action, we must always ask whether it reasonably counts as the performance of 
the state’s job.  
A state’s claim to keep its job is also normatively different from your average case 
of a person’s right to keep their job in that the state’s right — actually any one of it’s rights 
— is held on behalf of those whom it serves.  Normally, your average worker has a claim 
to his job because he has certain personal (moral) interests in his job.78  He deserves it 
because he is doing well at it.  By contrast, the point of a state is to serve its subjects (or 
even people more globally) and to secure equal freedom on their behalf by legitimately 
exercising its rights to rule.  When it deserves its job, we would also say that the people 
whom it serves have a right to the state doing its job and staying in its job.  It is in virtue 
of the state’s moral responsibility to serve its subjects and to secure equal freedom that is 
has a claim to continue in its job so long as it does an adequate job.  When a given state 
makes a claim to keep its job, it is doing so on behalf of those whom it serves.  Its claim is 
therefore derivative of the moral rights of those whom it serves.79 
A number of plausible theories of political legitimacy in the literature seem to fit 
the basic contours of the modest threshold account I have just described, though perhaps 
unwittingly.  So I want to pause to discuss a few such theories, describe how they fit into 
                                                          
78 Most broadly, his job and his compensation secure his ability to pursue his conception 
of the good.  Jobs also have intrinsic value. 
79 There is a common criticism that the state could not have a right to rule because that 
would absurdly imply that the state is wronged when an individual violates the law.  That 
criticism fails insofar as the state possesses its right on behalf of others, namely those 
individuals who are wronged when one fails to abide by a legitimate law.   
 
 
50 
the model, and urge that such theories should be construed along those lines.  Such accounts 
offer a way to fill out the state’s threshold job description and to understand the threshold 
model more generally.  Alan Buchanan offers an account of political legitimacy that 
broadly fits the contours of the modest account of the legitimacy of the state: 
The central idea is this: a wielder of political power (the monopolistic 
making, application, and enforcement of laws in a territory) is legitimate 
(i.e., is morally justified in wielding political power) if and only if it (a) 
does a credible job of protecting at least the most basic human rights of all 
those over whom it wields power, (b) provides this protection through 
processes, policies, and actions that themselves respect the most basic 
human rights, and (c) is not a usurper (i.e., does not come to wield political 
power by wrongly deposing a legitimate wielder of political power).80  
Notice that the account centers on a threshold responsibility: protecting basic human rights 
and not violating basic human rights in the process of doing so.  Insofar as a state credibly 
lives up to that responsibility, it has a claim to stay in the job and to continue to use the 
means employed in generally doing the job, namely political power and its enabling rights 
to rule.  That includes issuing legal directives and upholding those directives with force.  
There is no requirement that the job be done perfectly, only that it be done credibly, which 
is to say that a certain threshold has been met.  Even the last criterion, that the wielder of 
                                                          
80 Buchanan, “Political Legitimacy and Democracy,” 703.  Notice that Buchanan conflates 
justification and legitimacy here.  Moreover, one reading of Buchanan is that he is offering 
a view akin to that offered by Wellman and Ladenson.  We can ignore those difficulties in 
light of the earlier discussions. 
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political power is not a usurper, meaning the state did not steal the job from some other 
entity that had a claim to the job, fits within the model I have described.  You cannot violate 
someone else’s right to the job and then seek to stand on the very same ground when your 
right is challenged.  Notice too how the account fits in the basic moral task framework 
discussed earlier.  The state has a job, specifically protecting and securing basic human 
rights.  And, it has a right to make, apply, and enforce law in order to do that job.  Moreover, 
we can say that such a state is minimally politically legitimate insofar as it is credibly 
discharging that moral responsibility to the extent identified by the threshold described in 
(a) and (b). 
 It is important to remain within the moral task framework even when simply 
offering a threshold account.  That is best exhibited by looking at a theory of legitimacy 
that identifies a threshold but does not explicitly present a moral task analysis.  Rawls offers 
a threshold-based account of legitimacy that does not fit into the moral task framework in 
a straightforward way but we can extrapolate to present one consistent with that offered by 
Buchanan.  Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy states that an “exercise of political 
power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the 
essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in 
the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.”81  The liberal 
                                                          
81 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 137.  Later, I will explain that despite the modesty of the 
liberal principle of legitimacy discussed here, the principle is also unreasonably 
overdemanding in that it requires that constitutional principles that all persons would 
reasonably endorse.  But the moral need for legal rules that can resolve reasonable 
disagreement is premised on the idea that not all reasonable persons will endorse the same 
principles.  So, we need an account that recognizes the need for authority to resolve 
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principle of legitimacy is used to determine whether a political regime is legitimate rather 
than whether it is fully just.82  A state must satisfy “constitutional essentials and questions 
of basic justice,” which is a threshold requirement.83  Rawls describes constitutional 
essentials along the following lines.  First, constitutional essentials include the 
“fundamental principles that specify the general structure of government and the political 
process,” including “the powers of the legislature, executive and the judiciary,” as well as 
“the scope of majority rule.”84  Second, constitutional essentials include the “equal basic 
rights and liberties of citizenship that legislative majorities are to respect.”85  That list of 
basic rights and liberties includes: freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of 
association, freedom of speech, the right to security and independence (including freedom 
of occupation and freedom of movement), a right to personal property, a right to a social 
                                                          
reasonable disagreement without the expectation that all persons would reasonably endorse 
every legislative or constitutional act.  
82John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 47.  That is clear from the fact that the principle does not require 
satisfaction of the second of Rawls’s two famous principles of justice, namely the 
difference principle, which requires fair equality of opportunity and social and economic 
equality unless inequality in those things would benefit the least advantaged.  Interestingly, 
one constitutional essential is that “careers [be] open to talents.”  Ibid.  In Theory of Justice 
Rawls rejects careers open to talents as a defensible interpretation of the difference 
principle, since it “permits distributive shares to be improperly influenced by . . . factors 
so arbitrary from a moral point of view.”  Rawls, Theory of Justice, 72.  That is an example 
of why the issue of legitimacy should not be confused with the issue of justice.  Rawls’s 
charge of moral arbitrariness, however, must be too strong if liberal legitimacy is not also 
to be guilty of permitting what is morally arbitrary.  Even legitimacy should seemingly be 
insulated from moral arbitrariness.  
83 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 227. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
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minimum that provides for basic needs, and the protections of the rule of law.86  In effect, 
the liberal principle of legitimacy identifies the features that a political regime must 
minimally possess, because it is its primary responsibility to secure those rights, before it 
counts as reasonably just and therefore legitimate.  Insofar as it satisfies that principle, 
apparently the state has a right to continue to exist and continue doing what it has been 
doing, but Rawls is not explicit on the point.87   
 Notice what Rawls does not say in describing the liberal principle of legitimacy.  
First, there is no explicit account of the moral point or job of the state in Rawls’s brief 
discussion.  The implicit idea seems to be that the state has to satisfy or secure 
constitutional essentials because it has a responsibility to secure those rights for its citizens.  
Insofar as it does that job, then it is legitimate.  Second, there is no moral argument for why 
the legitimate state, in light of its job and its adequately discharging its responsibilities, has 
the moral right to make, apply, and enforce legal rules.  That is surprising in light of the 
fact that Rawls maintains that the liberal principle of legitimacy is addressed to “two 
special features” of political institutions: political institutions are non-voluntary and 
“political power is always coercive power backed by the government’s use of sanctions, 
                                                          
86 Ibid., 227-29.  Although Buchanan refers to the need to protect “the most basic human 
rights,” he does not spell out the specifics of those rights beyond saying that there are 
“certain basic human interests [] of such profound moral importance that they merit the 
extraordinarily strong protection that the recognition of rights accords.”  Buchanan, 
“Political Legitimacy and Democracy,” 705.  We could interpret Rawls’s principle as 
identifying the specific basic human rights that must be protected.   
87 Earlier, I noted that for Rawls the more general point of a just state is to secure society 
as a fair system of social cooperation amongst equal persons.  That idea is not explicitly 
invoked in Rawls’s discussion of political legitimacy. 
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for government alone has the authority to use force in upholding its laws.”88  Those 
obviously are two central issues in discussions of political legitimacy.  Yet, the threshold 
requirements of the liberal principle of legitimacy address neither of those concerns. 
A modest account of political legitimacy does nothing more than identify a 
threshold standard that a given state or legal system must credibly meet to continue to have 
a right to continue in its job.  That seems to be the core idea in Buchanan and Rawls and 
the best way to defend such views.  A threshold account does not tell us that any particular 
exercise of political authority or power is legitimate.  It does not lend legitimacy to any 
particular exercise of political authority or power.  A state’s modest political legitimacy is 
consistent with significant failures at securing and protecting fairly basic rights so long as 
they do not happen regularly enough and are not particularly egregious.  So, a state’s right 
to keep its job does not legitimate everything it does.  Moreover, the modest account, as a 
formal matter, does not say anything about the nature of the particular rights the state might 
have beyond its right to continue in the job.  More work needs to be done on that for us to 
explain why the specific character of the state’s responsibilities require certain specific 
Hohfeldian rights to discharge those responsibilities. 
States obviously claim the general moral right to create morally binding legal rules 
and uphold those rules with force.  However, the modest account does not say that the 
modestly legitimate state has a general right to create morally binding laws or to enforce 
those laws.  It just says that it has the right to keep its job, which includes generally 
attempting to create moral obligations but perhaps failing.   
                                                          
88 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 135-36. 
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The modest account also does not justify or legitimize all of a state’s laws or 
exercises of force.  According to many theorists, states claim that all of their laws are 
morally binding.  That claim is most commonly associated with the claim that there is a 
general moral obligation to obey the law.  However, the modest account does not say that 
the modestly legitimate state has that moral power.  Nor does it identify the conditions 
under which a state’s demands are morally binding generally or in specific instances.  It 
merely identifies the threshold that a state must meet for it to keep its job. 
There is a tendency in political philosophy to think of states or legal systems as 
monolithic things.  If the state is legitimate, then all of the things that it does through its 
valid legal processes are legitimate.  The threshold model permits us to reject that view.  
Put differently, we need not hold on to forward entailment.  States, at least modern states, 
are not monolithic things like the primitive states discussed earlier.  Modern states consist 
of numerous branches of government, agencies, and bodies of law, not to mention the 
thousands of human legal actors that animate all of those institutions.  Each of those 
animated parts have their own jurisdiction or own roles in virtue of which they have certain 
rights to do certain things, each of which can reasonably be described as exercises of 
political authority.  Each of those animated parts make decisions on a daily basis.  Many 
may make responsible decisions.  Many may not.  There is not one ruler but many.  On any 
theory of legitimacy, we should be able to assess the legitimacy of any and all of those 
parts. 
There are perhaps reasons to think of states as indivisible entities.  For one, many 
political philosophers are in the business of ideal theory.  I don’t mean that in the sense that 
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their theories are built on idealized assumptions about the circumstances in which we live.  
There is obviously a lot of that type of theorizing, and there are legitimate reasons for 
engaging in that type of theorizing.  Some of that will probably happen in this dissertation.  
Instead, I mean to say that political philosophers are often in the business of painting a 
broad picture of the ideal that we should strive for.  In the case of the state, that would be 
the fully just state, one that, as a whole or systematically, always acts and organizes itself 
and all of its parts according to whatever our the ideal principles of justice demand.  In that 
case, it makes sense to speak about the state as a whole as if it is a unitary thing. 
More important though, according to a number of theorists, the state itself 
understands its authority in that manner.  It claims that those subject to its authority are 
bound by any and all of its laws equally unless it permits otherwise.  Its moral authority is 
comprehensive and systematic.  As John Finnis puts the point, the law “presents itself as a 
seamless web.  Its subjects are not permitted to pick and choose among the law’s 
prescriptions and stipulations.”89  In light of that, the task for political philosophers would 
seem to be to offer an account of the legitimacy or justice of a state that lives up to the 
state’s image of itself.  To be sure, that task is not primarily motivated by a need to preserve 
conceptual sincerity.  The law does not just claim that all of its laws are morally binding.  
It also claims the systematic right to uphold its laws with force.  The legitimacy of the 
                                                          
89 John Finnis, “Authority of Law in the Predicament of Contemporary Social Theory,” 
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 1 (1984): 120.  Elsewhere, Finnis 
makes a similar point: “[L]egal thought . . .  embodies the postulates that each obligation-
stipulating law is a member of a system of laws which cannot be weighed or played off one 
against the other but which constitute a set coherently applicable to all situations and which 
exclude all unregulated or private picking and choosing amongst the members of the set.”  
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 317.     
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state’s self-image is therefore not just a matter of conceptual analysis but of justifying the 
authority of the law to those who would face its worst consequences.  It is an attempt to 
address Dworkin’s Point. 
The threshold account does not tell us much beyond that there is a threshold job 
description beyond which a legal actor or entity gets to continue in its job.  Such a right 
protects it from revolution and actions that broadly undermine its ability to credibly do its 
job.  We work with and within such legitimate states rather than attempting to overthrow 
them.   
In not presupposing the idea that political legitimacy entails a general moral right 
to compliance with the law or a general moral right to uphold the law with force, the 
threshold model permits “a piecemeal approach to the question of the authority of 
governments,” as Raz puts it.90  For Raz that means, first, that the extent of the state’s 
authority can be partial and more limited than what the government claims, and, second, 
that its authority can vary from individual to individual.91  My own account rejects that 
latter claim insofar as part of the moral necessity of authoritative legal rules is to create 
reciprocal, meaning equally applicable to all persons, rights and responsibilities.  Raz’s 
piecemeal approach thus is at least in tension with the importance and assumption of 
equality in liberal political theory.  Nonetheless, we should accept that the state’s moral 
power to impose obligations and enforce them can be partial and limited by what we 
                                                          
90 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 80. 
91 Ibid.   
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identify as its moral responsibilities or tasks.  The threshold model of minimal political 
legitimacy fits with that picture.   
In the rest of this dissertation, I will broadly lay out what the state’s job is, the 
conditions under which it has the moral rights to rule that it claims, and why law is so 
important.  It is the legitimate exercise of those rights that lends to the state’s legitimacy 
on the threshold account.  To determine whether a state is credibly doing its job, we need 
to be able to assess broad categories of state activity, as well as its individual actions.  
Accordingly, we need to be able to identify when the state is actually doing its job.
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CHAPTER 2 - COORDINATING RIGHTS DESPITE DISAGREEMENT 
 In liberal political theory, rights have an important job to do — protecting the 
freedom and independence of the individuals who hold them.  This chapter is about the 
moral function of enforceable rights and how the law has a necessary practical role to play 
in securing those rights.  Because rights have a job to do, the law has a job to do.92  
The law is morally valuable and necessary for its dynamic nature, as well as its 
static nature.  The law is dynamic in that legal officials are empowered to exercise political 
authority to alter the moral landscape in a variety of ways over time.93  They do so, for 
example, by imposing obligations and conferring rights on those subject to their authority.  
That capacity is important in the face of changed circumstances, recognition that a previous 
legal solution is unworkable, or because regular discretion is required or valuable.  I will 
focus more on the dynamic character of the state’s authority in the next chapter, which 
focuses on the importance of political authority for achieving broader public ends, ends 
that do not straightforwardly implicate the personal sphere in which we live our lives. 
Here, I want to talk about how the law is also valuable and necessary for its static 
qualities.  The law settles disagreements, often permanently, and in doing so creates and 
                                                          
92 The idea that the law has a moral job or function is important in both the natural law and 
legal positivist traditions in jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Murphy, Natural Law in 
Jurisprudence and Politics, 25-60; Shapiro, Legality, 119 (“The[] function [of the 
fundamental rules of legal systems] is to structure legal activity so that participants can . . 
. achieve goods and realize values that would otherwise be unattainable.”); Joseph Raz, 
The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 
2009), 163-79. 
93 For similar points, see Hart’s discussion of secondary “rules of change,” The Concept of 
Law, 95-96, and Raz’s discussion of “the dynamic aspect of rights” more generally, The 
Morality of Freedom, 171. 
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secures legitimate entitlements and legitimate expectations in our private interactions with 
others.  In doing so, the law serves a morally important guidance function and, in turn, a 
morally important protective function.  
 In this chapter, I will focus on the specific problem that reasonable moral 
disagreement about the abstract right to equal freedom creates for the possibility of living 
amongst others while respecting the freedom of others.  The argument is Kantian in 
character and runs as follows.94  First, each person has a fundamental right to equal 
freedom.  What that means is that each individual has a right to a determinate and secure 
normative space in which their person, property, and choices are not subject to the 
interference or control of other individuals.  That normative space is articulated by 
determinate bundles of Hohfeldian rights.)  Second, the right to equal freedom is fraught 
with moral indeterminacy, meaning that in a broad range of cases well-meaning reasonable 
people aiming to respect the freedom of others will regard reasonable but inconsistent 
courses of action as consistent with respecting the abstract rights of others.  Indeterminacy 
and the resulting disagreement undermines the very point of equal rights, namely that 
individuals retain a determinate and secure normative space in which their person, 
property, and choices are not subject to the interference or control of other individuals.  
Third, what is a morally necessary task for equal freedom is coordination around a 
                                                          
94 Kant’s defense of political authority and his account of private rights are found in the 
Doctrine of Right.  Kant, Practical Philosophy, 363-506.  A comprehensive account of 
Kant’s political philosophy is provided by Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s 
Legal and Political Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 2009).  That account is 
generally followed in Anna Stilz, Liberal Loyalty: Freedom, Obligation, and the State 
(Princeton University Press, 2009), 27-56. 
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reasonable scheme of equal rights.  Fourth, public political authority is able and necessary 
to complete that moral task, and partly in virtue of that capacity, it is its responsibility to 
do so.95  Therefore, finally, if a public political authority exists that is effective at resolving 
that task, then that political authority has the legitimate authority that it claims in 
completing that task.  That authority is in no way contingent upon the voluntary consent of 
those subject to its authority.  The view is broadly a moral task account of the legitimacy 
of political authority, as described in the previous chapter.96  The account describes one of 
the broad roles of that state in virtue of which it possesses and legitimately exercises its 
enabling rights to alter the moral situation and enforce our legal obligations.  The basic 
point is that one of, if not the, central moral tasks of the law is to specify or constitute a 
public system of individual moral rights and duties that define and secure our freedom from 
other individuals.  
                                                          
95 The Thomist tradition offers a comparable approach articulated in terms of the common 
good.  John Finnis says of justice that “[b]ecause one’s pursuit of fulfillment would be 
unreasonable and self-mutilating if it were indifferent to friendship and to the worth of the 
instantiation of human goods in the lives of other people, one needs look to getting order 
into one’s relations with one’s fellows, one’s communities.  The name for that order, and 
for one’s constant concern for it, is justice.”  John Finnis, Philosophy of Law: Collected 
Essays (Oxford University Press, 2011), 47. 
96 Green describes such as view as a “task-efficacy” account.  Green, “The Duty to 
Govern,” 165.  The argument in broad form tracks Elizabeth Anscombe’s argument: 
“authority arises from the necessity of a task whose performance requires a certain sort and 
extent of obedience on the part of those for whom the task is supposed to be done.”  
Anscombe, Collected Philosophical Papers, 138.  And, then: “If something is necessary, 
if it is, for example, a necessary task in human life, then a right arises in those whose task 
it is, to have what belongs to the performance of the task.” Ibid., 145.  The second 
formulation is subtly different in that the individual or entity who performs the task holds 
the right to the performance.  But we could think that this right is held by someone other 
than the task performer.  For example, as I will argue here, one’s fellow citizens have the 
right against their fellow citizens to a legal system that performs a moral task.  Political 
obligation therefore is fundamentally owed to our fellow citizens and not the state. 
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2.1 - The Philosophical Anarchist’s Challenge  
 Before explaining how rights protect freedom, it will be helpful to articulate the 
primary argument offered to block the inference that the state has a practical role to play 
in our lives.  Legitimate political authority, many would agree, consists in the right to rule, 
where that right is understood at least to consist in a Hohfeldian moral power to impose 
obligations and a right to demand conformity with those obligations.97  The point can 
equally be framed in terms of the power to confer rights and the right to demand compliance 
with those rights.  We can also include a right to use coercion as an element of legitimacy.  
The state exercises its moral authority through it legal directives, meaning that a legitimate 
political authority’s directives are not just legally binding but morally binding.   
 The philosophical anarchist, however, urges that there is no moral obligation to 
obey the directives of the state, even the reasonably just state,98 and challenges the 
legitimacy of political authority.  On the philosophical anarchist account, such obligations, 
according to the philosophical anarchist, could only arise after satisfying fairly stringent 
standards, such as universal voluntary consent.  Although such standards could be satisfied 
in principle, as an empirical matter they are unlikely to be satisfied with respect to most 
people and most laws.  Nonetheless, the philosophical anarchist’s broader point is that if 
                                                          
97 See, e.g., Perry, “Political Authority and Political Obligation,” 1; Raz, The Morality of 
Freedom, 23-24. 
98 According to Raz, one has even less reason to obey just laws because “[t]he more just 
and valuable the law is . . . the more reason one has to conform to it, and the less to obey 
it.”  Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, 343. 
 
 
63 
one already has duties grounded in justice (or some other moral value) to do what the law 
happens to require, then the law has no practical role to play.  As Green puts the point, the 
“general requirements of justice, and [any] special obligations acquired through consent” 
would “pretty much exhaust our political duties.”99  Non-consenting individuals subject to 
the authority of the law would not have a moral obligation to obey the law on the ground 
that the law results from legitimate exercises of the state’s legal authority.  Thus, the fact 
that something is the law does not provide one with any independent moral reason to act 
beyond what morality (plus the empirical facts) already require.   
As noted in the previous, those who are philosophical anarchists do not disagree 
that states or legal systems can be morally justified in a broader sense.  As Simmons, who 
defends the position, puts the point: 
Some illegitimate states may thus be justified by reference to the good that 
they do, which is just to say that they merit our support, and thus we have 
moral reason to provide it.  But saying that some states merit support is not 
at all the same as saying that they have a right to direct and coerce us, which 
we are bound to honor.100 
Nor must the philosophical anarchist deny that we have non-voluntary duties of justice to 
others.  According to Simmons,  
[e]ven in a relatively disorganized state of nature (as Locke emphasizes), it 
is perfectly possibly — even if sometimes difficult — for persons to do their 
                                                          
99 Green, The Authority of the State, 267. 
100 Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, 156. 
 
 
64 
duty, obeying the natural law requirement of respect for others’ rights. . . . 
But if the duty of justice could be discharged in a nonpolitical social 
condition, then it is hard to see how we could reasonably derive from the 
duty of justice a duty to obey our countries’ laws.101   
The philosophical anarchist therefore aims only to reject the particular idea that the 
directives of the state are reason-giving or obligating in any way over and above what our 
determinate natural duties and rights already require.  The law, even the just law, is 
therefore normatively inert.  What matters, according to Simmons, is that we do what we 
have all-things-considered most moral reason to do, including respecting and protecting 
the rights of others and doing our fair share in pursuing our collective ends.  Thus, the 
problem for the defender of the idea that the state can legislate moral obligations is to avoid 
the claim that there are moral obligations to obey unjust laws but to explain how the law 
still has a moral role to play over and above pre-existing natural morality in the case of just 
laws. 
The philosophical anarchist is mistaken about the extent to which our natural duty 
to respect the rights of others is able to serve the role of protecting freedom without 
practical help from the law.  The law, I argue, has a moral role to play in decisively 
identifying or specifying which actions or forbearances count as respecting the right of 
others when we interact.  The law’s specifications change our moral situation in that they 
give us clear and equality-preserving guidance on how to respect the rights of our fellow 
citizens.  Outside the context of the law, our abstract natural duty to respect the equal 
                                                          
101 Simmons, Is There a Duty to Obey the Law?, 152. 
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freedom of others cannot play that role.  Because the role of the law is to specify 
requirements of equal freedom, any law that could not reasonably count as a specification 
of equal freedom need not be binding.    
2.2 - Freedom and Rights 
The commitment to equal individual freedom or liberty is at the core of liberal 
political theory.  Here, my point of departure is the basic liberal commitment that each 
moral person has an equal right to freedom insofar as that right can coexist with the equal 
rights of others.  That of course is Kant’s view too.  Kant contends that we have a single 
innate right to “freedom as independence.”  That innate right is the ultimate ground of the 
authority of the state and the law.  Kant articulates that right as follows: “Freedom 
(independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with 
the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right 
belonging to every human being by virtue of his humanity.”102 
Kantian freedom as independence can be abstractly defined in a number of 
interrelated ways.  First, the right to be independent of the choice of others is the right to 
be your own master.  Most broadly, it protects one’s capacity for choice.  As a consequence 
no other person can be permitted to be the master of another, and persons have a right not 
to be placed in circumstances in which that would be the case.  This protects individuals 
                                                          
102 Kant, Practical Philosophy, 6:237.  The principle is analogous to Rawls’s framing of 
his first principle of justice: “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.”  John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Harvard University Press, 1971), 60.  As will become clear later, Rawls’s later 
understanding of the first principle imports the idea that a right to freedom must be 
specified.  
 
 
66 
against having their person or property be subject to or dependent upon the discretionary 
choice of another.  Second, an individual’s right to independence is a right against wrongful 
interference in one’s “purposiveness.”  As Arthur Ripstein explains, this means “that you, 
rather than any other person, [are] the one who determines which purposes you will pursue. 
. . . [I]t is your right that no other person determine what purposes you will pursue, not that 
you exercise that capacity successfully.”103  Accordingly, wronging someone involves 
interfering with a person’s capacities or powers rather than undermining the particular ends 
that a person happens to have.  Third, freedom as independence is a right not to be treated 
as a “mere means” by others.  In this way, an individual could not rightfully be bound by 
a legal duty that required or permitted otherwise.  Equally, others have a rightful duty not 
to make others a mere means.  So, individuals cannot simply be the pawns of other’s 
purposes.  Finally, the right to freedom as independence protects one’s capacity for choice 
against being used or destroyed.104  For example, just as you, absent my consent, would 
not be permitted to cut my arm off, you equally would not be permitted to use my arm to 
hold an umbrella over your head.  Such constitutes an interference in my capacity to use 
my arm in the way I see fit.  Similarly, absent consent, one could not use or otherwise 
destroy the property of another because such would constitute an interference with one’s 
capacity to choose to use one’s property in whatever way one sees fit. 
                                                          
103 Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 40-41. 
104 Kant’s presentation of the abstract right to freedom as independence can be found in the 
Metaphysics of Morals at 6:238.  For a general overview of the Kantian right to freedom 
as independence, see Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 30-56. 
 
 
67 
In practice, what all of that amounts to is that each individual has an equal claim to 
an equal, definite, and secure normative space in which their person, property, and choices 
are not subject to the interference or control of other individuals.105  Within that space, one 
need not ask the permission of others.  Persons have that right in virtue of the fact that they 
are free and equal moral persons, namely persons who have the capacity to set and pursue 
their own ends, and who have the capacity to recognize and abide the by the rights of 
others.106  At the very least, following T.M. Scanlon, we can agree that “the ability to 
influence outcomes and protection from interference or control by others are things people 
care about.”107 
Central to the idea that individuals have a right to a certain sphere of control and 
choice that is insulated from the discretionary control and choice of others is the idea that 
                                                          
105 Stilz, following Kant, urges the following:  “To be free . . . is not to be forced to obey 
the will of another person; it is to enjoy a sphere of independent self-government within 
which others cannot interfere.”  Stilz, Liberal Loyalty, 37. 
106 These are essentially what Rawls describes as the two moral powers: the capacity for a 
sense of justice, which is the capacity to understand, apply, and act from principles of 
political justice; and the capacity for a conception of the good, which is the capacity to 
have, revise, and rationally pursue a conception of the good.  Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 
18-19.  As here, for Rawls, “[the] basic rights and liberties protect and secure the scope 
required for the exercise of the two moral powers . . . . To exercise our powers . . . is 
essential to us as free and equal citizens.”  Ibid., 45.  For criticism of the idea that possession 
of such capacities is the appropriate locus of value for liberal political theory, see Martha 
C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Harvard 
University Press, 2006), 14-35. 
107 T. M. Scanlon, The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 29.  Scanlon goes on to comment, consistent with the view 
defended here, that rights protecting such values may vary from society to society:  “[T]he 
case for rights derives in large part from the goal of promoting an acceptable distribution 
of control over important factors in our lives.  This general goal is one that would be of 
importance to people in a wide range of societies.  But the particular rights it calls for may 
vary from society to society.”  Ibid., 36. 
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there determinate limits on how we can treat each other.108  Broadly, rights are valuable 
because they articulate the fixed normative limits within which individuals are protected 
in the exercise of their choice and control and through which they can form reasonable 
expectations about the choices of others.  Most directly, rights secure the freedom of those 
who hold them.  To do that, our rights must be “determined (with mathematical 
exactitude).”109 
What specific rights one has specify and define the contours of that sphere of 
control.110  To start, the way in which a right secures that sphere depends on the species of 
right possessed.  It will therefore be helpful to gain a basic understanding of the conceptual 
distinctions between different species of rights and identify the manner in which particular 
species of rights protect111 the freedom of the right holder.  To do so is in part to explain 
the normative significance of rights within liberal political philosophy.112  
                                                          
108 This cuts across the distinction between positive and negative duties. 
109 Kant, Practical Philosophy, 6:233. 
110 Cf. John Oberdiek, “Specifying Rights Out of Necessity,” Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 28, no. 1 (2008): 128 (“[D]ynamism . . . distinguishes specified rights.  A right, on 
this picture, can stand against different behaviour in different circumstances, so that what 
conflicts with a right in one context may not conflict with it in another.”). 
111 I will generally use the terms “protect” and “secure” to describe the relationship between 
one’s rights and one’s freedom.  As will become clear, however, that relationship is more 
nuanced.  We ought not conceive of one’s freedom as something completely distinct from 
the rights that one possesses.  Our rights not only protect our freedom, they also constitute 
our freedom.  I discuss this point more in this Chapter and in Chapter Four, which discusses 
specificationism more generally.  
112 These distinctions are also helpful in understanding the variety of accounts on legitimate 
political authority that are discussed here. 
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As noted in the previous chapter, Hohfeld described the conceptual framework for 
characterizing different species of rights, with each species having a distinct logical form.  
The basic framework of legal relations is captured in Hohfeld’s table of “jural correlatives”: 
Right: Claim Right Privilege Power Immunity 
Correlative to:  Duty 
No Claim 
Right 
Liability Disability113 
 
The columns designate jural correlates, namely pairs of “incidents” that logically entail one 
another.  For example, that Ann has a claim-right against Bob, logically entails that Bob 
has a duty to Ann.  Moving diagonally between the columns, we have pairs of jural 
opposites, pairs in which the negation of one incident logically entails the other.  For 
example, that Ann has no duty to wash Bob’s car entails that Ann has a privilege not to 
wash Bob’s car.  I will flesh out the relationships more in the course of explaining how 
each species of right secures freedom.   
The way in which a right secures the freedom of the right holder depends on the 
particular Hohfeldian right possessed.  A basic starting point for and the core of the idea 
that individuals have rights is the idea that there are determinate limits on how individuals 
can treat each other.  The idea of a limit is the core of a claim-right.  Every claim-right is 
logically correlated with a duty.  So, insofar as an individual has a claim-right, someone or 
                                                          
113 Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,” 
30. 
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some entity has a duty to that individual.  Other individuals are limited to complying with 
their duties and therefore lack discretion to do what the limit proscribes.   
Two examples will suffice to explicate the idea of a claim-right, the two examples 
chosen from each side of the traditional distinction between positive and negative rights or 
duties.  A negative right is a claim-right that imposes a negative duty on another individual 
not to act in a certain way.  Such a right calls for a forbearance.  For example, if Abe has a 
claim-right against Barb that she not intentionally touch him absent his consent, then Barb 
has a duty to Abe not to touch him in that manner absent his consent.  By contrast, a positive 
right entails an affirmative obligation on another to do something for or to provide 
something to the right holder.  If Abe has a claim-right against Barb to a watch in Barb’s 
possession, then Barb has a duty to ensure that Abe gets the watch.  Nonetheless, in both 
cases, a logical relationship holds between the claim-right holder and the duty holder.  As 
Judith Jarvis Thomson puts the point, a claim-right is something “a person has against a 
person [or entity].”114  One cannot have “a claim out into the blue.”115  Rather, a claim-
right is held against some other person or entity.  
Claim-rights protect the freedom of the right holder by imposing obligations on 
others.  Claim-rights against specified forms of interference most clearly exemplify that 
point.  Rights against certain forms of interference in one’s person protect one’s ability to 
do as one chooses with one’s own body.  Similarly, a right against interference in one’s 
property protects an individual’s right to do as one chooses with one’s property. 
                                                          
114 Thomson, The Realm of Rights, 38. 
115 Ibid., 41. 
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Insofar as powers, privileges, and immunities are types of rights, it is not the case, 
as Thomson puts it, that “[e]very right is a right to something.”116  Claim-rights are rights 
to something, namely a correlative duty, but that is not true of other rights.  Under the 
Hohfeldian scheme, a privilege-right is not a right to something; it is a right that consists 
in the right holder not having something, namely a duty.  The Hohfeldian correlate of a 
privilege is a “no right.”  What that means is that having a privilege to do something entails 
that someone else does not have a claim-right that the privilege holder not do that 
something.  For example, if Abe has a privilege to swim in the lake with respect to Barb, 
Abe does not owe Barb a duty not to swim in the lake.  Often when we speak loosely of an 
individual having a privilege, we mean to say that the individual has that privilege with 
respect to everyone.  For example, if Abe has a privilege to swim in the lake, then he does 
not owe a duty to anyone not to swim in the lake.117 
A privilege-right protects the freedom of an individual insofar as having a privilege 
entails that one does not have an obligation that limits one’s conduct.  A privilege by itself 
does not protect an individual from interference from others; that job is left to claim-
rights.118  Rather, a privilege merely entails that one is not bound in some way and is 
                                                          
116 Ibid., 37.  Thomson is referring to rights “in the strictest sense,” namely claim-rights 
that are correlative with duties.  
117 Of course, that will not always be the case.  One can have a privilege with respect to 
one person but not another.  For example, if Abe promised Cindy that he would not swim 
in the lake, then he would not have a privilege with respect to Cindy but would have a 
privilege with respect to Barb. 
118 For example, exercising one’s privilege-right to use a single-use bathroom does not 
interfere in the privilege-right of another person to use that same bathroom.   
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therefore free from an obligation.  The privilege holder therefore lacks certain specifiable 
limits.   
A power-right gives the right holder a moral capacity intentionally to alter the moral 
situation of oneself or another, for example, by altering the duties or rights of another or 
oneself.  We recognize a number of circumstances in which having such capacities 
constitute part of the power-right holder’s freedom.  These include the moral power to bind 
oneself by making promises and entering into contracts, the power to consent to things that 
would otherwise be wrong absent one’s consent, and even the power to seek redress of 
wrongs done against one’s person or property, among other things.119  Such powers are 
essentially expressions of each individual’s power to make choices about their person and 
property in the course of pursuing one’s conception of the good, including entering into 
certain sorts of relationships with other people.  As Raz explains, moral powers are 
constitutive of how “[w]e are all to a considerable degree the authors of our moral 
world.”120  
Finally, a Hohfeldian immunity-right makes the right holder free from having their 
moral situation changed.  An individual’s immunity-right entails that someone else lacks a 
power-right with respect to that individual.  That individual therefore is not subject to the 
moral control of another insofar as they have immunity from such control.  For example, 
individuals in liberal societies possess immunities against public and private demands that 
                                                          
119 For a discussion of promises and agreements in terms of moral powers, see Raz, The 
Morality of Freedom, 173-76.  For a discussion of the importance of power rights in 
thinking about private law causes of action, see Benjamin C. Zipursky, “Rights, Wrongs, 
and Recourse in the Law of Torts,” Vanderbilt Law Review 51, no. 1 (1998): 79-86. 
120 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 85-88. 
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they participate in a particular religion.  So, any attempt to impose an obligation to praise 
the Pope would be ultra vires.  No obligation would be imposed and the attempt to do so 
would be normatively fruitless.  Immunity against the decisions of others protects one’s 
freedom in that one is not subject to the moral control of another.  In different terms, insofar 
as one has an immunity, one does not have a master and is not subject to another’s 
authority. 
Rights in common political discourse are most often not atomistic in the way 
described.  That is because when we speak loosely about rights, we are speaking about 
collections of Hohfeldian rights.  Take for example our right to bodily integrity.  Such a 
right arguably includes 1) certain claim-rights against interference in one’s person (e.g., 
non-consensual touching); 2) certain immunities from being subject to the choices of others 
(e.g., the decision of another to sell your body); 3) certain privileges to use your body in 
the way you choose (e.g., your privilege to waive at your neighbor or not); and 4) certain 
power-rights to alter your own moral situation (e.g., consenting to let another hold your 
hand). 
The moral order that Kant describes is an order in which individuals are universally 
and equally secure in a normative space in which: 1) they can determine the course of their 
actions and property through their own choice in a way that is free from interference from 
others within limits (claim-right), 2) in a way that is not subject to the discretion of others 
within limits (immunity-right), 3) in a way in which they do not wrong others with their 
actions within limits (privilege-right), and such that (4) they can alter their own rights 
against and responsibilities to others within limits (power-right).  Beyond that, however, 
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the Kantian right to equal freedom alone does not tell us much about the specific content 
of the rights that we have in our person or property.  Rather, it tells us that we have an equal 
right to have rights and that they have to be determinate and systematic to do their job.  
That all serves to make the more general point that rights secure the freedom of 
rights-holders in a variety of ways.  Below I explicate that point further in discussing how 
a system of equal rights secures freedom and how the law plays an important role in the 
life and vitality of our rights.  
2.3 - Moral Indeterminacy and the Defects of the State of Nature 
Rights that articulate the space within which individuals can live independent of 
the choices of others must be effectively coordinated in an public, univocal, and 
determinate way to do their job.  To understand that point, it will be helpful to look at life 
absent those features.   
At its core the state of nature in liberal political theory is a state of reasonable 
disagreement spawned by moral indeterminacy in our rights to person and property rather 
than a morally permitted war of all against all for private gain.  Only against such a baseline 
can we make sense of a mutual requirement and goal of ensuring the equal freedom of 
others notwithstanding indeterminacy.121  That baseline establishes the standpoint from 
which we should assess the question of how laws can morally bind.  Most agree that the 
                                                          
121 Thus, the Hobbesian state of nature is not a state of reasonable disagreement.  Rawls 
describes the appropriate standpoint as follows: “disagreement between reasonable 
persons: that is, between persons who have realized their two moral powers to a degree 
sufficient to be free and equal citizens in a constitutional regime, and who have an enduring 
desire to honor fair terms of cooperation and to be fully cooperating members of society.”  
Rawls, Political Liberalism, 54.   
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law plays an important coercive function in that the law authorizes and uses force to 
provide assurance and security for our rights, particularly against those who choose not to 
respect the rights of others.  But to justify the legitimacy of the practical role that the state 
claims to play is also to justify that role to the reasonable citizen, one who aims not to do 
arbitrary violence against others but one who aims in good faith to respect the rights of 
others and to equally stand up for his own rights.122 
According to the philosophical anarchist, the reasonable citizen does not need the 
state’s political authority to provide him with guidance about what he must do to satisfy 
his obligations not to violate the freedom of others.  On such a view, the state is permitted 
to use force to protect individuals against those who will or who do violence to the rights 
of others.  But, in that respect, the philosophical anarchist believes the state is no different 
than any other individual who is authorized to use force to protect their own rights or the 
rights of others.  Therefore, we need to understand why life without political authority is 
not as the philosophical anarchist claims.   
Arthur Ripstein, interpreting Kant, maintains that the state of nature suffers from 
three defects.  Those defects are moral in nature and make the state morally necessary to 
secure our right to freedom as independence.  First, acquired rights to property, which are 
a necessary extension of freedom, are not possible in a state of nature.  Second, acquired 
rights cannot be secure outside of the assurance-providing coercive institutions of the state.  
And, third and finally, in a state of nature our rights are indeterminate and subject to 
                                                          
122 One thing to point out is that the state of nature is reproduced in a small way within the 
state whenever there is a reasonable disagreement about rights and no public solution has 
been offered. 
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disagreement, as “objective standards cannot be established in a state of nature.”123  For 
those reasons, rights to property can only be provisional in a state of nature.  Ripstein sees 
those defects as interconnected but distinct.  I am going to suggest that the primary defect 
in the state of nature is indeterminacy in our rights and that the discrete problem of 
acquisition would disappear in the absence of indeterminacy.  But, for now, I will rehearse 
Ripstein’s three defects. 
According to Ripstein, it must be possible to obtain property rights in objects, 
including land, because objects must be able to “serve as means for setting and pursuing 
purposes.”124  A secure capacity to set and pursue one’s own purposes within determinate 
limits just is one’s freedom.  It is that more general right that is constituted by our rights in 
our person and property.  The original acquisition of property, however, raises a problem 
“because it does not simply change the world,” rather “it places others under new 
obligations” as a result of the unilateral choice of the person acquiring the property.125  
What that amounts to is one person subjecting other persons to his own private will for his 
own private purposes.  That is the problem of unilateral choice or private authority.  
Freedom is inconsistent with being subject to the private will of another person.  That is 
because each individual has an immunity that protects them against being subject to the 
private will of another. 
                                                          
123 Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 146. 
124 Ibid., 149.  For the same reason, freedom “precludes any requirement that all others 
consent to any acquisition.  Such a requirement would make the use of a usable thing 
depend on the matter of other people’s choices, and so subject everyone to the choice of 
each other private person.”  Ibid. 
125 Ibid., 153. 
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The problem of private authority is raised because a private individual is 
unilaterally interpreting his own rights and the rights of others.  In doing so, he is 
unilaterally using another person’s person and property for his own private purposes.  
The problem is not raised, however, “if I move from one place to another, [such that] I 
occupy space which is not available for your occupation while I am there.”126  According 
to Ripstein, that “change does not place you under a new obligation, but simply applies 
[my right to my person] to a different circumstance.”127 
A legal system with publicly defined rules for acquiring property resolves the 
problem in two ways.  First, our right of acquisition of property must be reconciled with 
the rights of others.  I cannot acquire property rights that result in unfair property 
distributions or acquire rights that systematically undermine the rights of others.  A 
systematic solution is required.  And, one must be able to tell where their property right 
begins and ends.  Second, and more importantly, the exercise of a power to acquire property 
must be an exercise of a public power that is equally conferred to all.  So, a private 
individual cannot exercise the power of acquisition in a manner that serves only his own 
private purposes.  Acquisition in accordance with public authority, an authority that has a 
public responsibility to all to ensure that all could be reasonable in abiding by the common 
scheme, is the exercise of a public power with a public purpose. 
 The second defect is the lack of assurance or security for equal rights.  According 
to Ripstein, “without public enforcement, people lack the assurance that others will refrain 
                                                          
126 Ibid., 151. 
127 Ibid. 
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from interfering with their property and, as a result, have no obligation to refrain from 
interfering with the property of others.”128  The point is not just that coercion is necessary 
to protect one’s rights.  Rather, if assurance is absent, then the problem of private authority 
arises again: “If you refrain from taking what is mine, without assurance that I will refrain 
from taking what is yours, then you are permitting me to treat what is yours, and so an 
aspect of your capacity to set and pursue purposes, as subject to my purposes.”129  Your 
freedom is thus subject to my will because the security of your rights depends on whether 
or not it happens to be my private purpose not to take what I am claiming is mine.  The 
solution to that problem is a coercive state that provides security and assurance that one’s 
rights will be protected just like everyone else’s. 
 Before moving on to the third defect, I want to briefly discuss the notion of coercion 
involved in securing our rights.  For Kant, coercion is not primarily understood in terms of 
punishment, which is how many would perhaps understand that term.  Instead, coercion is 
understood as a morally permitted constraint on the freedom of another to secure freedom, 
or, as Kant puts it, a “hindering of a hinderance to freedom.”130  Such hinderances are 
necessary to secure one’s rights.  As a practical matter, there are three basic categories of 
such hinderances. The first is preventive.  Public and private actors are permitted to 
intervene and hinder the freedom of another to prevent that person from violating the rights 
of others.  For example, one would be permitted to restrain an individual who is attempting 
to punch another person.  The second is remedial.  Public and private actors are permitted 
                                                          
128 Ibid., 159. 
129 Ibid., 162. 
130 Kant, Practical Philosophy, 6:231. 
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to remedy continuing and past hinderances.  For example, if a person is trespassing on 
one’s property, they can be physically removed from the property.  Or, if someone steals 
property, they can be forced to return the property or pay for it.  The third category would 
cover what we traditionally refer to as punishment.  These are hinderances attached to 
criminal offenses.  Such hinderances serve both the purpose of deterring (or simply 
confining) those who are not otherwise deterred by law or its remedial character, and the 
purpose of punishing by imposing proportional retribution on those who commit wrongs.  
Each of those categories describes a manner in which rights are enforced or upheld.131           
 Returning to the moral defects in the state of nature, the third defect is that in the 
state of nature our rights are not determinate.  That is also the basic point that I am 
emphasizing in this chapter.  As Ripstein puts the point, “general rules are not sufficient to 
classify particulars falling under them.”132  More specifically, a general rule that 
individuals are to respect to the rights of others is not sufficient to guide their actions in 
particular cases because each person can disagree in good faith about what that requires.  
It is partially but not fully determinate.  The argument differs from the Lockean argument 
that the state is necessary simply to settle rights disputes that tend to result in rancor and 
violence.  Of course, the state will do that too.  But, even if there were no actual disputes, 
                                                          
131 For a discussion of Kantian coercion that highlights some of these categories but casts 
them in a different light, see Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 303-24.  I do not mean to 
suggest that each of the three categories can be justified together.  The primary point is that 
they can be consistent with freedom insofar as they can be understood as hinderances to a 
hinderance.  Although the preventive and remedial nature of the use of force seems 
uncontroversial, the jump to punishing certain categories of offenses requires more moral 
theory.     
132 Ibid., 168.   
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the state would still be necessary to settle the content of our rights.  The point is that “rights 
are necessarily subject to dispute, not that they are always disputed.  The application of 
concepts to particulars is always potentially indeterminate, and so requires judgment, as a 
result of which the classification of particulars is always, at least in principle, 
indeterminate.”133  The view is also not the skeptical view that “the basic terms of social 
life have no answers but somehow require them, so that institutions must step in to answer 
them.”134  There are certain precepts of freedom that are not subject to reasonable 
disagreement, such that there is no role for the law to play in resolving a reasonable 
disagreement. 
 Broadly the point is that , 
concepts of right do not always generate a single answer, but because they 
demarcate aspects of a system of reciprocal limits on choice, their 
application to particulars must be given a single answer in every case. . . . 
[N]either the normative concepts nor the relevant facts nor any combination 
of them guarantees agreement.  Again, different people may . . . agree in a 
wide range of cases.  Any such agreement is, from the standpoint of right, 
mere coincidence, and so rights are by their very nature subject to 
dispute.135   
                                                          
133 Ibid., 170. 
134 Ibid., 169.  Ripstein attributes this view to Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).  I am not sure that Ripstein accurately 
captures Waldron’s view, but such a discussion is beyond the scope of this chapter.   
135 Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 170-71. 
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In the case of acquisition of property, for example, there is always going to be 
“indeterminacy, with respect to quality as well as quantity, of the external object that can 
be acquired.”136  Notwithstanding a determination not to violate the rights of others, in the 
state of nature, the best that individuals can do is what they have a right to do, namely, 
“what seems right and good” in the situation.  Not to do that would be to subject their own 
decisions about what is right to the private authority of other individuals with whom they 
are interacting.  Again, that is the problem of private authority. 
 Political authority resolves that problem by making our rights systematically 
determinate in a univocal way that secures the freedom of all.  In the state, no longer are 
one’s rights dependent on what others subjectively deem to be right and good in the 
situation but are now dependent on determinate public standards. 
 The broad theme running throughout the previous discussion is that the three 
defects amount to the problem of private authority.  Private authority is contrary to freedom 
as independence because what freedom consists in is being able to choose the course of 
one’s life independent of the private purposes of other individuals.  That problem is a real 
problem that needs to be cured by the state. 
 Moreover, although assurance is a defect in its own right where we cannot assume 
that others will abide by the law, the first defect turns primarily on the third defect, namely 
moral indeterminacy.  The problem of acquisition arises because, first, there is no 
                                                          
136 Kant, Practical Philosophy, 6:266; Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 23.  Nozick raises 
this point in discussing Locke’s labor-mixing theory of property acquisition, questioning 
whether “[b]uilding a fence around a territory presumably would make one the owner of 
only the fence (and the land immediately underneath it).”  Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, 
and Utopia (Basic Books, 1974), 174. 
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reasonable expectation that any one individual’s acquisition of property can be made 
consistent with the equal property rights of others absent a univocal specification of our 
rights.  And, second, such acquisition in a state of nature involves one individual imposing 
obligations on others in their own private manner and according to their own private 
interpretation of what right requires.  Those problems, however, go away if we assume for 
the moment, as the philosophical anarchist does, that there is a true account of equal natural 
rights that governs our property rights, including the mechanisms by which we acquire 
property.  Assume that something like the Lockean account of property acquisition is 
correct, that we have a right to appropriate property though the use of our labor insofar as 
“there is enough, and as good left in common for others.”137  The Lockean who acquires a 
particular piece of property, say land, alters the moral situation of others insofar as those 
persons now have certain duties not to violate the Lockean’s property rights by trespassing 
on that land. 
 If that is indeed the case, no problem of private authority arises, as the Lockean’s 
property was acquired by exercising the same and singular right and capacity to labor that 
each other free human being is endowed with.  That capacity can be exercised for whatever 
purpose any individual chooses, just like an individual in the modern state can exercise a 
legal power to acquire property for whatever purpose she chooses.  What is more, if the 
Lockean account is true, the Lockean can raise a private authority objection of his own to 
the Kantian: by disregarding the Lockean rights of others and placing state-imposed 
normative conditions on property rights, the Kantian is attempting to alter the moral 
                                                          
137 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, II, § 27. 
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situation of those who have acquired bona fide property rights through the use of their 
labor.  So, the Kantian needs the indeterminacy argument to find a defect in acquisition. 
 The Kantian can make that argument.  The problem of private authority arises 
because the Lockean account of property acquisition is woefully indeterminate with respect 
to the mechanism of acquisition and the character of the right acquired.  First, there are just 
no clear answers as to what constitutes enough and as good left:  Is that measured by the 
area of the property?  The agricultural quality of the property?  The market value of the 
property?  And, so on.  What is more, even if that could be determined, it is unclear how 
the necessary coordination between each acquisition is supposed to happen.  Second, is 
there a minimal amount of labor that must be used to acquire property, and must that labor 
continue for the property right to continue.  Third, when one labors on a particular piece of 
property there will be “indeterminacy, with respect to quality as well as quantity, of the 
external object that can be acquired.”138  Nozick raises that point in discussing Locke’s 
labor-mixing theory of property acquisition, questioning whether “[b]uilding a fence 
around a territory presumably would make one the owner of only the fence (and the land 
immediately underneath it),” or all of the property within its bounds.139  Finally, even if 
one acquires a property right to a particular piece of property, that does not settle the 
question of the content of the right acquired.  Is the right absolute, or are their exceptions?  
Are their limits on what can be done with the property?  Is there a time limit on the right?  
And so on. 
                                                          
138 Kant, Practical Philosophy, 6:266; Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 23.   
139 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 174.     
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 It is only because of that indeterminacy that the problem of private authority is 
generated.  That is because in unilaterally interpreting what the nature of one’s property 
rights are, one imposes one’s own view of what the moral situation ought to be on other 
individuals.  Such a right would confer unequal authority on that individual, authority that 
could not be shared by all.  Because of indeterminacy, others also have different reasonable 
views about what our property rights consist in.  As an equally free moral person, each 
person has no reason to defer to another private individual’s judgment about what property 
rights they have. 
2.4 - Necessary Features of Rights 
In light of the previous discussion, I want to focus on how indeterminacy 
undermines the ability of rights to articulate equal spheres of independence.  We have 
already seen that indeterminacy in the state of nature results in the problem of private 
authority.  Here I want to explore that idea more broadly and explain what is needed for 
rights to articulate a domain within which individuals can lead independent lives.   
Rights that articulate the space within which individuals can live independent of 
the choices of others require several important features that cannot be satisfied outside of 
the state.  First, rights must be systematically coordinated between persons and across time.  
Largely that means that our rights must be coordinated in a univocal and settled way such 
that they are mutually consistent and universal.  For an given right, all persons must know, 
or be easily able to know, the legal content of the right such that it makes sense to say that 
there is in fact a specified legal rule in existence that governs conduct.  Call that the 
coordination requirement.  Second, our rights must be action guiding in a decisive and 
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determinate way in broad cases.  There must be definite courses of action that count as 
respecting rights.  Call that the decisive-reason requirement.  Third, rights must be 
publically knowable.  Call that the publicity requirement.  Fourth, the state must be broadly 
effective in satisfying those requirements.  Call that the effectiveness condition.  Those 
requirements are interconnected and mutually reinforcing, but it is helpful to separate them 
out. 
The basic idea behind the coordination requirement is that the mandate of a system 
of equal rights presents a kind of coordination problem in light of the fact of moral 
indeterminacy.  What that means is that there is a moral need for all members of a 
community to act or “coordinate” according to a single scheme of rights that is internally 
consistent and egalitarian.  This obviously is not a coordination problem in the traditional 
sense in which individuals need to choose a course of action and the outcome is jointly 
determined by the actions of all of the agents.140  Rather, the point is that groups of 
individuals who interact must have a settled rule that specifies the content of a right, which 
they will conform their actions to and upon which they can assert their claims against 
others.  People are not coordinating their behavior simply by acting in accordance with 
what everyone else is doing; instead, they are coordinating around a legal rule that they 
regard as legitimate.141  The first and foremost reason for that is egalitarian in nature.  
                                                          
140 See, e.g., David Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study (Blackwell: 2002), 8.    
141 To some extent the law does not care why individuals follow the law.  But it does matter 
that a relevant community of individuals (perhaps just legal officials) coordinate around a 
shared understanding of what the law requires, as the status and content of legal rules is 
partly determined by the attitudes the members of the relevant community have toward the 
conduct covered by the rule.  Hart discusses this idea in terms of the “internal point of 
view.” See Hart, The Concept of Law, 89-91.  For discussions of the idea, see Scott J. 
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Insofar as we are all equal moral persons, we have the same basic rights that articulate our 
freedom.  That equality must be coordinated between people despite indeterminacy (or 
inequality) between the various interpretations of our rights.  But, finally, rights are 
valuable because they protect one’s ability to form and follow plans around one’s 
conception of the good.  One cannot plan one’s life if what one is entitled to varies broadly 
depending upon whom one is interacting with and how they interpret one’s rights.142 
Accordingly, the problem of unilateral authority represents a failure to coordinate 
our interpretations about what rights each of us have.  Outside of the state, each person has 
a right to do what seems right and good to him.  What that means is that the security of 
one’s claims is arbitrarily dependent upon whom one happens to interact with and whether 
their conception of one’s rights happens to coincide with one’s own.  That is a problem 
both because one is then subject to the private authority of another and because that 
authority could not be shared equally.  Of course we can enter into private agreements with 
others, but then what rights we have is subject both to the bargaining power of others and 
their own private purposes in deciding who to enter into agreements with.  Moreover, even 
if that were acceptable, we would constantly be forced to haggle with others about the 
                                                          
Shapiro, “On Hart’s Way Out,” Legal Theory 4, no. 4 (1998), 489-92, and Matthew D. 
Adler, “Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practices Ground 
U.S. Law?,” Northwestern University Law Review 100, no. 2 (2006), 745-69. 
142 The coordination requirement can also be understood as one of the “formal constraints 
of the concept of right” from Rawls.  Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 131.  There Rawls 
articulates a series of constraints on principles of justice, but several of the constraints are 
of equal applicability in this context.  These include the generality constraint and the 
universality constraint.  The former requires that the existence, nature, and scope of an 
individual’s right do not depend on the proper identity of that individual or whom he is 
interacting with.  The universality constraint requires that if one person has a right in virtue 
of their status as a moral person, then all must have that right.  
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terms of our interactions, which is hardly desirable from the perspective of freedom.  By 
contrast, if our rights are coordinated in a univocal and equal manner, those problems are 
resolved. 
The second requirement is that our rights must be action guiding in a decisive and 
determinate way in broad cases.  Rights must provide clear guidance as to what counts as 
respecting the right, what is protected by the right, and/or how the right is to be utilized (in 
the case of a power-right).  Rights have the capacity to be action guiding in several ways.  
First, rights guide the actions of those who possess them in that a right possessor can form 
reasonable expectations about what he is and is not permitted to do and what others are and 
are not permitted to do.  That is important with respect to one’s ability to plan the course 
of one’s life.  Second, rights can guide the actions of those who are looking to avoid 
violating the rights of others insofar as rights specifically define what counts as respecting 
the rights of others.  Finally, with power-rights, one most know specifically how to exercise 
a moral power successfully insofar they are permitted to do.  
We can first explain the idea with respect to claim-rights.  A claim-right is 
correlative with an obligation.  Obligations are commonly regarded as special types of 
reasons for action, namely reasons for action that are “presumptively decisive,” namely 
“reasons which, although they are capable in principle of being outweighed or overridden, 
nevertheless present themselves as considerations upon which I must act.”143  The 
decisiveness of such reasons for action is part and parcel of the “trumping” quality of 
                                                          
143 Samuel Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility 
in Liberal Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 100. 
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rights.144  But, the decisiveness of such reasons requires that those reasons precisely 
identify how one is to proceed to satisfy the obligation.  And, insofar as a right-holder 
expects others to abide by their obligations, the right-holder must have a precise 
expectation as to how others are going to act, insofar as the right-holder has a reasonable 
expectation that others will respect his rights.  Rights must be “determined (with 
mathematical exactitude).”145 
Because of indeterminacy, however, freedom-based considerations cannot 
decisively settle which courses of action are consistent with the freedom of others.  
Indeterminacy does not just create reasonable disagreements between people; it also creates 
reasonable disagreement within people about which course of action to take.  For example, 
I may believe that I would be reasonable to think that I have freedom-based right to use a 
grill in my backyard despite the fact that the smell of barbeque will waft across my 
neighbor’s yard, as she can close her windows.  Such an intrusion, I might reason, does not 
unduly burden my neighbor.  On the other hand, I might reasonably think that the smell 
from my barbeque violates my neighbor’s freedom-based right to enjoy her property as she 
sees fit.  Nonetheless, I would not be unreasonable in having either of those views.  
Therefore, I do not have a decisive reason to choose one course of action over the other 
and am left without a clear way to respect my neighbor’s freedom.146 
                                                          
144 See Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 153-67. 
145 Kant, Practical Philosophy, 6:233. 
146 If I choose to grill, my neighbor is similarly situated and does not know if she has a 
right to complain about my grilling or if it is her responsibility to close her windows or 
wear a mask to block the smell when I am grilling. 
 
 
89 
Comparable points can be made with respect to moral powers.  Not only must a 
possessor of a moral power have clear guidance on how to exercise the power, others must 
have a clear understanding of the circumstances under which moral powers are effectively 
exercised.  For example, one seeking to exercise the power of contract must be able to 
ascertain the circumstances under which an attempt to exercise the power to bind oneself 
or another in an agreement will be effective and enforceable.  And, those putatively subject 
to someone else’s power must know under what circumstances their moral situation will 
be altered so that they can plan accordingly.     
The publicity requirement is connected with the previous two requirements in a 
fairly straightforward way.  If there are to be equal rights that are action guiding, they must 
be publicly discernible.  For rights to coordinate action in a univocal and decisive manner, 
and create and secure reasonable expectations, the fact of a right must be epistemically 
accessible in a fairly robust way.  Rights could not serve their practical role if they were 
not capable of being readily known.  They would not be able to guide action and therefore 
not be able to coordinate our actions in a way that is consistent with all having equal and 
secure rights.  An unknowable right cannot be acted upon.  It is also important that 
individuals be able to see that others are respecting each other’s rights.  They could only 
do so if they can assess others’ actions against a public standard.147  
                                                          
147 This is also important for the effectiveness of the system, or the “stability” of the system, 
as Rawls puts it: “[T]he general awareness of [the principles of justice’s] universal 
acceptance should have desirable effects and support the stability of social cooperation.”  
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 133.  Similarly, Thomas Christiano urges that publicity requires 
that “each person can see that he or she is being treated as an equal.”  Christiano, The 
Constitution of Equality, 4. 
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 Finally, a state that is tasked with satisfying those requirements must be broadly 
effective at doing so.  Roughly, that is just to say that the above constraints must actually 
be satisfied by the state.  A law that is not broadly followed or enforced is not serving its 
purpose.  The state possesses effectiveness insofar as it not only has the capacity to 
decisively coordinate behavior in a public way, but effectively does so.  That point is 
emphasized and at the core of John Finnis’s account of legitimate political authority.  
According to Finnis, “the sheer fact that virtually everyone will acquiesce in somebody’s 
say-so is the presumptively necessary and defeasibly sufficient condition for the normative 
judgment that that person has (i.e. is justified in exercising) authority in that 
community.”148  Of course we need not go as far as to say that effectiveness is a sufficient 
condition, but it is definitely a necessary condition. 
 The importance of assurance in Kant’s view is largely explained by the importance 
of the state’s effectiveness at getting people to follow its directives.  That the state needs 
to rely on force to uphold the effectiveness of a system of equal rights is tangential to the 
basic point that the state needs to uphold the effectiveness of a system of equal rights.  If 
we were all fully motived to abide by the state’s articulation of our rights, there would be 
no need employ force to maintain the effectiveness of our rights.  Assurance is assurance 
that others will abide by rights, not that they will abide by those rights because those rights 
are backed by force.149  
                                                          
148 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 250. 
149 Kant conceives of a right as involving a moral title to coerce.  Kant, Practical 
Philosophy, 6:232.  However, title to use force in defense of rights does not imply that 
force will be necessary to secure rights, just that it always be an option. 
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 Here I have argued that life outside the state is problematic from the perspective of 
freedom.  Reciprocal rights of freedom must be effectively coordinated in a public, 
univocal, and determinate way to do their job.  Insofar as the state has effectively done that, 
it possesses the legitimate authority it claims to have with respect to our rights.  In the next 
two chapters I will say more about why the positive law is specially suited for that task, 
first focusing on the importance of law for achieving broader collective goals and then 
focusing on how specification of our rights and responsibilities works.
92 
 
CHAPTER 3 - DYNAMIC AUTHORITY, COLLECTIVE ENDS, AND FAIRNESS 
In the previous chapter, I argued that that the law has a necessary practical role to 
play in ensuring the freedom of those subject to it.  Specifically, I argued that all individuals 
have a right to a determinate and secure normative space in which their person, property, 
and choices are not subject to the interference or control of others.  Because of moral 
indeterminacy in the right to independence, the law is morally necessary to publicly settle 
how we are to interact with others in such a way that we do not violate their independence.  
Reciprocal rights of freedom must be effectively coordinated in a public, univocal, and 
determinate way to do their job.  Insofar as the law effectively settles how we are to avoid 
using and interfering with the person and property of others, we have moral obligations to 
obey those laws.  The legal rights and responsibilities that govern the face-to-face 
interactions between persons and property determine and secure our independence.   
Here, I want to focus on how we use law to achieve and specify our broader 
collective ends.  This topic is normally discussed under the heading of public goods,150 
where our concern is not with individuals using or injuring the personal means, one’s 
person or property, that uniquely belong to any discrete individual.  Instead, our concern is 
with individuals who do not participate in the relevant way in the state’s discharging of its 
public responsibilities.  Our public responsibilities are collective for two reasons.  First, 
they are derivative responsibilities that each of us have in virtue of being part of a state-
                                                          
150 Here my concern is not to present a defense of public goods as those are discussed in 
the rational- and social-choice literature, namely goods that are non-excludable and non-
rivalrous.  For a discussion of public goods and references, see generally George Klosko, 
“Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and Political Obligation,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 16, 
no. 3 (1987): 241-59.    
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linked collective that has certain responsibilities.  Second, they are collective in that they 
are discharged on behalf of and usually for the sake of the equal freedom of all members 
of the collective.  This obviously raises the issue of what collective responsibilities we 
actually have.  Put differently, what ends are states permitted to pursue through its 
authority?  How do such ends relate to freedom?  How do such responsibilities implicate 
what individual citizens are responsible for doing?  This raises issues connected with taxes 
and compelled civil service.  Contemporary theorists usually explain the responsibilities of 
individual members of the collective by reference to the principle of fairness.  Here, I will 
seek to understand that principle in terms of the moral responsibility of the state to secure 
equal freedom in a fair way.  
I will begin by sketching how securing and maintaining equal freedom in the face 
of changing circumstances requires that political authority in part be dynamic.  Following, 
I explain how political authority has a coordinative role to play in discharging our 
collective responsibilities.  Next, I will discuss and criticize variants of the view that 
fairness requires individuals to obey laws that effectively execute our collective 
responsibilities.  I will end by articulating a better way of understanding how fairness is 
involved in legitimizing our collective obligations.   
3.1 - Securing Equal Freedom through Dynamic Authority 
Securing equal freedom is a big undertaking that requires fair, coordinated 
collective action in the face of reasonable disagreement amongst a diverse populace about 
the nature of our collective responsibilities and how they are to be discharged.  Individuals 
generally do their part in two ways: they pay, or they participate.  Those activities need to 
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be coordinated in some fashion.  Here I will discuss in broad terms the nature of our 
collective responsibilities or problems, and how the state’s capacity to coordinate behavior 
is necessary to specify and discharge those responsibilities. 
Any public projects that are the legitimate responsibility of the state must be 
reasonably understood to secure and maintain equal freedom.  Put differently, the state’s 
legitimate power is limited to securing and maintaining equal freedom.  Otherwise, 
participation in public projects could not be mandatory and coercively enforceable.  As 
Ripstein puts the point, “[t]he only powers a state may exercise are ones that fall under 
various aspects of its duty to create, maintain, and improve a rightful condition.”151   
There are perhaps three interrelated categories of public projects that roughly152 fit 
that bill: securing rights, securing institutions, and securing relations of independence 
through distributive justice.  I described the first project in the previous chapter.  We require 
effective political institutions to specify and secure our rights in our person and property, 
and to enforce agreements between us.  The second project concerns adequately securing 
the organs or instruments of government so that they can effectively discharge their 
responsibilities to secure equal freedom.  Put differently, the state has a responsibility to 
maintain itself and maintain the means reasonably necessary to do its job.  We need 
effectively funded and staffed legislative, executive, and judicial bodies; public buildings 
to house those entities; entities that protect those institutions, including the military, law 
                                                          
151 Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 223.  This is a more general way of capturing Kant’s 
point that legitimate force must be a “hindering of a hindrance to freedom.”  Kant, Practical 
Philosophy, 526. 
152 To be sure, there may be other ways of dividing up categories of public projects. 
 
 
95 
enforcement, and fire department; and other administrative agencies that deal with the 
economy, public health, education, and so on to ensure that there are people able to take 
on those responsibilities effectively.  I do not mean to provide a comprehensive list, as the 
nature and extent of any necessary government bodies is in many respects subject to 
reasonable disagreement.  The basic point is that insofar as any of those government bodies 
are needed to secure our right to equal freedom, we need to collectively secure the ability 
of those bodies to do their jobs effectively.  We either need to pay or participate.153 
Ripstein identifies public roads and thoroughfares as a paradigm case of a 
mandatory public end.  The example is a good place to start.  The necessity of roads can 
be seen as derivative of the necessity of the first two projects I just identified.  First, public 
roads are necessary because without them private property rights in land would not be 
consistent with equal freedom.  If all land were privately owned, then individuals would 
ultimately get trapped on their own land or that of others.  The only way to move around, 
pursue your own ends, and associate with whom you desire would be to seek permission 
from one’s neighbors.  But that creates a situation in which your freedom is dependent on 
the choices of others.154  Second, a similar problem arises in light of the state’s 
responsibility to secure equal freedom, for example, by deploying law enforcement to 
prevent an attack.  Law enforcement would not be able to do its job of preventing an attack 
if it was not able to get to the victim without trespassing on land or seeking permission 
from owners of land adjacent to where the victim is located.  The idea, then, is that public 
                                                          
153 For a good discussion of this issue, see Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 243-66. 
154 Ibid., 244-45. 
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roads are a precondition without which private rights in land or public responsibilities to 
protect would not be possible. 
The third project deals with the state’s role in distributing resources for the purpose 
of ensuring that individuals do not fall into impermissible relationships of dependence and 
domination.  Even if the state secures those rights that are covered by the private law, we 
might still be concerned about how inevitable natural and social processes and 
happenstance can place people in circumstances that are inconsistent with equal freedom.  
Recall that freedom as independence requires not only that individuals be free from 
interference by others by that they not be subject to relationships that are inconsistent with 
their equal status as independent persons not subject to will of others.  For example, that 
sort of rationale can be used to account for the state’s responsibility to combat poverty.  
The person who falls into poverty is effectively subject to the choice of those who are 
fortunate to have more.  Although such individuals have a duty of charity, that duty on the 
Kantian account is an imperfect duty, meaning that individuals have latitude or discretion 
in how and when they discharge the duty.  The result is that the impoverished person finds 
himself in a relationship in which his capacity to set and pursue his own ends independently 
of others is subject to the discretionary charity of others.  To resolve the problem, there 
needs to be public provision of resources to secure those who might fall into poverty.155 
The basic rationale for poverty relief can be brought back to the rationale for public 
roads.  Recall that roads are necessary to prevent situations in which individuals are 
                                                          
155 This is the basic argument presented by Ripstein, ibid., 267-99, and Stilz, Liberal 
Loyalty, 98-101. 
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landlocked and cannot pursue their own ends without asking leave of their neighbor.  The 
situation is analogous to a case in which a person falls into a deep pit and cannot leave the 
pit without assistance.156  In effect, the person is landlocked in a hole, and he is completely 
at the whim of possible rescuers who may or may not choose to rescue him, which is 
inconsistent with his freedom.  Mandatory public rescue is therefore necessary to cure the 
dependence, just like mandatory public roads are necessary to cure the dependence when 
someone is landlocked.  Poverty relief can be analogized to mandatory public rescue.  The 
person who falls on hard times is like the person who falls in the hole: he is dependent on 
the charity of others.  He therefore has a right to be rescued with some sort of social safety 
net. 
The previous discussion was simply a sketch of how we should think about the 
relationship between public responsibilities and equal freedom.  Surely, we will have 
reasonable disagreements about how to address the moral problems discussed.  In any case, 
the point is that for any proposed public responsibility we need to seek out justifications 
that are grounded in the right to freedom as independence. 
How can those collective responsibilities be discharged?  The answer provided by 
the moral task account defended here is that only effective political authorities enabled 
with certain moral rights, most prominently moral powers to change the moral situation, 
for example by imposing obligations, can discharge those responsibilities.  The above 
responsibilities are collective in nature.  That is so primarily because of the scale and 
                                                          
156 This example is drawn from Raz’s example of the man in the pit.  Raz, The Morality of 
Freedom, 373-74. 
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complexity of those projects, which require the expenditure of significant amounts of time, 
manpower, and money.  But they are also collective because we regard them as a shared 
responsibility that must be discharged fairly.  I will have more to say about that latter point 
below. 
In the previous chapter, I focused on the moral importance of the static character of 
legal rules.  When it comes to the rights and responsibilities that govern interactions 
between private persons, the law is morally necessary to settle reasonable disagreement 
between competing but reasonable interpretations of our right and responsibilities.  
Otherwise, our person and property would not be secure even from morally motivated 
individuals.   
Not only is the law meant to settle such disagreement for the time being, it is meant 
to settle it for good.  That is especially important when it come to the laws governing our 
person and property.  Individuals require a stable sphere of dominion in which they can 
make choices about their person and property, often over a lifetime, based on the legitimate 
expectations set by the law.  The laws governing those rights could not serve their purpose 
of securing equal freedom if they changed much over time.  This is one of the principles 
inherent in the principle of the rule of law.157  
Notwithstanding, equal freedom must also be secured over time in the face of 
constant changes in our physical, social, economic, and technological circumstances, 
changes that have the capacity to undermine equal freedom.  In addition, reasonable 
disagreements that were once settled often reemerge.  Recall that one aspect of political 
                                                          
157 Raz, The Authority of Law, 214-15. 
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legitimacy is the moral power to change the moral situation.  That power is dynamic in the 
sense that it is a prospective capacity to alter how the current contours of the moral 
landscape.158  Insofar as that capacity can be used to alter the moral situation, for example 
by imposing enforceable moral obligations, it is also a capacity that can be used to guide 
and secure changes in the coordinated behavior of those who are subject the state’s 
authority.159   
That a state with the dynamic capacity to alter the moral situation is morally 
necessary should be evident from our earlier discussion of the need to intervene to protect 
individuals from falling into relationships of dependence through time and the need to 
secure institutions and rights over time.  In the face of such changes, political authority 
with the capacity to alter our coordinated behavior is necessary.  Political institutions 
themselves are also subject to degradation over time and require regular supervision and 
revision.  This is as true in mundane cases, such as allocating resources to fix infrastructure, 
as it is in the more exceptional cases of allocating resources to military defense in the face 
of real security threats.  The broad point is that not only must we secure a rightful condition, 
                                                          
158 This discussion is informed by Perry’s analysis of political authority in terms of the 
“value of intentionality” and “prospectivity” conditions.  Perry, “Political Authority and 
Political Obligation,” 4-5.  Although he mentions it only in passing, I take Shapiro to be 
pointing to a similar virtue in legal authority when he remarks that legal systems “provid[e] 
a highly nimble and durable method of social planning.”  Shapiro, Legality, 213. 
159 I will leave out of this chapter a discussion of how to conceptualize judicial application 
of the law to disputes.  On the one hand, we might say that judges applying law to 
particulars are simply stating what the law requires rather than changing the moral 
situation.  In this way, they act like theoretical authorities.  On the other hand, judicial 
authority plausibly may be understood to involve significant moral powers to alter the 
moral/legal situation of the parties before the court and those outside the court within its 
jurisdiction. 
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to use Kant’s terminology, we need to sustain it over time in the face of natural and social 
forces that would slowly or dramatically undermine that condition. 
This discussion is limited in a number of ways.  First, it is not meant to be an 
exhaustive discussion of the range of cases in which moral change is necessary and 
reasonable.  The discussion is just meant to show that our legal circumstances are not fixed 
by a system of rights and responsibilities that falls from the sky and is set for time 
immemorial.  Law is purposive and dynamic, and there are reasons having to do with equal 
freedom to defend the need for law with that character.  Second, although the authority to 
change the moral situation is necessary, like any aspect of authority, it can be abused.  
Obviously, we expect authority to be exercised consistent with the rule of law.  
Notwithstanding a need for change, we expect that laws will still generally be reasonably 
stable over time.  That is both because law could not secure legitimate expectations if it 
were to change constantly and because it could not coordinate our behavior if it were to 
constantly change course.  Although an exhaustive discussion of the relationship between 
moral powers and rule of law principles is beyond the scope of this discussion, I highlight 
the problem to show the limits of the discussion before pressing on to the next section.   
3.2 - Coordination and Positive Law 
Political authority is in large part legitimized by the moral necessity of resolving 
large-scale coordination problems between persons through public laws that give easily 
discernible guidance.  Not only is coordination necessary for rights, it is necessary to get 
large-scale projects done.  Because the above responsibilities are collective in nature, they 
necessarily require coordination between the broad range of persons who share in that 
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responsibility.160  How is that possible?  The inability to coordinate our behavior without 
law is not due simply to the frailties of the human condition, including limitations in the 
reason, foresight, knowledge, or motivation of any given individual or association.  
Although, those are legitimate concerns.  Rather, even our most ideal well-motivated 
citizens will reasonably disagree about what the right course of action should or must be to 
discharge our collective responsibility to secure equal freedom. 
Disagreement comes at two points.  First, we may disagree about what it means to 
secure equal freedom where that is understood as a certain state of affairs over time that 
satisfies one’s conception of equal freedom.  Second, we may reasonably disagree about 
the means (including the timeline) according to which that state of affairs is to be secured.  
Reason cannot be our only guide in many cases.  And, even in cases where perhaps there 
is an obvious better option, coordinating around a less-ideal option may be better than not 
doing so.  Absent a unitary legal authority to direct action, we would not be able to realize 
our collective ends. 
Political authority is able to coordinate our actions because instead of being guided 
simply by our own conception of right, we are to be guided predominantly by the law.  The 
law is able to serve that purpose in part because of its positive nature.  To determine what 
equal freedom requires, and hence what course of action is required, we simply look to 
what the law says.  To determine that, we need only look to social facts about what legal 
                                                          
160 In Chapter Six, I will account for the range of this class of people in terms of the 
instrumental effectiveness of the state. 
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officials, or bodies of legal officials, have done and said.161  As Waldron expresses the 
point, “law must be such that its content and validity can be determined without 
reproducing the disagreements about rights and justice that it is law’s function to 
supersede.”162 
More is required for the law to play its coordinative role beyond its positivity.  The 
law must be reasonably communicated to all those whom it seeks to coordinate.  And, its 
demands must be reasonably easy to understand.  The law must also be effective both in 
the sense that people generally abide by it but also in the sense that it is enforced and seen 
to be enforced where individuals fail to abide.  If individuals have no assurance that others 
are following the law’s dictates, then they will see themselves as being duped into serving 
the ends of others rather than coordinating with others for the purpose of sharing 
responsibility in securing equal freedom.  
Additionally, the moral need for political authority to achieve large-scale collective 
ends is not just instrumental in nature.  Rather, it matters that those ends are achieved 
through the rule of law.  Placing authority in legal rules and offices with public mandates 
addresses the problem of private authority, in which we are subject to the private purposes 
of others.  In that way, law has intrinsic and necessary value apart from being a means to 
securing a collective end.  It puts each of us in a relationship of equality with our fellow 
citizens. 
                                                          
161 Another way to put this is that the law makes a candidate course of required action 
salient. 
162 Jeremy Waldron, “Kant’s Legal Positivism,” Harvard Law Review 109, no. 7 (1996): 
1540. 
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The law’s authority has limits.  Its purpose is to resolve reasonable disagreement 
about equal freedom, not to impose demands that no reasonable person would accept as 
consistent with equal freedom.  Where there is no possibility of reasonable disagreement, 
then the state’s authority to specify our rights and responsibilities ends.  For example, we 
would be hard pressed to account for the permissibility of using public dollars to fund 
sports arenas or religious celebrations.  The moral task of equal freedom therefore also sets 
limits on the uses of political power.  For any possible public purpose, we need to identify 
how it can be justified in terms of secure a system of equal freedom.  
This point can be easily missed in discussions of political authority because of the 
assumption that in legitimizing authority, we are demanding that individuals completely 
surrender their judgment about what is right and what is not.163  However, the point of law 
is to coordinate our actions, not exclude thinking about how action should be coordinated.  
The background assumption of this dissertation is that others are actively reasoning about 
what course of action is right, but they will inevitably reasonably disagree.  There is nothing 
unreasonable or concerning from the perspective of equal freedom about that.  Individuals 
only become unreasonable in the event that they insist on acting according to their own 
personal judgments about what freedom requires once the law settles the matter.  It is at 
that point that they unilateral impose their will on others and unilaterally undermine fair 
solutions to securing equal freedom.  They hinder freedom rather than simply thinking or 
reasoning about doing so. 
                                                          
163 E.g., Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, 13. 
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3.3 - The Principle of Fairness and Political Authority 
It is perhaps not that controversial that much of the law’s moral value comes from 
its ability to coordinate human activity to achieve valuable ends.164  A number of theorists 
have therefore questioned whether we can draw the inference that laws rationally related 
to such ends will bind all of those subject to the law.  Recall my earlier discussion in 
Chapter One of Hume’s defense of political obligation.  Hume urged that we are bound to 
obey the law “because society could not otherwise subsist.”165  The plain difficulty with 
that view, however, is that the law can tolerate some level of non-compliance without 
society falling into ruin.166  The same can be said about almost any of the public tasks that 
are reasonably the responsibility of the state.167  Thus, one might ask how the general moral 
necessity of legal solutions to collective problems implies the moral necessity of any 
                                                          
164 Even Simmons, for example, seems to think that state coordination can be a good 
thing in some cases.  Wellman and Simmons, Is There a Moral Obligation to Obey the 
Law?, 193. 
165 Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” 481.  Along similar lines, Hume wrote, “society 
cannot possibly be maintained without the authority of magistrates, and that this authority 
must soon fall into contempt where exact obedience is not paid to it. The observation of 
these general and obvious interests is the source of all allegiance, and of that moral 
obligation which we attribute to it.”  Ibid., 480. 
166 This is supported by the fact that the law often permits exceptions so long as they are 
on the law’s terms. 
167 As Simmons remarks, “Legal systems tolerate quite impressive levels of noncompliance 
without performing the tasks in question interestingly less well (than they would with 
greater compliance).”  Wellman and Simmons, Is There a Duty to Obey the Law?, 136.  
Wellman agrees: “[A]n average citizen’s (dis)obedience typically has no discernable effect 
whatsoever upon a government’s capacity to perform its functions, so it appears that no 
strictly consequential account of our duty to obey the state’s commands can be plausible.”  
Ibid., 33. 
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individual person complying with the law.  Theorists have sought to resolve that problem 
with an appeal to the notion of fairness.  Fairness brings into the fold those actors and 
actions that are not necessary to bring about whatever end needs to be achieved because 
those individuals whose compliance is not marginally necessary would violate a duty of 
fairness if they failed to comply. 
Rawls was an early proponent of the principle of fairness, so our discussion must 
begin there.  Rawls argued that under the following conditions, an individual will have an 
obligation to obey the law:  First, there is a just scheme of social cooperation that yields 
benefits.  Second, the individual can benefit from the scheme even if he does not do his 
part.  Finally, the individual voluntarily accepts and intends to continue to accept the 
benefits of the just scheme.168  If those conditions are met, then the individual has an 
obligation to cooperate and do his fair part, which in the case of the state amounts to his 
obligation to follow the law. 
There are a number of difficulties with the view, which I will address by looking at 
the steps in reverse order.  The first major difficulty is the step from the duty to do one’s 
fair part to the duty to follow the law.  We might accept for the sake of argument that if 
one accepts benefits from a just social scheme of cooperation, then one has a duty to do 
one’s fair share in producing that benefit.  For example, say that I live in a town with an 
ordinance that requires payment of a $5 tax that is used to pay for the daily services of a 
river-cleanup technician.  All of my fellow citizens pay the tax.  I refuse, despite the fact 
that I accept and enjoy the benefits of the clean river.  It is where I fish for my dinner.  
                                                          
168 Rawls, Collected Papers, 122-23. 
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Although I refuse to pay the tax, I clean the river on the day that the town does not hire the 
technician.  There is no difference in the cleanliness of the river because I clean the river 
on that day, just like I do every other day when the town hires me as the technician.  The 
difficulty is that if one can do one’s fair share in a way that the law has not specified, then 
one has not violated one’s duty to do one’s fair share even though one has violated the law.  
Accordingly, the failure to do one’s fair share without additional premises cannot account 
for why one’s failure to follow the law violates the principle of fairness. 
The second problem is with the inference from receiving benefits from a just 
scheme of cooperation to a duty to do one’s fair share in producing the benefits.  Say that 
364 of my co-workers agree to create a cooperative coffee scheme whereby everyone is 
assigned a day to contribute a bag of Primo coffee.169  I did not participate in the agreement, 
nor was I somehow made aware of it prior to taking the job, but pursuant to the agreement 
my name is put on a list with all of my other co-workers designating the date on which 
each of us is responsible for buying one giant bag of Primo coffee for the pot.  As a result 
of the scheme, there are 365 cups of coffee available each morning, and a hot cup of coffee 
is placed on my desk each day.  I drink it each day because I like coffee, and I don’t want 
to, and should not have to, walk down the hall to pour the cup out in the kitchen sink.  
According to the principle of fairness, when it comes to my day, I am supposed to 
contribute a bag of Primo coffee.170  Yet, there is no apparent reason why I can be required, 
                                                          
169 This example models Nozick’s public address system of entertainment.  Nozick, 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 93-94. 
170 The example can also be used to challenge the inference from the duty to do my fair 
part to the duty to obey the rule.  Even if I believe that I have a duty to do my fair part in 
the coffee scheme, there may be another way to do that.  For example, instead of buying a 
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let alone forced, into such a thing.  The Primo coffee scheme is just a case of other people 
foisting their own private purposes on me, which is a violation of my rights.   
The next difficulties arise because the conditions that are supposed to trigger the 
duty of fair play are rarely, and therefore not generally, present.  Moreover, in part because 
of that, those conditions in no way seem relevant to the question of whether one has a moral 
obligation to obey a law.  First, the applicability of the law to an individual is not 
conditional on their voluntary acceptance.  Laws, unless explicitly stating so, do not 
condition their applicability on the voluntary acts of those subject to them.171  There is a 
good reason for that.  We saw this earlier in Chapter Two.  Conditioning the applicability 
of the law on the voluntary actions of those subject to it permits individuals to unilateral 
impose there own will on their fellow citizens.  Second, the applicability of a law is also 
not contingent up whether an individual benefitted from that law.  There may be a broad 
sense in which we expect citizens generally to benefit from the law, not in the sense that 
they are better off than some comparative state of affairs or that they receive discrete 
discernible benefits, but in the sense that they can exercise their freedom to personally 
pursue whatever benefits they want so long as they abide by the rights of others.  That just 
                                                          
bag of Primo as required, I might by a bag of Sub-Primo but spend thirty minutes cleaning 
the deposits out of the coffee machine, which needs to be done to make good tasting coffee 
even though no one else recognizes that fact.  Nonetheless, a lot depends on how we 
describe the benefit that is produced by the scheme.  If the benefit is that all drink Primo 
coffee each day, perhaps because Primo has special nutrients, one’s substitution is not 
doing one’s fair share.  If the benefit is that all drink good-tasting coffee each day, then one 
has offered an adequate substitution. 
171 The nature of the acceptance necessary to ground the obligation of fair play is also 
subject to dispute.  Simmons, for example, defends a more robust conception of the 
acceptance necessary for any duty of fairness.  Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, 20.  
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means the state is generally doing its job.  However, whether a particular law is legitimate 
and binding, fully or partially, on a person does not turn on whether they actually received 
some benefit from it.  For example, part of my tax dollars may be spent to fund a battered 
women’s shelter.  Being a man, I do not receive any obvious personal benefits from that.  
Yet, surely the state’s funding of that program can be understood to be securing the equal 
freedom of the women who need that shelter, and the state can demand some of my tax 
dollars on that basis.  I can be called upon to share in the responsibility of securing the 
equal freedom of those women. 
Several observations should be made at this point.  First, I have not argued that the 
principle of fairness, perhaps with some adjustments, is not applicable in contexts outside 
of the law.  For example, Simmons’s has articulated a version of the principle of fairness 
with reasonably robust requirements that, if met in the context of our everyday voluntary 
associations with others, would seems to ground a moral obligation to do one’s fair 
share.172  Second, despite that, it seems obvious that notions of fairness would somehow 
be relevant and important in any discussion about what the state can demand of individuals 
when it comes to the broader public responsibilities that make coordination necessary.  
Accordingly, and finally, the implication is that the state is sui generous in that it is not 
simply your average association amongst teammates or co-workers.  Any fairness account 
should presume that fact.  This, as I remarked earlier, is the problem with conceiving of 
the state simply as a system of social cooperation.  Instead, the state is singular in the 
                                                          
172 Ibid.  However, any such duty would have to be specified by the law. 
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mandatory role it plays and the mandatory responsibilities that it discharges with respect 
to securing equal freedom. 
With those lessons in mind, a number of theorists have sought to combine the 
principle of fairness with moral task theories of the state.  For example, David Estlund 
argues that we have a collective duty to solve humanitarian problems, which translates into 
a duty that individuals have to do their “fair share” to solve such problems.173  And, 
Wellman argues that only states have the effective capacity to benefit us by rescuing us 
from the state of nature.  Therefore, states have a samaritan duty to benefit us by securing 
peace and protecting rights.  The principle of fairness then comes in to account for why we 
all are subject to the law in furtherance of those ends even though any one of us would not 
be marginally necessary to achieve the goal.174   
I will discuss Estlund’s use of the principle of fairness some in Chapter Five 
because it fits with his account of the authority of democratic institutions.  Because 
Wellman offers a more developed and nuanced account of the issues of fairness relevant 
in this chapter, I will focus on his view.  Wellman summarizes his view as follows: 
The samaritan model of political legitimacy explains that a state has a right 
to force even those who do not consent because this force is necessary to 
rescue this person and others.  Adding samaritan duties and fairness to this, 
                                                          
173 Simmons describes the most defensible way in which fair play could bind one to a joint 
enterprise.  See ibid., 1-42.  While Estlund’s account employs the fair-share requirement, 
it is not based on the idea of voluntarily accepting benefits and free-riding on others.  David 
Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton University Press, 
2008), 147. 
174 Wellman, “Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation,” 749. 
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we can now explain that each person has an obligation to obey the law as 
her fair share of this samaritan task.  By invoking fairness in this fashion, 
we may freely admit that no one would slip into peril if a single individual 
disobeyed the law.  Instead, we point out that it would be unfair to shirk 
one’s share of the samaritan chore.  Securing political stability is a 
communal responsibility that falls upon all of us; it is wrong to leave all the 
work to others.175  
I will not say much about Wellman’s view of the specific task that he identifies for the 
state.  There are surely questions about what exactly it means to say that the state’s 
responsibility is to rescue us from the state of nature and secure political stability.  We 
could interpret that responsibility more or less narrowly.  It is difficult to understand how 
many of what we reasonably take to be the state’s responsibilities could be understood as 
derivative of the state’s responsibility to rescue us from the state of nature.  What is 
important, nonetheless, is that the account reasonably fits within the basic moral task 
framework.  That is crucial because it addresses any difficulties that would arise in applying 
the principle of fairness to demand fair contributions to benefits that are not mandatory or 
moral in nature (such as daily coffee). 
Wellman uses fairness to capture, and subject to the state’s authority, those actors 
and actions that are not strictly necessary to bring about whatever end needs to be achieved.  
The basic idea is that if others are required to expend effort to resolve an important task, 
                                                          
175 Ibid. 
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then everyone else, as a matter of fairness, must do so too.  I will challenge that idea in part 
later on, but for now it is not particularly controversial to accept that view. 
The view still faces a substantial difficulty, one that was discussed above.  The 
problem is with the inference from the duty to do one’s fair share to the duty to “obey the 
law as [one’s] fair share” of the collective end.176   Even if we assume that individuals have 
a duty to do their fair share, it would seem that in most everyday cases there are any number 
of ways in which individuals might discharge their fair-share responsibility, ways that do 
not involve compliance with the law.177  For example, if some of my tax dollars would be 
spent on a poverty relief program, why can I not forgo paying those dollars to the 
government and instead direct them to a different poverty relief program that does as good 
or an even better job relieving poverty?  The picture that emerges from that difficulty is 
one in which the law is a guide for how to do one’s fair share, but it is not a mandatory 
guide.  There is the possibility that individuals can do their fair share in a manner that is 
                                                          
176 Ibid.  Estlund is aware of this difficulty too:  even if “I might get an obligation to direct 
my efforts to some local portion of the system that is addressing [some] need, something 
more would be needed to explain why I would be obligated to follow orders, to do what I 
am told because I am told.”  Estlund, Democratic Authority, 151.  Estlund employs the idea 
of “normative consent” to address the problem.  In Chapter Five, I discuss why that 
resolution is unsuccessful. 
177 A comparable point has been made in the literature on the supposed division of labor 
between political institutions and individuals in reconciling the co-existence of impartial 
values (e.g., justice) with partial values (e.g., family).  See, e.g., Samuel Scheffler, “The 
Division of Moral Labor,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 
79 (2005): 250; Kok-Chor Tan, Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site, Ground, and 
Scope of Equality (Oxford University Press, 2012), 32.  There the issue has to do with why 
political institutions limit and mediate one’s responsibilities founded in justice when one 
can, the argument goes, better discharge those responsibilities directly.  As Liam Murphy 
puts the point, “[i]f people have a duty to promote just institutions, why do they lack a duty 
to promote whatever it is that just institutions are for?”  Liam Murphy, “Institutions and 
the Demands of Justice,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 27, no. 4 (1998): 280.   
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not mediated by political authorities.178  Obviously, whether someone in fact lives up to 
that responsibility would have to be considered on a case-by-case basis, and adjudicatory 
bodies would be necessary to adjudicate disputes about that.  However, insofar as we accept 
the idea that individuals can do their fair share independent of the law, we cannot draw the 
inference that compliance with the law is necessary as a matter of fairness. 
Wellman attempts to solve this problem.  His answer is that discretion in how to do 
one’s fair share is “a good of which one may not take more than one’s fair share.”179  In 
requiring that all individuals obey the law, we are fairly distributing the good of discretion.  
The individual who disobeys but still does what is her fair share in support of important 
moral task is taking more of her fair share of discretion. 
Although interesting, this strategy is not successful.  There are two problems.  The 
first problem is that requiring a fair distribution of discretion does not entail full obedience 
with the law unless there is already full obedience with the law.  Hart offered an early 
version of the principle of fairness, what he called “mutuality of restrictions,” that helps to 
explicate the idea.  Hart argued that “when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise 
according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these 
                                                          
178 One point that is often lost in the literature is that there are at least two ways in which 
the state mediates one’s duties in justice.  First, the state specifies one’s responsibilities 
with a law that identifies what action is required.  For example, pay $5 for poverty relief 
by some date.  Second, the state plays an administrative role.  The tax is paid to the state, 
and the state administers how the fund is to allocated and so on.  But, we can imagine 
institutional arrangements where the state mediates one’s responsibilities in the first way 
but not the second.  For example, the state may require that $5 for poverty relief be paid 
directly to Oxfam rather than the state.  Obviously, we will have reasonable disagreements 
about what arrangements should be chosen, which is why the law is needed in the first 
place.    
179 Wellman and Simmons, Is There a Duty to Obey the Law?, 40. 
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restrictions when required have a right to a similar submission.”180  It fairly captures the 
idea that Wellman is invoking here.  If everyone else restricts their liberty, i.e. their 
discretion, in furtherance of the collective task, then they have a right to the same 
“submission.”  So, if everyone else obeys the law in furtherance of the state’s 
responsibilities, then I must submit in the same way and obey the law.   
A difficulty arises, however, if we do not assume that everyone obeys the law, 
which is not an unreasonable assumption in light of human experience.  As an empirical 
matter, compliance is only ever partial: people break the law.  What that means is that so 
long as the state’s moral responsibilities are sufficiently discharged, a fair distribution of 
submission and discretion will not require full compliance from all persons but only partial 
compliance from all persons.  Whether there is a fair distribution is determined by reference 
to how people in a given state are actually behaving.181 
The second difficulty is that discretion is not always a good and, in fact, is not a 
good in this context.  Having an obligation obviously impacts whether one has discretion 
with respect to a certain action.  If a person has a decisive moral obligation to do X, then 
she has no discretion not to do X.  If she has no decisive moral obligation to do X, then she 
                                                          
180 Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?,” 185.  In “Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair 
Play,” Rawls makes no reference to the “mutuality of restriction” aspect of the principle of 
fairness, which perhaps would be one way to bridge the gap between the duty to do one’s 
fair share and the duty to do one’s fair share in the same way that everyone else does.  
Rawls, Collected Papers, 117.  However, in other writings, Rawls invokes that idea 
through what he describes as the right to “similar acquiescence.”  Ibid., 60, 99, 209.  
181 Even in a case where everyone else fully complies, the principle of mutual restriction 
might not compel full compliance.  The individual deciding whether to comply might just 
say to everyone else, “I am going to do my fair share in a different way this one time, and 
to keep things fair, you also should do the same some time too.” 
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has discretion to do X.  The question of discretion is thus conceptually related to the 
question of whether there is an underlying moral obligation.  It is therefore true that if 
everyone has the same obligation with respect to X, then everyone has the same discretion 
with respect to X.  But, if an individual has a moral obligation to do X, then having the 
discretion to do otherwise is not a moral good.  Their exercise of discretion would amount 
to violating their moral obligation.  It would be odd to aim to fairly distribute permissions 
to violate moral obligations.   
More generally, the issue of whether a law is politically legitimate seems to have 
little to do with how much discretion individuals are given in how they discharge their fair-
share responsibilities.  For example, say that a Pennsylvania law requires that all 
Pennsylvanians contribute to the state-run poverty program.  Assume also that New Jersey 
has a similar requirement, but New Jersey requires contribution either to the New Jersey-
run poverty program or a private option run by a company in Princeton.  Assuming that 
such programs function adequately, I see no reason to think that New Jersey is any more 
legitimate, or even politically preferable, simply because it permits more discretion.  Nor 
do we think that Pennsylvania citizens are being treated unfairly when compared to New 
Jersey citizens.  Obviously, citizen’s within each state might reasonably disagree about 
which program the state should employ, which is why each state must pick an alternative 
to resolve the disagreement and coordinate everyone’s behavior.  But, either option could 
be legitimate. 
Those problems represent a broader difficulty with the distributive argument: it gets 
the order of explanation wrong.  Although perhaps a fair distribution of discretion is a 
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consequence of full compliance with the duty to obey the law, securing a fair distribution 
of discretion does not explain why individuals have a duty to obey the law. 
3.4 - Securing Equal Freedom Fairly 
 The prior discussion of the principle of fairness and the distributive argument 
compels a different way of thinking about the relationship between fairness and the 
obligation to obey the law.  In the views described above, fairness was to be determined by 
focusing on the acts or discretion to act of individuals.  Those arguments took two forms:  
Individuals have an obligation to do their fair share.  Or, each individual is to have the same 
amount of discretion.  Our focus should be elsewhere.  Instead, we should focus on the law 
itself and whether the law secures freedom in a fair manner. 
 Earlier I noted that the primary ways in which individuals participate in collective 
projects is by paying or participating.  Here, I want to use that distinction to make a point 
about how thinking about political legitimacy in terms of a moral power allows us to think 
about whether the principle of fairness really requires everyone do the same exact thing or 
have the same amount of discretion.  Say that there is a legitimate national security threat, 
and a special operations team of 200 soldiers is required to supplement the existing 200 
soldier volunteer force.  Now, as a general matter, the law requires taxes to fund the military 
and more money may need to be raised to support the additional special operations force.  
But, if you are a soldier, your taxes are discounted some because of your military service.  
How is the state to raise 200 additional soldiers?  Well, it could ask for 200 more 
volunteers.  But let’s say that instead it will choose to draft 200 additional soldiers by 
lottery. 
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 The solution specifies a fair system of shared responsibility.  No citizen has been 
treated unfairly in the example.  Yet, they fall into three unequal categories: payers, 
volunteers, and draftees.  What should be evident is that the example does not 
straightforwardly fit the principle of fairness as it was discussed earlier.  Between the three 
categories, citizens are not contributing in the same manner.  Nor is there obvious 
distributive equality in the amount of discretion afforded each citizen.  At present, the 
volunteers have very little discretion.  They are living the military life and constantly 
subject to the say of their commanders.  But, the volunteers chose the life, so at least they 
had more discretion than the draftees who had no choice.  The draftees will have little 
discretion soon enough but before the draft they have more discretion than the volunteers.  
The payers, well they have a lot of discretion in contrast with the soldiers.  But the payers 
also lack discretion in that they have to pay more in taxes.  Perhaps they need to work 
longer hours to buy things they have wanted to buy.  Plus, they had no ability to choose to 
join up.  The only way to get into the additional special force unit was to be selected in the 
lottery. 
 There are three lessons here.  First, fairness does not require everyone to do the 
same thing or to have the same amount of discretion.  You can end up a volunteer, a draftee, 
or a payer.  Second, there is no obvious way in which we would measure the discretion of 
each category of citizen with the goal of treating them equally.  For example, as between a 
payer and a volunteer, in one sense, payer has more discretion because a member of the 
military will end up with way less discretion.  But, in another sense, they each have the 
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same discretion insofar as each was given the discretion to limit their discretion or not.182  
Finally, what we are primarily concerned with is coordinating everyone’s behavior in a fair 
way such that the job of securing the nation is completed.  Insofar the law specifies a 
reasonable approach to that job, it has resolved any reasonable disagreements that might 
exist about whether the same actions must be required of all or whether discretion must be 
distributed equally if possible.  Undoubtedly, there may be cases where equal action is the 
choice that resolves a reasonable disagreement, but it is not a requirement. 
 Articulating the principle of fairness as a principle used to assess the law directly 
offers an additional advantage over the standard accounts.  We can now respond to an 
important criticism of fairness-based accounts of political obligation.  Jules Coleman offers 
the following argument against the principle of fairness as an account of the obligation to 
obey the law:  
[L]ooking at duties of fair play to help us understand how the law can be a 
source of content-independent moral reasons is like looking for love in all 
the wrong places. . . .  If there is a duty of fair play to comply with law it is 
not grounded in law, but is instead contingent upon the compliance of others 
with law.  It is not a duty to obey the law whose ground is the law, but a 
duty we owe others not to take advantage of their compliance with law.183 
                                                          
182 A fuller discussion of this is beyond the scope of this chapter.  However, there is a broad 
and interesting literature on the related issue of the extent to which distributive justice is 
choice-sensitive and what that could mean. For discussion and references, see Kok-Chor 
Tan, “A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism,” The Journal of Philosophy 105, no. 11 (2008): 
665-90.  
183 Jules L. Coleman, “Beyond the Separability Thesis: Moral Semantics and the 
Methodology of Jurisprudence,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 27, no. 4 (2007): 591.  
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The account that I just described avoids this criticism.  Because the principle of fairness 
applies to how the law chooses to coordinate our behavior rather than our behavior directly, 
it is not the case that any duty is explained by a need not to take advantage of the 
compliance of others.  Instead, the bindingness of any duty that results from fair legal 
coordination is grounded in the fact that the law is coordinating our behavior in a fair 
manner.  Therefore, the law is, at least in part, the ground because the law resolves any 
reasonable disagreement about what fairness requires.  Another way of putting this is that 
the principle of fairness is a principle that applies to institutions.184 
 That is not to say that there is not a related background duty that applies to 
individuals.  Citizens have a moral responsibility to participate in fair legal solutions (to 
the extent they are called) to secure equal freedom.  The state in part determines the 
character of that shared responsibility through the law.  In addition, it is only because we 
each have a shared responsibility that the state can call on us at all.  In that sense, there is 
a correspondence between moral reasons that apply to the state and those that apply to 
individuals. 
 
 
                                                          
Perry echoes this criticism as showing that the principle of fairness violates the directive-
as-ground condition Perry, “Political Authority and Political Obligation,” 23. 
184 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 257. 
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CHAPTER 4 - LEGAL SPECIFICATIONISM GENERALLY 
I have argued that moral indeterminacy without enforceable political institutions 
undermines the possibility of equal freedom.  A legal system is necessary to provide a 
univocal specification of what our rights and responsibilities consist in.  The primary 
reason for that is so that individuals can pursue their our own good in a way that is 
consistent with the pursuit of the good by others.  But, what does it mean to specify our 
abstract right to equal freedom?  And, why must specification be performed by the state 
rather that simply by each individual?  This chapter addresses those issues.   
It will be helpful to begin with a commonplace example to understand the 
relationship between an abstract requirement and a specification of that requirement.  Law 
schools demand that prospective students demonstrate proficiency in critical reasoning and 
critical writing prior to admittance.  Nonetheless, most law school-bound students will tell 
you that what is required is demonstrated proficiency on the LSAT, the Law School 
Admission Test.  Thus, law school applicants are required to demonstrate proficiency 
through a particular test that is created and administered by a particular company, namely 
the Law School Admission Council (LSAC).  That is the demand that law schools make 
on applicants and applicants must comply if they have a hope of admittance.  Only the 
LSAT counts. 
 Say that a trash man, Lenny, gets ahold of an actual version of the upcoming LSAT, 
with answer key and all, after one is accidentally tossed in the trash.  Convinced that the 
LSAC is a corrupt enterprise that should not have so much influence, but acknowledging 
that his law school-bound kid, Junior, has to demonstrate proficiency to gain admission, 
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Lenny brings the test home to administer to his kid free of charge.  Mainly for spite, he 
changes the name to the “LAST” (Lenny’s Anarchically Standardized Test).  He 
administers the exam to his kid in the same way that it would be administered by the LSAC 
and scores the exam according to the answer key.  Has the kid demonstrated proficiency in 
critical reasoning and critical writing?  You bet!  He only missed two questions!  Junior is 
a smart cookie.  Yet, despite demonstrating proficiency on the LAST, Junior is not admitted 
into any of the law schools to which he applied.  In fact, all of the law schools refuse to 
read his application because he never took the LSAT.  
In this case, demonstrating proficiency in critical reasoning and critical writing is 
the abstract demand.  Demonstrating proficiency on the LSAT is a specification of that 
demand. Insofar as prospective law students intend to comply with the abstract demand, 
they must do whatever counts as complying with that demand, namely doing well on the 
LSAT administered by LSAC.  That is because only demonstrating proficiency on the 
LSAT counts as satisfying the more abstract demand as far as law schools are concerned.  
Proficiency on no other exams or in other academic exercises will count as demonstrating 
proficiency for purposes of law school admissions.  With that example in mind, I will now 
provide a more general theoretical framework for how to understand specification of 
abstract requirements. 
4.1 - A Framework    
 Philosophers writing about political authority have described the practical effect of 
exercises of authority in a variety of ways: “the law modifies the way morality applies to 
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people” (Raz)185; our political duties are “mediated” and thus “filled out” by the law (Stilz 
interpreting Kant)186; the law has a role in “constituting” and making “determinate” our 
rights and responsibilities (Ripstein interpreting Kant)187; or the law provides 
“determinations”188 of principles (Murphy, Finnis, and Aquinas).189  I will describe all of 
these practical effects under the heading of specificationism, which is the view that the 
state, through the law, has a responsibility and a right to specify the abstract right to equal 
freedom.   
 Henry Richardson offers an account of how specification works for individuals 
deliberating about their own moral ends and how they are to act in light of those ends.  It 
will therefore be helpful to begin with Richardson’s account and build from there.  
Richardson’s account most directly concerns our reasons for action and thus is easily used 
to build an account of specifications of political obligations, but we can equally use it to 
cover the variety of Hohfeldian rights discussed earlier.   
  Richardson aims to present an account of deliberation about ends that is rational 
and action guiding in real-life cases, notwithstanding conflict and incommensurability 
between many of our important goals.  So, while I have described specification as an 
interpersonal problem, Richardson presents it as an intrapersonal problem.  How is an 
                                                          
185 Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation, 192. 
186 Stilz, Liberal Loyalty, 21. 
187 E.g., Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 9 & 197 n.24. 
188 Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics, 88.  Murphy is following the 
natural law view articulated by Aquinas and later Finnis.  Finnis, Natural Law and Natural 
Rights, 249.  
189 Jon Garthoff speaks similarly about social institutions, which he argues “embody” 
morality.  Jon Garthoff, “The Embodiment Thesis,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7, 
no. 1 (2004): 15. 
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individual to act in the face of competing commitments, such as personal success and close 
family ties?  Richardson characterizes specification as a deliberative process that 
supplements both intuitive balancing of values or reasons, and deduction from general 
practical principles.  Specification, on his account, is important not just for acting but so 
that one can systematize their practical commitments into a reasonably coherent scheme in 
which one is able to act according to principle.   
Specification of norms, according to Richardson, involves “setting out substantive 
qualifications that add information about the scope of applicability of the norm or the 
nature of the act enjoined or the end aimed at.”190  A specification does that by “describing 
what the action or end is or where, when, why, how, by what means, by whom, or to whom 
the action is to be done or the end is to be pursued.”191  More broadly, a specification “will 
involve spelling out the ways or circumstances in which it is to be pursued.”192  So, 
returning to our example of law-school admissions, the norm that specifically requires that 
proficiency be demonstrated on the LSAT administered by LSAC adds information about 
the specific nature of the act and circumstances required to demonstrate proficiency more 
generally.   
Richardson is primarily concerned with norms or ends that are non-absolute in 
character, norms that display a “kind of looseness” that Kant described in his account of 
imperfect duties using the idea of “latitude.”193  Some norms describe more general policies 
                                                          
190 Henry S. Richardson, Practical Reasoning about Final Ends (Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 73. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid., 70.   
193 Ibid., 71. 
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or goals that can be satisfied in any number of ways.  For example, Kant argued that we 
have an imperfect duty to ourselves to develop our talents.  Nonetheless, that duty does not 
tell one which talents to develop or the manner in which they are to be developed.  
Similarly, we have an imperfect duty to promote the happiness of others.  But that duty 
does not tell one whose happiness to promote, when, how much, or in what manner.  Of 
course, here we are not concerned with ethics but political right, an account of what 
individuals can be required and forced to do by the state.  Below, I will return to why 
Richardson focuses on non-absolute norms or ends, and note a problem.   
Take the following example, from Richardson, of an abstract, non-absolute norm 
or end that is in need of specification: “Within reason, do what is necessary to improve my 
chances of getting into medical school.”194  How is a budding medical student to go about 
satisfying that norm in a reasonable manner?  He has a number of commitments to family 
and friends.  He also must look out for his own welfare.  And, he wants the options of 
specializing and getting a good job.  One specification of the above norm would be, 
“Generally speaking, while I am at school, do whatever morally acceptable acts are 
necessary to assuring myself a reasonable chance of getting into a premier East Coast 
medical school.”195   Notice that the latter norm incorporates relevant substantive 
information into the norm such that the budding medical student has reasonably clear 
guidance on what to do in the face of a broad range of choices.  First, the abstract norm is 
specified to require certain actions only when one is at school.  That limits the 
                                                          
194 Ibid., 73. 
195 Ibid. 
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circumstances in which the end is to be pursued.  When at home, he can close the books.  
Second, the norm now only permits choices that are morally acceptable.  So, for instance, 
the student would not be permitted to study instead of abiding by his promise to spend the 
afternoon with his sister.  Third, the norm narrows the range of necessary actions to those 
that reasonably improve one’s chances of not just getting into an East Coast medical school 
but a premiere East Coast medical school.  Hence, despite consistently scoring above 
average on his practice exams compared to students who got into average medical schools, 
the student cannot leave the library to go watch television; he must press on until he masters 
those practice exams and scores above average for premiere East Coast schools.  In the 
end, “[f]ulfilling the more specific end is a way of fulfilling the more abstract one,” but not 
the only way.196 
 There are two consequences to specifying the norm.  First, once a norm is 
sufficiently specified, prospectively, it should be “sufficiently obvious” which actions will 
count at satisfying the norm.197   Specification therefore serves a purpose in guiding action 
in a range of cases that pose real ethical problems.  Second, retrospectively, once a norm 
is sufficiently specified it becomes sufficiently clear which actions “count” as satisfying 
the norm or not.  Thus, others and oneself will be able to determine if one has satisfied the 
abstract norm by looking to see if one has satisfied the additional criteria set out in the 
norm that specifies the manner in which the abstract norm is to be satisfied. 
                                                          
196 Ibid., 75. 
197 Ibid., 75-77. 
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 Richardson offers the following helpful definition of the specification relationship 
between two norms.  Norm p is a specification of norm q if and only if: 
(A) every possible instance of . . . p would count as an instance of . . . q (in 
other words, any act that satisfies p . . . also satisfies q . . .); 
(B) p qualifies q substantively . . . by adding clauses describing what the 
action or end is or where, when, why, how, by what means, by whom, 
or to whom the action is to be done or the end is to be pursued; and 
(C) none of these added clauses in p is substantively irrelevant to q.198 
(A) imparts the notion that one can satisfy the more abstract norm by satisfying the 
specified version of the norm.  The idea is that the set of actions that satisfy p is contained 
within the set of actions that satisfy q.  (B) imparts the notion that more specific information 
is incorporated into the norm.  Obviously, more or less specific information can be added 
to the norm.  How much information is enough has much to do with what is the purpose of 
specification.  For present purposes, it should be the case that enough information is added 
to offer practical guidance in real decision scenarios.  (C) is included for completeness but 
merely follows from (B) insofar as irrelevant information could not substantively qualify 
q.  For example, incorporating irrelevant conjuncts into the norm would be ruled out.    
Now, Richardson says that if a norm is “logically absolute in that it is to be pursued 
in all circumstances, then specification could add nothing that is already implicit in it.”199  
It is for that reason that he focuses on norms qualified by “generally,” norms that therefore 
                                                          
198 Ibid., 72-73.  I have omitted some of the more technical language for clarity. 
199 Ibid., 70. 
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permit some sort of latitude.  That claim would seem to rule out the argument for 
specification that I have offered here.  For one, it is expected that one must always respect 
the equal freedom of others.  And, one must also always do their fair share in securing 
equal freedom for others.  Those are logically absolute norms insofar as they must be 
followed in all instances, and it is the job of the state to secure compliance to the fullest 
extent possible.   
Richardson nonetheless overstates the point.  To begin, take the following example 
that he offers to make the point that logically absolute norms cannot be specified:  “For 
example, if we began with ‘always do whatever is required for personal success,’ then 
‘always dress in the way required for personal success’ would be redundant.”200  The idea 
is that the latter norm is not a specification of the former more general norm because the 
latter norm directly follows from the former.  It is a simple entailment.  The latter norm 
therefore adds nothing to the former norm.  The same would be the case if we reframed the 
example in terms of respecting the rights of others.  For example, from, “always act in a 
way that does not violate the rights of others,” one can infer, “always drive in a way that 
does not violate the rights of others.”  From the example, Richardson infers that logically 
absolute norms cannot be specified.  It is “the nonabsolute character of our norms [that] 
ensure[s] that judgment has a role in deliberation,” according to Richardson.201   
Another way to articulate the problem is in terms of the view of practical authority 
that Raz calls the “no difference thesis.”202  The no difference thesis says that an “exercise 
                                                          
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid., 76. 
202 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 30. 
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of authority should make no difference to what its subjects ought to do.”203  Instead, 
practical authority, including political authority, does change reasons and what subjects 
ought do.  It would not be practical authority otherwise.  Similarly, if the contents of all 
legitimate legal norms were simply entailed by natural political morality, there would be 
no sense in which such norms made a practical difference.  They would not be 
specifications. 
 Although it is true that norms that are entailed by logically absolute norms cannot 
be specifications, it is not true that logically absolute norms cannot be specified.  Even 
logically absolute norms can be specified insofar as there is any indeterminacy in the norm, 
meaning that there are a number of viable qualified norms satisfaction of which would also 
satisfy the indeterminate norm.  Return to the mandate of personal success.  Even 
Richardson’s example can be specified insofar as “personal success” is indeterminate.  
There are innumerable standards by which personal success can be measured.  For 
example:  Does personal success demand prestige, money, a doctorate, or fame?  Does 
dressing for personal success require functional clothing or clothing designed to foster a 
certain image?  What one does to satisfy the abstract norm ultimately depends on how one 
defines personal success.  Consequently, that the norm is logically absolute is not 
dispositive.  What matters is that there are number of ways to satisfy the norm and that 
adding more information will identify which course of action to take. 
 The point is not of mere technical importance.  As I explained earlier, practical 
authority, authority that is able to alter the moral landscape, can only be legitimized if there 
                                                          
203 Ibid., 48-50. 
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is a moral need for that authority.  If all logically absolute moral norms provided 
sufficiently clear moral guidance in all circumstances, there would be no role for practical 
authority to play aside from the need for coercive enforcement.  The law could make no 
practical difference, and the law could no more than merely recite our pre-existing logically 
absolute rights and responsibilities and what follows from them.  Even logically absolute 
norms, like the norm mandating satisfaction of the right to equal freedom, require 
specification, such that there is a practical role that the law can play.  
We are now in a good position to offer a general definition of the specification 
relationship between two norms, building off Richardson’s account.  Moral norm B is a 
specification of abstract moral norm A if and only if: 
(1) Every action or state of affairs that satisfies the specified moral norm B 
could reasonably count as satisfying the abstract moral norm A; 
(2) Specified moral norm B is not logically entailed by moral norm A; and 
(3) Specified moral norm B adds relevant substantive information (content) 
about the who, what, where, when, why, and how for satisfying the 
abstract moral norm A.204 
Here I have largely followed Richardson’s exposition with some minor changes in 
language and the inclusion of (2) to capture the point made in the above discussion.  (2) 
makes clear that a practical difference in made by the specification.  So we could even 
revise (2) to state: 
                                                          
204 The model described is a bit simplistic in that the specification of equal freedom is not 
contained in a single legal norm but in a system of legal norms. 
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(2’) Moral norm B makes a practical difference in the moral landscape. 
In the case of norms that require action, for example an obligation-imposing norm, the 
specification of that norm makes a practical difference with respect to what an individual 
must do.  The broad norm language is still useful.  It encompasses both norms that describe 
obligations and norms that describe rights.  A norm can describe any Hohfeldian incident. 
 As I have argued so far, the law is required to specify our abstract equal right to 
freedom as independence.  Although still interpreted in abstract terms, the abstract right 
can be interpreted to obligate individuals to respect to rights of others and to obligate 
individuals to do their share in securing the background conditions necessary for equal 
freedom.  The state can force individuals to comply with those obligations by forcing them 
to comply with the law, law that provides specifications of those obligations.  As I have 
explained, we reasonably disagree about what more specific norms, actions, and states of 
affairs constitute satisfaction of the abstract rights to equal freedom and the abstract 
responsibilities that flow from it, which is why political authority is morally necessary to 
specify our rights and responsibilities in the first place.   
In light of the language I have been employing to discuss the need and importance 
of political authority, (1) can also be reformulated in a way that employs less philosophical 
jargon: 
(1’) Specified moral norm B is a reasonable interpretation of abstract moral 
norm A. 
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The core idea is that we have competing but reasonable interpretations about what freedom 
requires.  Nonetheless, freedom requires the law to coordinate our interpretations so that 
we can live among each other in a way that is consistent with the freedom of each other. 
4.2 - Sources of Indeterminacy 
At this point, it will be helpful to address some of the sources of indeterminacy in 
our shared and undisputed moral commitment to freedom.  Moral indeterminacy is the 
primary defect in the statute of nature that the state’s practical authority is supposed to cure.  
Beyond agreement on the abstract value of freedom, there is likely broad agreement on a 
broad range of examples of violations of freedom.  We presumably agree that the core cases 
of wanton intentional homicide and intentional theft count as rights violations.  
Nevertheless, there is still broad room for reasonable disagreement. 
There are numerous sources of moral indeterminacy.205  The first source of 
indeterminacy in the abstract concept of freedom itself.  First, the concepts of freedom and 
its cognate political values, including justice and fairness, are quite abstract.  Although we 
might all agree that all moral persons have a right to freedom it is unlikely that we all share 
the same conception of freedom and therefore will reasonably disagree about the scheme 
of rights that is necessary to realize freedom.206  Our abstract concepts contain a range of 
core conceptions about which we reasonably disagree.207 
                                                          
205 Rawls broadly refers to these as the “burdens of judgment.”  Rawls, Political 
Liberalism, 54-58. 
206 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 5; Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 134-36.   
207 Recently, Amartya Sen has emphasized that point in describing how the values of 
impartiality or justice fail to choose between three competing rules that determine 
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Second, our moral concepts contain vagueness and therefore admit of borderline 
cases.208  Take the concept of battery, defined broadly as any “harmful or offensive contact 
with a person, resulting from an act intended to cause the [victim] to suffer such contact . . 
. .”209  A paradigm instance would be a violent beating with one’s fist.  A borderline case 
would be a slight nudge to move another out of the way in a crowded bar.  Terms obviously 
can be more or less vague.  Nonetheless, agreement about core cases still leaves 
disagreement about borderline cases. 
Third, oftentimes, while in theory there might be a right answer upon which all 
would agree, the choice requires a difficult and complex “overall assessment” and yet a 
decision must be made.210  In some cases with this structure, it is more important that a 
decision between reasonable interpretations be made than that the most reasonable option 
prevails.211   
                                                          
entitlement to a flute between three children.  Child A claims entitlement to the flute on 
the ground that she is the only one who knows how to play the flute and that therefore 
giving it to her would maximize happiness.  Child B claims entitlement to the flute on the 
ground that he is the poorest and that therefore giving it to him will further egalitarian 
equality.  Finally, child C claims entitlement to the flute on the ground that she made the 
flute and that individuals who expend the time and energy to make something are entitled 
to the fruits of their labor.207  Sen’s basic point is that the abstract concept of justice alone 
cannot resolve the matter.  The concept of freedom suffers from the same difficulties.  
Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 12-15. 
208 Roy Sorensen, “Vagueness,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward 
N. Zalta, 2012, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/vagueness/. 
209 William L. Prosser et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5th ed. (West Group, 
1984), 39. 
210 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 57. 
211 Thus, some resources can be devoted to continuing to make the overall assessment such 
that a new and better decision could be made down the road. 
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Fourth, while we might all agree that freedom-based considerations must be 
brought to bear on political decisions, we might reasonably disagree about the relative 
weight or ordering of the competing freedom-based considerations.212  Our disagreements 
result from diversity in our backgrounds, natural makeup, and our judgments about what 
other things are important.213  Such diversity is inevitable, especially in liberal societies.  
Two examples will suffice to demonstrate the point.  Rules governing the rules of the road, 
including speed limits, balance freedom-based considerations about freedom of movement 
with freedom-based considerations about security in one’s person.  Similarly, rules 
governing the workplace, for example, rules governing workplace safety, balance freedom-
based considerations about freedom of contract with considerations about personal safety.  
Nonetheless, our plural and incompatible commitments cannot all be satisfied at the same 
time.  Thus, there has to be a “moral loss” and there is reasonable disagreement over where 
the losses are to lie.214  
Finally, in some cases, an arbitrary choice needs to be made among equally morally 
acceptable options.  There are multiple options and any option will do.  The choice between 
                                                          
212 Similarly, we might both agree that liberty and equality are important considerations in 
crafting a scheme of rights but reasonably disagree about the weight of each consideration.  
See ibid., 5. 
213 Rawls notes that “the way we assess evidence and weigh moral and political values is 
shaped by our total experience, our whole course of life up to now; and our total 
experiences must always differ.”  Rawls, Political Liberalism, 56-57.  Diversity may also 
cause us to have difficulty understanding the legitimate interests of others and to downplay 
burdens that ultimately have to fall on others if our own view is to win out.  See Thomas 
Christiano, The Constitution of Equality : Democratic Authority and Its Limits (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 58-59. 
214 As Rawls notes, “any system of social institutions is limited in the values it can admit 
so that some selection must be made from the full range of moral and political values that 
might be realized.”  Rawls, Political Liberalism, 57. 
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options is arbitrary.  That is the broad description of the well-worn case of choosing which 
side of the road cars must drive on.  Our moral commitment to freedom, does not supply 
the answer.  The required decision, then, is indeterminate. 
 It is important to note that those with whom we reasonably disagree are not 
regarded as being understandably mistaken in their interpretations and therefore merely 
excused for holding to the unreasonable beliefs that they do.  We can imagine the person 
who was cultivated as a vehement racist who believes that the enslavement of some races 
is permissible and laudable.  In such cases, there is an explanation for why they hold the 
unreasonable beliefs that they do, but there is not a rational explanation, or justification, 
for their wrong beliefs.  No reasonable political theory could support the view.  Perhaps 
they are merely excused.  But, their excused viewpoint could not count as a plausible 
interpretation of what freedom demands and therefore could not bind.  In light of the 
diversity of reasonable viewpoints that are explained by the factors described above, 
individuals are justified in what they take to be the requirements of equal freedom when 
they reasonably disagree.  Some interpretations of what counts as respecting the freedom 
of others will be clearly mistaken.215  Those interpretations are not candidates for binding 
law. 
The indeterminacy in abstract right has the capacity to generate three types of 
reasonable disagreement.  First, we might have a disagreement between different 
conceptions of freedom. For example, a sufficientist about distributive justice would 
                                                          
215 For example, someone who interpreted justice as the principle “to each according to his 
threat advantage,” would not be offering an interpretation of justice. 
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disagree with an egalitarian who requires broader equality wealth.  Second, we might agree 
on a conception of freedom, for example that inherent in Rawls’s justice as fairness, but 
reasonably disagree about the institutions and rules that should realize that conception of 
justice.  So, we might disagree about whether the law should realize a property-owning 
democracy or market socialism.216  Finally, even with institutions and rules in place, we 
might reasonably disagree about the application of those institutions and rules to particular 
facts.  Such disagreements require some form of adjudication.217 
4.3 - Some Examples and a Clarification  
As I noted, specified norms can describe any of the Hohfeldian incidents.  That is 
important because all Hohfeldian rights can secure freedom.  For example, moral powers 
are subject to specification.  There are reasonable disagreements about how a given moral 
power must be exercised to be successful and there are reasonable disagreements as to the 
limits on our moral powers.  Contract law exemplifies this point.  If one aims to sell their 
land to another individual, we can reasonably disagree about the conditions that must be 
met for them to successfully exercise their power to do so.  Perhaps the land-sale agreement 
must be in writing.  Maybe a certain number or kind (e.g., a notary) of witness is required.  
                                                          
216 On this debate within Rawlsian scholarship, see Martin O’Neill and Thad Williamson, 
Property-Owning Democracy Rawls and Beyond (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 
1-14. 
217 The picture is also complicated by the reciprocality of our interactions.  When someone 
suffers harm as a result an interaction with another person, it is not the case that one of the 
individual’s actions uniquely caused the harm and therefore violated the rights of the other 
person.  Rather, the harm results from the interaction of the two persons equally.  See 
Stephen R. Perry, “Libertarianism, Entitlement, and Responsibility,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 26, no. 4 (1997): 352.  As a result, a normative question about who should be 
responsible for a given harm remains and that question has to be answered. 
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Perhaps there is a review period in which the contract can be cancelled.  Such decisions 
create certain consequences for parties to agreements and to the public more generally.  
But, freedom is served by coming up with a decisive and univocal specification of how 
moral powers can be exercised, regardless of the ultimate decision between reasonable 
views.  The same goes for possible limits placed on our power to contract.  For example, 
there is reasonable disagreement over whether individuals can contract to work in certain 
work conditions, say to work more than a certain number of hours a week.  Such details 
must be hashed out politically. 
 Cases involving rights against harms that result from certain categories of risks also 
exemplify the point.  Currently, the law imposes strict liability for harms that result from 
certain activities that are categorized as abnormally dangerous, for example, blasting.  
Thus, a blaster who causes a foreseeable harm to another’s person or property as a result 
of blasting violates the right of the victim regardless of whether the blaster was negligent 
and regardless of the broader social value of blasting.  Whether that should be the case is a 
political question that is subject to reasonable disagreement.  It would not be unreasonable 
to advocate a fault-based policy rather than a strict liability policy.   
 I want to discuss a final example involving necessity exceptions in trespass cases.  
The example also affords an opportunity to discuss a related view that has been described 
under the heading of “specification” and to explain how the other view differs.  According 
to John Oberdiek, the “specified conception of rights” is the view, that “[a]lthough [rights] 
have a determinate and predictable content in a wide variety of contexts, . . . their content 
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nonetheless depends entirely upon context.”218  Oberdiek’s view is that we can only 
identify “the content of a right in light of and indeed in response to what is justifiable to do 
under the circumstances.”219  Thus, a moral right will be “specified so as not to conflict . . 
. with justifiable behaviour.”220  That view contrasts with a view he describes as the 
“general conception” of rights, which is the view that rights are not circumstance 
dependent.  The general conception of rights countenances cases in which individuals can 
justifiably infringe the rights of others. 
Accordingly, in defending the specified conception, Oberdiek’s concern is also to 
reconceptualize and unify intuitions about those cases in which individuals seem to be 
permitted and even justified in infringing or violating the rights of others.  In particular, he 
focuses on Joel Feinberg’s well-known Cabin Case, a case that raises the issue of whether 
there is a necessity exception to the right against trespasses on one’s property.   
In the Cabin Case, a mountain hiker must decide whether to break into another 
person’s cabin or remain outdoors in the face of a deadly snowstorm.  According to 
Oberdiek, “[t]here is widespread consensus that the hiker would be justified in breaking 
into the cabin under such circumstances.”221  Nonetheless, the view of “proponents of the 
general conception of property rights is that the hiker would be justified in breaking into 
the cabin out of necessity even though the cabin owner has a right that the hiker should not 
do so.”222  Oberdiek’s take is that the cabin owner’s right is specified to permit exceptions 
                                                          
218 Oberdiek, “Specifying Rights Out of Necessity,” 128. 
219 Ibid. (emphasis omitted). 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid., 134. 
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for cases of dire necessity.  The hiker’s justified intrusion does not conflict with the cabin 
owner’s right because the intrusion falls within an exception.  The overall picture is that 
“[a] right . . . can stand against different behaviour in different circumstances, so that what 
conflicts with a right in one context may not conflict with it in another.”223  So, if it were a 
beautiful day outside and thus no necessity, the intrusion would not be permitted.   
 That idea meshes well with the basic idea of specificationism articulated here.  One 
goal of specificationism is to reconcile decisively the competing freedom-based claims that 
individuals could potentially make against each other in what look like conflicts of rights 
cases.  Specified rights, which will often mark out exceptions in our rights to person and 
property, exhibit a complexity that cannot be captured by sole reference to our abstract 
rights to freedom, person, or property.  I therefore agree that exceptions can be built into 
the content of our rights.   
But we should part ways with Oberdiek in several respects.  First, what the hiker is 
permitted to do and how the content of the cabin owner’s property right is to be specified 
seems to me to be subject to reasonable disagreement.  It is not the case that our rights 
“have a determinate and predictable content.”224  Note that there are a number of ways in 
which rights might be structured in the Cabin Case.  To describe a few, first, there is the 
position that the cabin owner’s right should be unqualified and that there are no exceptions 
for necessity.  The hiker violates the cabin owner’s right if he trespasses.  It was his 
responsibility to prepare better for the hike.  Second, there is the position that the cabin 
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owner’s right is unqualified if the cabin owner is present but there is an exception for the 
hiker if no one is home.  Such a scheme obviously emphasizes interests that attach more to 
the cabin owner’s person than his property, such as his interests in safety and privacy.  
Third, there is the position that the hiker is permitted to enter the property and use it for his 
safety but that he must compensate the cabin owner.  Insofar as he compensates the owner, 
he does not violate the cabin owner’s right.  On that view, the cabin owner should expect 
that hikers will need to use the cabin in extreme cases and he should plan accordingly.  
Finally, there is Oberdiek’s view that the hiker is justified in entering the cabin to save 
himself regardless of the cabin owner’s consent, that the cabin owner has no right that the 
hiker not do so, and that compensation is not owed.  On my view, the law ultimately settles 
the question of which scheme structures our interactions, as we can reasonably disagree 
about the options. 
 That the nature of the scheme that should be in place is subject to reasonable 
disagreement brings me to the second difference.  Oberdiek contends that only specified 
rights are “fully moralized,” and that generalized rights are not, insofar as the content of a 
specified right is conditioned on the question of what individuals are justifiably permitted 
to do in the circumstances.  I agree with Oberdiek that one cannot be both permitted to do 
something and prohibited from doing something.  On my view, however, what one is 
permitted to do in the circumstances is determined by what the law selects from the range 
of reasonable views about how rights ought to specified in given circumstances.225  Law 
                                                          
225 To some extent, I also disagree with Oberdiek’s point that rights cannot be “normative 
primitives.”  Ibid., 131.  Oberdiek argues that we argue toward rights that are justified 
according to the balance of reasons rather than on the basis of certain primitive rights.  
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could specify or select a “generalized” property right that would prohibit the hiker from 
utilizing the cabin despite the circumstances.  In which case, the hiker would not be 
permitted to trespass despite the circumstances.  On that view, it was his responsibility to 
plan for foreseeable emergencies.  We therefore cannot determine what behavior is 
permitted independent of a determination of how our rights are specified in the 
circumstances.   
4.3 - The Necessity of Political Authority and Consent Theory  
I now want to discuss a challenge to the argument that the moral necessity of 
authoritative political specifications entails the conclusion that the state in fact has the 
exclusive moral right to specify our rights and responsibilities through the law.  Return to 
the challenge from consent theory discussed in Chapter Two.  Consent theorists do not 
necessarily deny the moral importance of the state or the possibility of legitimate political 
authority.  Instead, they believe that some form of consent is necessary for political 
authority.  Accordingly, the consent theorist might agree that specifications are morally 
necessary components of our moral lives yet reject the notion that the state retains any 
authority in virtue of that.  Mark Murphy is a consent theorist who offers such a view. 
Murphy appreciates the moral importance of specifications.  Nonetheless, he 
defends a version of consent theory that relies on consent in the “acceptance sense.”226  On 
Murphy’s view, binding consent need not require the performance of a speech act or an 
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attitude of approval.227  By contrast, one can consent to be bound by the state’s 
specifications merely by accepting those specifications into one’s practical reasoning as 
the principles upon which one will act.228    
That version of consent theory, Murphy maintains, is “consistent with the central 
thesis of natural law political philosophy — that the law’s authority derives from the 
common good of the political community.”229  The core principle of that view is the 
requirement that “each person is bound to do his or her share for the common good.”230  
The common good is a “comprehensive state of affairs in which each person’s good is fully 
realized.”231  Nonetheless, the common good principle exhibits “normative openness,” 
meaning that the principle, like the abstract right to equal freedom, underdetermines how 
we ought to act rationally in order to satisfy the principle.232  Murphy explains that 
normative openness “makes room” for the law to serve an important and necessary 
practical purpose with respect to the common good, as the law can “provid[e] a partial 
[specification] of what one is to do in fulfilling the common good principle.”233  A 
specification on Murphy’s account is either “a realizable approximation of an unrealizable 
ideal” or “a more precise specification of a vague objective.”234 
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 Nothing in Murphy’s account of specification is prima facie inconsistent with the 
view defended here.  However, although Murphy recognizes that there is a morally 
necessary role that the law can play, he does not believe that fact is enough to conclude 
that the law has the exclusive moral authority to specify the common good principle: 
[T]he fact that authority is needed, and that the law is the best candidate to 
serve this role, does not actually make the law authoritative.  It does not 
show that citizens are acting wrongly by failing to act in accordance with 
the law’s dictates.  At most, it shows that if citizens fail to do their part to 
make the institution authoritative — perhaps by consenting to it, or 
something of that sort — then they are acting unreasonably. . . . There still 
exists a gap that is not crossed: that it would be a good thing for the law to 
be authoritative does not mean that the law is in fact authoritative.235  
At first glance, Murphy’s argument looks like Simmons’s rejection of the justification-
legitimacy inference.  It will be remembered that Simmons argues that one cannot reason 
directly from the fact that a state is (or states are) on balance beneficial or generally justified 
to the conclusion that a state is legitimate, meaning that it has the kinds of moral rights that 
it claims to have.236  Notwithstanding, Murphy’s argument is slightly different and more 
akin to Stephen Darwall’s challenge against Raz.  Darwall charges that even if someone 
might have good or decisive reason to abide by the demands of another, for example, 
because he would do better in complying with the reasons that apply to him, no inference 
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can be drawn that the latter has moral authority over the former. 237  In a similar vein, 
Murphy rejects the inference from the moral value or moral need of moral authority to the 
actual existence of that authority.238  Merely because something would be of great moral 
value does not make it so. 
That political authority would be morally valuable instead is a sufficient reason to 
consent to be bound by the state’s specifications.  Murphy believes that individuals have 
good reason to consent to be bound by the law’s specifications in light of the law’s 
coordinative and epistemic capacities, and that perhaps they would be unreasonable for not 
doing so.239  But, that one would act unreasonably in not abiding by the law’s demands 
does not entail that one would act wrongfully in not doing so.   
Why accept and act according to specifications at all rather than on a case-by-case 
or willy-nilly basis?  Murphy argues that we run afoul of the common good principle not 
just by “performing an act that is ruled out by the content of the principle” but also by 
acting in an “unprincipled way.”240  We might understand that as a basic requirement that 
one act with integrity.241  The reason to stick with a given specification “does not . . . result 
from the character of the requirement specified but from the rational unseemliness of 
changing one’s mind without adequate reason for doing so.”242  Accepting and utilizing 
                                                          
237 See, e.g., Darwall, Morality, Authority, and Law, 146. 
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the law’s specifications, in the end, is merely one way in which individuals can act with 
integrity and according to principle with respect to the common good, while at the same 
time discharging their obligation to do their fair share.  It is not the only way however.  
Insofar as individuals act on their own private specifications of the common good principle 
and do so consistently, they do not run afoul of the common good principle or the 
requirement that they act in a principled manner.  “[S]o long as one accepts a certain 
determination of [some principle], one ought to act on it.”243  That is so regardless of 
whether the specification is the law’s or one’s own. 
We should agree with Murphy that specifications are normatively important in our 
practical lives and that specifications provide a vehicle by which we can live principled 
lives.  That seems to be the gist of Richardson’s account as well.  Nonetheless, we must 
grapple with Murphy’s argument that although specifications are morally important and 
the state is capable of resolving important moral problems, we have not shown that the 
state must be the exclusive specifier of our political rights and responsibilities rather than 
private individuals.  To respond to Murphy’s consent-based challenge, it will be helpful to 
remember the task that the law’s authority addresses.  The point of legal authority is to 
secure equal freedom and resolve the problems of the state of nature.  Insofar as Murphy’s 
natural law view cannot address those moral problems, the view presented here is on better 
footing. 
As was argued earlier, legal specifications are necessary to resolve the difficulties 
that indeterminacy creates for equal freedom.  The first is the problem of unilateral 
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authority.  Insofar as there is indeterminacy and each individual has an equal right to 
interpret the boundaries of the rights of others, we each becomes subject to the private 
authority of other individuals.  The second problem is that indeterminacy prevents us from 
forming legitimate expectations that our capacity to make choices within a particular 
domain of freedom will be respected and be free from interference.  Those problems are 
solved insofar as the state has the authority to decisively and public coordinate our rights 
and we have assurance that others will abide by those rights.  The same can be said with 
respect to those responsibilities individuals have in light of our collective responsibility to 
secure equal freedom in a fair way.  By ignoring the law and acting according to one’s own 
specifications one is imposing one’s will on others.  Murphy’s consent theory, like any 
other consent theory, leaves one’s right to a system of equal freedom subject to the private 
authority of individuals.  It therefore recreates the very problem that political authority is 
to resolve.   
Beyond recreating the problem of private authority and not addressing the tasks that 
freedom requires, there is a broader problem with Murphy’s reliance on the idea of personal 
integrity as a basis for consenting to be bound by the state’s specifications.  The law is 
fundamentally concerned with our interactions with others and securing freedom.  In that 
way, the law is interpersonal.  By contrast, integrity is an intrapersonal virtue.  At best, 
integrity is a matter of personal responsibility, not the state’s responsibility.  Individuals 
themselves must ensure that they lead a life of integrity.  At worst, perhaps there is no 
moral requirement that an individual lead a life of personal integrity.  So long as individuals 
respect the legitimate claims of others, integrity is a matter of personal choice.   
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Although the law and others are perhaps prohibited from undermining one’s ability 
to live a life of integrity, they could not make one accountable for not living such a life and 
surely could not force one to live such a life.  Suffice to say, integrity is just a reason of the 
wrong kind when it comes to justifying the state’s authority and the fact that it backs that 
authority with the right to extract compliance with its demands.  If integrity is a moral 
upshot of a commitment to follow the law, then perhaps that is a good thing.244  However, 
personal integrity is not an appropriate ground of political authority.  More importantly, 
however, integrity is not a proper basis for acting in a way that violates or undermines the 
equal freedom of others. 
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CHAPTER 5 - EQUALITY AND DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY 
Democracy serves the values of freedom, justice, equality, fairness, respect, 
publicity, participation, education, truth, and so on.245  That democracy serves those values 
is to say that democracy can be morally justified in certain ways.  But as we have seen, that 
the state, specific kinds of political institutions, or specific laws are morally valuable in 
certain ways does not directly speak to the question of whether and how they are politically 
legitimate.  More needs to be said.  A theory of political legitimacy, as I have explained, 
accounts for the state’s right to rule — its right to bind its citizens through law, its right to 
uphold the law with force, and minimally its right to continue in the job of exercising those 
rights.  Here, I have argued that the state’s task is best understood in terms of securing 
equal freedom.  Accordingly, we need to locate a theory of democracy within that theory 
of political legitimacy.  
A majority of the theorizing about democracy is concerned with moral ideals and 
democratic values more generally.  That is, theorists are responsive primarily to 
justificatory questions about the moral values that democracy serves: What makes 
democracy valuable?  Or, how can our democracy be better?  Or, what would make our 
democracy more responsive to some specific moral value, say equality or education.  
Obviously, those are important questions that will be fruitful in discussions about the 
political legitimacy of democracies.  Yet, here we want to address questions about political 
legitimacy, questions that would include: Must a state be democratic for it to be politically 
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legitimate?  Can laws that do not issue from democratic procedures be legitimate?  How 
does democracy affect legitimacy?  Here, I want to focus on how democracy figures in 
questions about the political legitimacy of political institutions, the human beings that 
occupy roles within those institutions, and the laws that demand our compliance.   
6.1 - Four Models of Democracy 
I want to begin by outlining four models for how we might conceptualize and 
understand the political legitimacy of democratic decision making: the Aggregative Model, 
the Self-Rule Model, the Deliberative Model, and the Arbitration Model.  My goal is to 
note any internal difficulties within these models and to highlight any manner in which 
they can be fit within the equal-freedom moral-task framework that I have discussed to this 
point. 
It should be said that for a number of reasons, these models are somewhat artificial.  
First, no view in the literature necessarily, explicitly or implicitly, defends any particular 
model exclusively.  Theorists instead tend to defend hybrid views that include element of 
a number of models.  Not one of these models is on its face mutually exclusive from the 
other, but each captures core elements of the major views present in the literature.  Second, 
with each model, I do not aim to capture the elements of every view that reasonably could 
fit within that model.  For example, theorists working within the deliberative democracy 
tradition disagree about how much agreement on fundamental moral principles is necessary 
for democratic decisions to be legitimate or ideal in some way.  But we need not focus 
extensively on that fact.  The goal simply is to assess some of the more common ideas and 
to articulate what each model identifies as the core moral purpose of democratic 
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institutions.  Finally, as any theory of democratic legitimacy will rely heavily on the value 
of equality, which has been central to this point, it will be useful to see how equality fits 
within each model.   
Before going further, we need to begin with a working understanding of what it 
means to say that a political entity or process is democratic.  For now, it will be helpful to 
begin with the folk understanding of democracy.  First, in a democracy, citizens have an 
equal right to participate, partly though not exclusively through voting, in the political 
decision making process, and disagreements within that process are resolved through some 
principle of majority rule.  Second, political offices are open to all in the sense that any 
person has an equal right to occupy any political office insofar as they are capable of 
adequately performing the tasks of that office.246  Finally, debate is free and open in the 
sense that no one is restricted from voicing their opinion on the basis of who they are or 
what their view is.  Later, I will suggest that democracy can and should be conceived more 
in terms of the broader notion of political equality.  The result is that the folk understanding 
of democracy is but one institutional specification of democracy, and majority rule is not 
as sacrosanct a rule of decision as it is often made out to be.  Nonetheless, it will be helpful 
                                                          
246 This basically restates what Rawls would describe as a political institutionalization of 
“careers open to talents.”  Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 72.  Rawls thinks that careers open 
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to begin from a point of common understanding, and each of the four models below attempt 
to present the moral foundation for our common understanding. 
The Aggregative Model is common among social choice theorists.  It also probably 
captures how ordinary citizens would explain the legitimacy of democratic decision 
making.  According to social choice theorists, democratic decision making effectively 
maximizes preference satisfaction while giving equal consideration to each individual’s 
preferences.  We might understand the latter point to express a broader democratic 
commitment to equality.  Whatever democracy requires, it requires that people be treated 
equally in some obvious sense.247  The Aggregative Model does that by ignoring individual 
differences and treating each person’s preferences like anyone else’s preferences.  In a 
democracy, persons reveal their preferences with their votes, and each vote is counted 
equally.  Satisfying the preferences of more people is an important moral goal, and majority 
rule is an effective way to satisfy the political preferences of more people.   
There are of course well-known internal theoretical problems with the Aggregative 
Model, which I will leave to the side.248  Here, I want to focus on how the Aggregative 
Model is problematic for moral reasons from the perspective of political legitimacy and 
equal freedom.249  The core difficulty is that the legitimacy of a political decision has little 
                                                          
247 E.g., Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Harvard 
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to do with the maximization of preference satisfaction.250  This problem can be presented 
from two different directions.  First, that a political decision satisfies any person, a majority 
of persons, or even all persons’ preference(s) is not sufficient to make a political decision 
legitimate, where that is understood to mean that it is morally binding and coercively 
enforceable.  It is simply a reason of the wrong kind when the issue is forcing people to do 
things.251  Individuals cannot be forced to abide by their own preferences.  In the previous 
chapters, I sketched a view of the reasons of the right kind that account for the legitimacy 
of political authority, namely that political decision making is necessary to specify and 
secure equal freedom.   
With that in mind, we can also challenge the Aggregative Model from a second 
direction.  One might propose that although maximizing preference satisfaction is not a 
sufficient condition, it is necessary to make a political decision legitimate.  The idea would 
be that a political authority could only be legitimate in discharging its moral responsibilities 
if it treats each person’s preferences equally and maximizes satisfaction of such 
preferences.  Democratic decision making, one could argue, is a necessary means to that 
                                                          
Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 20.  And, Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson charge that the Aggregative Model affirms and reinforces unjust power 
distributions in society and does not take deliberation seriously.  Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 
16.  
250 That is not to suggest that preference satisfaction cannot be connected with some other 
desiderata of political legitimacy like effectiveness.  So, if democracies happen to be more 
effective at guiding behavior because more people prefer the policies then that can be 
important.  That is not how the social choice theorist views the matter however.  
251 Building off the work of P.F. Strawson, Darwall makes the related point that 
“[d]esirability is a reason of the wrong kind” to ground our moral practices of holding 
culpable individuals morally responsible for wrongdoing.  Darwall, The Second-Person 
Standpoint, 15-17.  
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end.  The problem is that it is not the responsibility of the state, or the political community 
more generally, to satisfy anyone or more people’s personal preferences.  Responsibility 
for that lies with individuals who are to take responsibility for their own personal pursuits.  
Beyond that, if one’s preferences do not align with a political decision, individuals must 
alter their preferences or at least not demand that others act to satisfy those preferences.252  
The upshot is that the Aggregative Model does not fit within the basic picture of the state 
that has emerged thus far: the state has a moral responsibility to secure equal freedom, and 
creating an enforcing the law discharges that responsibility. 
The Aggregative Model fairs no better if we jettison preference-satisfaction in favor of 
another “currency” that is to be maximized.253  One might suggest that instead of 
maximizing preferences, democracy maximizes satisfaction of the legitimate claims of 
equal persons.254  Because each person has an equal claim to determine how society is 
ordered, each person gets an equal vote by which they communicate that claim.  The notion 
of a claim invokes the notion of a right.  We can think of democratic procedures as 
                                                          
252 Rawls makes a similar point: “It is within the limits of this division of responsibility 
[with society] that individuals and associations are expected to form and moderate their 
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Democracy and Disobedience (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 35.  Thomas Christiano 
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aggregating and maximizing satisfaction of equal rights or claims.  Yet, by invoking rights, 
the Aggregative Model fairs no better.255 
For simplicity, focus on a disagreement between an individual dissenting against a 
majority decision (Dissenter) and an individual who is a member of the majority (Majority 
Member).  Majority Member claims a right to Dissenter’s conformity with his view, which 
also happens to be the majority view.  Consider the situation from the perspective of 
Dissenter.  Dissenter thinks that Majority Member is either wrong or equally right.  If 
Majority Member is wrong, then Dissenter does not have an obligation to go along with 
what Majority Member demands.  But, if Majority Member is equally right, then we have 
something akin to a conflict of rights between Dissenter and Majority Member.  Let’s look 
at the conflict case.  How can Majority Member bolster her claim against Dissenter?  On 
the Aggregative Model, she points out that a majority of people have the same claim against 
Dissenter, and a larger number of rights in some sense outweighs Dissenter’s right.   
Nonetheless, on the standard view about how rights operate, Majority Member 
cannot bolster her claim in that way.  That is one of the upshots of John Taurek’s famous 
argument that the numbers do not count in conflict of rights cases. Because of the generally 
accepted liberal commitment to the separateness of persons, an individual’s legitimate 
claim against another is in no way augmented by the fact that others, no matter how 
numerous, have the same sort of claim against that individual.256  Similarly, the legitimacy 
                                                          
255 One might object that a claim should be considered to be distinct from a claim-right.  
Theorists generally seem to use them interchangeably.  I do not deny that a conceptual 
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of an individual’s claim against another is in no way diminished by the fact that there are 
a fewer number of others who share his claim.  Each individual considered as a separate 
person has their own equal claim against any individual with whom they disagree.  If we 
are to understand democratic processes as providing a justifiable resolution of the 
competing legitimate claims of Dissenter and Majority Member, that there are more 
claimants on Majority Member’s side is not normatively relevant to their dispute.  In effect, 
Dissenter says to Majority Member: “I will speak with each member of the majority 
separately.  But for now, this is between you and I, and I have as much of a claim as you.”  
Therefore, the Aggregative Model, as an account of the political legitimacy of democratic 
decision making, faces substantial obstacles.  I will not discuss it further. 
Next, consider the Self-Rule Model of democracy.  The Self-Rule Model invokes 
the prominent idea that democracy is rule by the people.  The basic idea is that those who 
participate in democratic institutions are somehow (individually and/or collectively) 
binding themselves through democratic law, by contrast with a system of government in 
which the government decides for us and binds us.  As Scott Hershovitz puts the point, 
“[t]he idea behind this view of democracy is that we are binding ourselves through acts of 
legislation. . . . [I]n democracies, people decide together what they shall be bound to do.”257  
He goes on to maintain that “denying people the opportunity to participate in the process 
of government closes off opportunities to organize one’s life autonomously.”258  
                                                          
257 Scott Hershovitz, “Legitimacy, Democracy, and Razian Authority,” Legal Theory 9, no. 
3 (2003): 210.   
258 Ibid., 214.  The roots of this model can be traced to Rousseau, who maintained that the 
social compact by which people unite in democratic society yields a system of law in which 
any citizen “obeys only himself and remains as free as before.”  Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
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Nevertheless, it is unclear how the rhetoric of the Self-Rule Model can be squared with the 
political reality of reasonable disagreement and the very purpose of political authority, 
which is to resolve those disagreements.  One way to understand the view is as a voluntarist 
account according to which individuals who participate in democratic processes 
autonomously choose, freely will, and/or consent to the binding outcomes of those 
processes.  Or something along those lines.259  There are significant difficulties with that 
picture.  For one, as Thomas Christiano correctly points out, the model seems “to require 
that the basic rule of decision making be consensus or unanimity. . . . Only when all agree 
to a decision are they freely adopting the decision.”260  Such a requirement undercuts the 
basic framework supporting the need for political authority in the first place.261  Moreover, 
it is inconsistent with the commonplace rule of decision in democracies, namely majority 
rule.  Second, even if there was unanimity, there is still only an attenuated sense in which 
                                                          
Basic Political Writings, ed. Donald A. Cress (Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), 147.  
As Joshua Cohen describes Rousseau’s view: Individuals “want to be able to regard those 
institutional ‘constraints’ as themselves conforming to their own judgments of what is 
right. Instead of taking the instrumental attitude that regards the social framework as 
constraining, the free person wants to affirm the framework of rules itself; they want to 
‘have their own will as a rule’” Joshua Cohen, “Reflections on Rousseau: Autonomy and 
Democracy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 15, no. 3 (1986): 286. 
259 Carol Gould, for example, explicates the idea in terms of autonomous self-development 
and self-determination: “For if an individual were to take part in common activity without 
having any role in making decisions about it and under the direction of another, then this 
would not be an activity of self-development, since such self-development requires 
determining the course of one’s activity.”  Carol C. Gould, Rethinking Democracy: 
Freedom and Social Co-Operation in Politics, Economy, and Society (Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 85. 
260 Thomas Christiano, “Democracy,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2008, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/democracy/. 
261 Finnis explicitly maintains that authority is an alternative to unanimity.  See Finnis, 
Natural Law and Natural Rights, 232-33. 
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any outcome could be said to be the product of any individual member’s exercise of 
autonomy or choice.  In all but very narrow circumstances, any individual’s input (e.g. 
vote) in the collective decision making process is not causally decisive with respect to 
bringing about their preferred outcome; they are dependent on a contingent majority of 
others voting for the same outcome.  Such is hardly a paradigm instance of self-rule.     
Some Self-Rule Model theorists are aware of such difficulties.  As Hershovitz 
notes, following Raz, conceiving of the model along voluntarist lines is “one of the least 
persuasive arguments for democracy.”262  He, nonetheless, urges that we can accept the 
Self-Rule Model because there is “value [for] people participating in decisions that have 
an important impact on their lives.”263   
I imagine that most would not doubt that participating in democratic politics can 
have some sort of valuable impact on one’s life.  Any philosophical theory of democracy 
would presumably accept that.  For example, such participation is a way of educating 
oneself and honing one’s deliberative capacities.  That claim is a component part of the 
Deliberative Model, which I will discuss next.  In any case, it is not clear how one draws 
an inference from the more general moral values associated with democratic participation 
to autonomous rule through democratic legislation.  We might specify the Self-Rule Model, 
or rule by the people, in an alternative non-voluntarist way, but then we lose the 
argumentative force of the rhetoric normally associated with that model.  Accordingly, the 
                                                          
262 Hershovitz, “Legitimacy, Democracy, and Razian Authority,” 214 n.36. 
263 Ibid. 
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Self-Rule Model cannot be reconciled with the basic purpose of political authority or the 
character of democracy as commonly understood. 
Next, consider the Deliberative Model of democratic legitimacy.  On the 
Deliberative Model, democratic procedures are legitimate and produce legitimate laws 
because such are the product of wide-scale deliberation between persons who equally 
participate in open and public debate about how to order our common world.  Proposals 
are publicly disputed and argued over.  Reasons are exchanged.  Individuals learn from the 
process and often revise their views.  Finally, a public decision is made, and the reasons 
for that decision are provided. 
As an initial observation, the emphasis on the value of deliberation places the 
Deliberative Model in proximity to the value of intentionality condition for theories of 
authoritative decision making.264  The moral order is not left to be the outcome of brute 
forces, market forces, or social forces more generally.  Instead, it is placed in the hands of 
a deliberative body of legal officials, or citizens more generally, with the capacity to reason 
about how society is to be intentionally ordered.  The expectation is that in doing so, 
decisions will more often be sufficiently responsive to the requirements of equal freedom 
that not. 
Theorists who work within the Deliberative Model differ widely on how to 
understand the internal requirements of that model, the types of value that the model is 
                                                          
264 Perry, “Political Authority and Political Obligation,” 4-5 (“The essence of the value-of-
intentionality condition is . . . the ability of one person intentionally to change the moral 
situation of another, where it is sufficiently valuable or desirable that the first person 
possess such an ability with respect to the second.” (emphasis added)). 
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responsive to, the role of majority decision making, and how the model accounts for the 
legitimacy of democratic political decision making.  I will not include an exhaustive 
presentation of those differences, except the following.  Some deliberative democrats 
demand that any legal decision be justifiable according to reasons that all subject to it 
would reasonably accept.  But, that sort of commitment brings us back to principles 
underpinning the Self-Rule Model.  Instead of unanimous endorsement of the legal 
outcomes of democratic processes, the unanimity version of the Deliberative Model 
requires unanimous endorsement of the reasons that justify the legal outcomes.  By 
contrast, other deliberative democrats, in my view correctly, maintain that such a 
requirement is too stringent.  We reasonably disagree about what equal freedom demands, 
so we cannot expect such consensus on the reasons justifying any law.  Moreover, some 
will just be mistaken about what reasons appropriately support the law.  We should not 
require shared reasons in that case.  In fact, that political authority and democratic 
principles of decision, specifically majority rule, do not require full consensus weighs 
against such a consensus requirement at any level.  Although a theory of deliberation can 
play a role in a theory of democratic legitimacy, it must be premised on reasonable 
disagreement and the importance of deliberation in light of disagreement. 
I want to note two final difficulties with the Deliberative Model.  First, a number 
of deliberative theorists simply build into their model of deliberation that individuals will 
comply with the outcome of the deliberative process.  For example, Joshua Cohen asserts 
that “in an ideal procedure of political deliberation . . . [participants] are prepared to 
cooperate in accordance with the results of such discussion, treating those results as 
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authoritative.”265  The difficulty then is to understand how the Deliberative Model itself 
would explain anything about the legitimacy of the outcome that is not already simply 
assumed.  In assessing the legitimacy of an outcome, we are seeking to account for its 
authoritativeness even for the person who is not prepared to treat it as authoritative. 
Second, it should be noted that the Deliberative Model on its face does not single out 
democracy as a requirement for political legitimacy.  Say that a dictator rules over a great 
land as his family always has.  Benevolent and professorial, the dictator always collects a 
significant amount of data on the public’s views on justice and public policy.  Sampling is 
done.  The dictator holds town halls at which he listens to the competing views and asks 
tough questions.  Citizens attempt to convince him of their views but often change their 
views in response to his questions.  The dictator respects the views of his citizens.  But at 
the end of the day, the dictator is the decider.  His publicly informed decisions become the 
rule.  In that case there is extensive deliberation amongst the citizenry about what the law 
should be, people are treated equally in the deliberation, and a decision is made as a result.  
It is unclear what role the democratic principle of majority rule plays in the Deliberative 
Model, such that the dictatorial regime would be excluded as an option.  Robust public 
deliberation in which all citizens participate equally can be had within a variety of 
institutional formats.  At this point, we should not jettison the Deliberative Model.  Aspects 
of that model can fit within the moral task account of democracy that I will offer below. 
                                                          
265 Cohen, “Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy,” 21. 
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Finally, consider the Arbitration Model of democratic decision making.266  On this 
model, democratic procedures offer a mechanism to settle disputes between competing 
parties about how we are to order our common world.  Democratic processes do that in a 
way that treats each party equally.  The key idea here is that there are reasonable disputes, 
and those disputes need to be settled in a way that is consistent with treating each person 
equally.  Democratic procedures are legitimate, binding, and enforceable because they 
effectively adjudicate those disputes consistent with equality.   
Note that the comparison with standard cases of arbitration is not exact.  In a 
standard arbitration, parties to a disagreement agree or consent in advance of the 
disagreement to come before a neutral arbiter, plead their case, and have the arbiter decide.  
Before resolving the dispute, the arbiter also attempts to persuade the parties to come to 
some form of agreement or compromise, as the process is only meant to resolve disputes 
that cannot be resolved otherwise.  Most aspects of modern-day democratic procedures do 
no operate that way though.  Instead, there are competing sides with no neutral arbiter.  The 
sides may enter into agreements or compromises, but only in limited cases.  There is also 
no pre-disagreement agreement to be bound by democratic law.  Arbitration is therefore 
mandatory.  And, a final decision is made through majority vote rather than through a 
neutral arbiter who makes a reasoned decision after considering each side’s position. 
                                                          
266 Scott Shapiro sketches this model and distinguishes it from the mediation model, which 
describes the purpose of authority as mediating between person and the reasons that apply 
to them (i.e., Raz’s view), in contrast with mediating between persons.  Shapiro, 
“Authority,” 432-33. 
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The Arbitration Model, however, provides an important insight into the moral 
purpose of authoritative democratic procedures and law more generally.  The core purpose 
of arbitration is to resolve disputes in a way that treats each party to the dispute equally.  
Insofar as democratic procedures resolve disputes and do so by giving each person an equal 
vote, democratic procedures serve that purpose.  Thus, the Arbitration Model captures a 
key part of the purpose of authoritative democratic political procedures. 
The difficulty, however, is that the Arbitration Model also does not exclusively 
support democratic procedures.  The Arbitration Model would support any political 
procedure or institution that resolved disputes in a manner that treated disputants equally.  
For example, return to the dictator example above.  The professorial dictator is a paradigm 
case of mandatory arbitration and fits the Arbitration Model.  That is not to say that the 
Arbitration Model does not have a role to play in any account of the political legitimacy of 
democratic procedures.  Surely it does: it effectively captures the basic point of political 
authority as described to this point.  The point is just that democracy as it is commonly 
understood is not the exclusive option under the Arbitration Model.  Put differently, 
effective democratic institutions are but one reasonable specification of the more general 
moral principle that reasonable disputes about equal freedom have to be authoritatively 
resolved in a way that treats each person as an equal.  Additional theoretical architecture is 
thus needed to account for democracy. 
6.2 - Unilateral Authority and the Political Equality Constraint  
 At this point I want to introduce an alternative account of the legitimacy of 
democratic political institutions.  This account makes sense of the role that political 
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equality plays in questions of legitimacy, while unifying the core elements of the 
Arbitration Model and the Deliberative Model.  This account understands democracy as an 
institutional answer to the problem of unilateral authority and fits within the broader moral 
task account. 
All of this talk about democracy might seem suspect in light of the discussions in 
the previous chapters.  Earlier, I argued that the state and law are morally necessary to 
secure relations of equal freedom among citizens.  I offered an account of why and when 
individuals living within reasonably just states can have fairly robust moral obligations to 
abide by the law.  Those obligations arise from the coordinative capacities of the state in 
the face of reasonable disagreement.  When there is a law in place that effectively resolves 
what would otherwise be a reasonable disagreement, not complying with that law amounts 
to one subjecting others to their own private view about what justice as equal freedom 
requires.  In doing so, one is unilaterally dictating the terms of one’s interactions with 
others according to one’s own private judgment.  Thus, one is violating the right of another 
to one’s conformity with laws that specify the standard for relations of equality between 
citizens.  Our actions are governed by public specifications of our rights and 
responsibilities rather than our own private view of such rights and responsibilities.  Only 
by acting according to the law, where the law provides an effective and reasonable 
interpretation, can one avoid unilaterally subjecting another to one’s own will.  It is the 
state’s responsibility to deploy the law to secure those relations amongst persons, and the 
law is morally binding insofar as it does that. 
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On its face, that suggests that morally binding law can exist without democracy.  If 
there is a moral task for a state to do, and it does that task credibly and effectively, what 
else is there to say?  Put differently, democracy concerns the process by which laws are 
created.  If the outcome of a process, democratic or otherwise, functions as needed, why 
does it matter how it came about?  To answer that question, we must first draw a distinction 
between the vertical and horizontal dimensions of legitimacy.  Philip Pettit teases out a 
similar distinction along the following lines: 
Given that a state is necessary for justice, there is an issue about how it 
ought to relate to its citizens, as distinct from the issue of how the citizens 
ought to relate to one another.  And that, as I conceive of it, is the issue of 
legitimacy.  Where the issue of social justice is a matter of the horizontal 
relations of citizens to one another, political legitimacy is a matter of their 
vertical relations to the state that rules over them.267  
We should not agree that justice is distinct from legitimacy in the manner that Pettit 
describes.  According to the view that I have described, politically legitimate laws are those 
that effectively specify the requirements of justice, conceived as equal freedom, between 
persons.  Thus, legitimacy of the law has as much to do with the horizontal relations 
between persons subject to authority as the vertical legitimacy of the state has to do with 
the extent to which it effectively structures just relations between equal persons.  We need 
                                                          
267 Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012), 135-36.  Dworkin draws a comparable but different 
distinction between the vertical and horizontal “dimensions” of political power.  Dworkin, 
Sovereign Virtue, 190-91. 
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not think that when we are talking about the justice of a law we are talking about something 
distinct from its legitimacy and visa versa.268  How the state relates to its citizens is surely 
an issue of justice.   
The distinction between the horizontal relation between citizens subject to a law in 
contrast with their vertical relation with a de facto authority is instructive.  The purpose of 
the state is to create and enforce laws that constitute certain horizontal relationships 
between subjects who are equally required to follow the law.  Each person is equally bound 
by the law, and by following the law, we interact with one another through the law on 
horizontally equal terms.  Doing so resolves the problems associated with the state of 
nature, the primary problem being situations in which individuals are subject to the private 
authority of others because of moral indeterminacy and disagreement.  That problem 
concerns a morally problematic horizontal relationship that one might have with others in 
the absence of public legal standards to govern our behavior.  The horizontal, then, serves 
to distinguish cases where the rule of law exists between subjects and those where it does 
not.  By following the law, one is not horizontally subjecting their fellow citizens to their 
own private will.  The law governs how we interact with others and articulates our 
enforceable rights and responsibilities with respect to each other.  Non-democratic political 
institutions and actors can equally secure the rule of law. 
 We can also evaluate the vertical relationship between subject citizens, and the 
political actors or processes that have authority over them.  Of that relationship, we can ask 
                                                          
268 As a matter of clarification, here I am not talking about legitimacy minimally conceived 
as a right to stay in the job. 
 
 
164 
whether and in what ways it is legitimate from the perspective of equal freedom.  This 
inquiry will seek to draw a distinction between societies where an unelected dictator or 
ruling class rules citizens, and those societies where political authority is adequately 
democratic in character.  For example, is the vertical relationship that a citizen has with an 
unelected dictator different from the vertical relationship that a citizen has with an elected 
leader in a democracy? 
 Another way to understand the vertical/horizontal distinction is in terms of the 
process/outcome distinction.  A common, and I think correct, point in the democracy 
literature is that in some manner the process by which a law comes into existence is morally 
relevant aside from the independent merits of the law that is produced.269  Thus, there are 
two dimensions by which we can assess the legitimacy of a law: the process by which it 
came about and the substantive merits of the law.  The former is the vertical dimension of 
legitimacy, which concerns the process by which the right to rule is exercised.  Is legislation 
the product of a single professorial dictator, or a democratic process?  With respect to the 
horizontal, insofar as we think of laws as structuring certain moral relationships between 
persons, then a moral assessment of the outcome of exercises of authority is a moral 
assessment of the moral relationships that the law constitutes between persons.  Is the law 
a reasonable specification of the right to equal freedom or something beyond the scope of 
the state?  That is the horizontal dimension noted above. 
                                                          
269 As Hershovitz puts the point, “[o]ur discourse about the legitimacy of governments 
indicates that we believe a government can fail to be legitimate on procedural grounds.”  
Hershovitz, “Legitimacy, Democracy, and Razian Authority,” 216. 
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 Call the following the Political Equality Constraint (PEC).  The PEC demands that 
each individual in a society has an equal right to decision-making authority as each other 
individual in society.  That is a constraint on the vertical, or process, dimension of 
legitimacy, as well as the horizontal relationships between citizens.  On the common 
understanding of democracy, that constraint is satisfied in two ways.  First, political offices 
with decision-making authority are open to all.  What that means is that if one has the basic 
capabilities to do the job, then there is no constraint on them occupying the position, except 
that it might already be occupied or that the open process for choosing between capable 
candidates did not choose them.  Second, insofar as any individuals have certain rights to 
participate, all have the same rights.  The obvious consequence is that all reasonably 
capable citizens have an equal right to vote where elections are held.  But, they are also to 
have equal access to the public deliberative process, including equal rights to speech and 
equal rights to communicate with those who have decision-making authority. 
 The PEC is derivative of three interrelated ideas that I discussed earlier in Chapters 
One through Four.  The first is the prohibition against unilateral authority.  Recall that one 
aspect of being independent is not being subject to the private will of another.  What that 
means is that no individual is permitted unilaterally to determine the choices of others.  
Those with unilateral authority are able to impose their own private purposes on others.270  
But the reverse is not the case.  In order not to run afoul of the prohibition on unilateral 
                                                          
270 It does not matter that those with unilateral authority act in good faith to secure what 
they believe justice requires of the subordinate rather than for personal gain or something 
of the sort.  What matters is that the unilateral authority is imposing what he take to be 
right despite what others reasonably take to be right.  
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authority, rights to decision-making authority must be equal.  The second is the rule of law.  
Part of the idea of the rule of law is that laws are to be general, meaning that their 
application and scope does not depend on the proper identity of any particular individual.  
So, Abe cannot posses the right to rule in virtue of the fact that he belongs to a particular 
family.  Instead, if anyone is to have a right to rule, everyone must have as much of a right 
as anyone else.  Third, the constraint is a direct implication of the liberal commitment that 
all sufficiently capacitated persons are to be regarded as both free and equal, such that no 
individual could have a claim to political power that is any different from any other 
individual.  A free and equal moral person has equal standing to make demands about how 
equal freedom is to be secured and what it means. 
The PEC is described as a constraint because it places a limit on what would 
otherwise be a sufficient argument for the legitimacy of exercises of political authority, 
namely that such exercises are morally necessary to secure equal freedom and effectively 
do so.  The moral necessity of political authority aside, the PEC governs both how political 
authority is to be distributed and the manner in which it is to be exercised.  The latter point 
is that political authority can only be exercised through a process that at a fundamental 
level gives each individual an equal right to decision-making power.  The upshot is that no 
potential political leader can make a claim to a position of authority on the ground that she 
has a right to assume that position that no one else possesses.  The PEC therefore rules out 
theories that would permit claims to decision-making authority on the basis of family name, 
race, gender, or social class, among other things. 
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How does the PEC contrast or fit with the models of democracy described above?  
Recall that the Arbitration Model effectively captures the basic moral purpose or task of 
political authority as I have described it here.  There are reasonable disagreements between 
citizens, and authority must be exercised to resolve those disagreements effectively so that 
we can live on reciprocal terms.  The PEC can be understood as a constraint on how 
mandatory arbitration over law making should operate.  Reasonable disagreements over 
what the law should be are to be resolved by a process that gives no one anymore authority 
than anyone else. 
What about the Deliberative Model?  The Deliberative Model captures an important 
aspect of why authority is valuable in the first place.  It allows human beings to deliberate 
and reflect on how to order our lives rather than leaving that order to chance or social 
forces.  That is of primary instrumental importance because it allows us to aim at laws that 
adequately respond to the requirements of equal freedom, laws that are within the domain 
of the reasonable.271  The right to participate in deliberations can also be understood to 
flow from the PEC.  If any right to decision-making authority must be equal, surely any 
right to participate in deliberations as to what decisions should be made must also be equal.  
Thus, not only is the PEC consistent with the Deliberative Model, the equal right to 
participate follows from the PEC.  Finally, because participating in the process by speaking 
one’s mind and contributing to the deliberation, within limits, does not violate the freedom 
                                                          
271 Even though the PEC does not directly address such values, the PEC does not undermine 
or challenge the valuable participatory consequences of democracy.  Dworkin explains 
“three kinds of participatory consequence: symbolic, agency, and communal.”  Dworkin, 
Sovereign Virtue, 187. 
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of others under any reasonable political theory, the right to speak one’s mind will be 
secured on any account of democratic authority, including one that invokes the PEC.       
The PEC, along with the vertical/horizontal distinction, can also be deployed to 
account for two reasonable views that are in tension with each other.  First, a dictatorship, 
even a professorial one, in some sense lacks legitimacy, in contrast with a democracy.  The 
PEC accounts for that because the dictator’s claim to rule violates the PEC and a democracy 
does not.  Second, in light of the more general argument that the law’s purpose is to secure 
equal freedom between persons by specifying our rights and responsibilities, we should be 
able to account for why individuals can have obligations to obey the law notwithstanding 
that they happen to live in non-democratic states.  Clearly, non-democratic states can 
actually do the job of creating laws that specifies the requirements of equal freedom.  
Insofar as the law does that, it is legitimate.  But such an institutional arrangement would 
seem to violate the PEC. 
It is important to note that the issue of the bindingness of non-democratic law is not 
just about distinguishing between dictatorships and democracies.  That is because the issue 
arises even within democracies.  Two instances are worthy of note.  First, constitutional 
law, which identifies the basic structure of government, its powers, and its limits, is hardly 
democratic.  Instead, such law secures the background structure in which democratic 
decisions can be made and enforced.  Such law is not susceptible to change through normal 
democratic processes.  Second, many of the laws that bind generations today were created 
during previous generations.  In that sense, future generations are bound by legal decisions 
made by past generations participating in legal decision making without the participation 
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of future generations.  Consequently, we cannot so easily deny the possibility that non-
democratic law can still be binding.   
To resolve that issue, return to the above distinction between the vertical and 
horizontal dimensions of legitimacy.  The PEC is a constraint on each of those dimensions.  
Whether a state is democratic rather than a dictatorship is a vertical legitimacy issue.  The 
PEC is only satisfied vertically if rights to political authority are held equally between those 
who are ruled and the state actors who rule.  Democracy is therefore necessary for vertical 
legitimacy.  But, democracy is not necessary for horizontal legitimacy.  Instead, whether 
the rule of law is satisfied between those individuals is the relevant issue.  The PEC is 
satisfied horizontally insofar as all of those subject to the state’s rule have equal authority.  
In the case of a dictatorship, the PEC is satisfied horizontally because all subjects have the 
same authority—none.  And, they are all subject to a set of laws that govern them equally. 
Imagine a law that governs the terms of interaction between neighbors, Joe and 
Smo.  Imagine that law is a noise ordinance that limits playing music that can be heard 
across property lines past 8:00 p.m.  Everyone recognizes that to be the law, generally 
abides by it, legal officials effectively enforce it, and it is a reasonable candidate for such 
a law.  Such a law can equally emanate from a democratic process as it can unilaterally 
from a dictator.  Now, say that it was imposed by a dictator and say that neighbor Joe 
violates the law.  On the view presented here, Joe has violated Smo’s right to Joe’s 
compliance with the law.  In violating the law, Joe has unilaterally imposed his own will 
on Smo.  When Smo asks for a justification, imagine that Joe says he refuses to abide by 
that law because it emanated from a non-democratic process that he was precluded from 
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participating in.  Smo, nonetheless, has a legitimate grievance.  His response can and 
should be that the law effectively set the terms of interaction between him and Joe such 
that he has a right to Joe’s compliance.  The fact that the vertical character of the law is not 
democratic is not Smo’s problem.  Joe’s beef is not with Smo or the law; it is with the 
dictator. 
The point of the example is to show that the horizontal legitimacy of the law can 
float independently of its vertical legitimacy.  Legitimacy is not just about doing what the 
dictator tells you to do; it is also about doing what the law tells you to do.  Horizontal 
legitimacy in this case is about whether a law effectively resolves moral disagreement and 
coordinates actions and expectations.  Compliance with the law is fundamentally owed to 
our fellow citizens, not those who possess political authority.  If the law effectively sets 
the terms of our interaction with others, they have a right to our compliance with the law.  
The law effectively resolves a moral disagreement that does or could exist between us.  It 
does so in a way that binds us all equally and therefore satisfies the PEC between us.  
The question then is how to understand the legitimacy, or lack thereof, in the 
vertical relationship that exists between the dictator and his citizens.  This is where things 
get complicated and likely become heavily circumstance dependent.  In some states, 
democracy is not possible in light of circumstances that exist in such states.  For example, 
in some places, insisting on democracy would just result in turning government over to a 
majority coalition of religious zealots who seek to impose their religious views on everyone 
else.  In such a case, we might remember the threshold model described earlier.  A dictator 
in such a situation might insist that he has a right to stay in the job because he is credibly 
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doing the job of securing equal freedom.  That right and any attendant enabling rights 
belong to him in virtue of his moral responsibility to secure equal freedom.  He is the only 
one who can effectively do that.  He might admit that his rule violates the PEC but explain 
that democratic institutions are not plausible in light of the circumstances.  One way to 
understand what the dictator is saying is that his responsibility to secure horizontal 
legitimacy takes priority over his responsibility to secure vertical legitimacy.272 
In summary, what I have described is a moral task account with a constraint, 
specifically the PEC.  This model, I have argued, adequately captures how we think about 
the moral importance or necessity of democratic authority in contrast with non-democratic 
authority.  Moreover, the PEC account described imports aspects of the Arbitration and 
Deliberative Models.  Now I want to turn to several views that work within those two 
models that are explicitly moral task accounts but that rely on alternative components other 
than the PEC to account for the authority of democratic law. 
  
6.3 - Moral Tasks and Equal Respect 
 I noted earlier that the literature on the authority of law often lacks much discussion 
of the relationship between democratic institutions and legitimate authority.  In recent 
years, that has changed, as a number of democracy theorists have defended theories of 
                                                          
272 That point seems to be what would explain the distinction that Christiano draws between 
“inherent authority” and “instrumental authority.”  Christiano defines instrumental 
authority as “the capacity to impose duties on the subjects of the authority.”  By contrast, 
inherent authority is a robust right to rule that includes a right against interference, a right 
to impose duties, and a right to obedience that is owed to the authority (specifically, the 
legislature).  Christiano, The Constitution of Equality, 240-41. 
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democratic authority that fit within the moral task framework that I have been defending 
throughout this dissertation.  Here I want to discuss such views with goal of explicating the 
overall moral-task account and the PEC.  The goal is to explain why a moral task theory 
that attaches the PEC is superior to theories that append some other moral principle to 
account for the authority of democracy.  I also want to begin to lay the groundwork for the 
claim in the final section of this chapter that democracy as we currently know it is just one 
of a number of plausible specifications of authoritative political institutions that satisfy the 
PEC.   
 A number of theorists have sought to explain the authority of democracy by 
reference to a principle of equal respect amongst citizens.  Broadly, there are two 
components to such views.  First, democratic institutions themselves express respect for 
individuals as equals in giving each individual an equal say.  Second, when individuals 
abide by democratic laws they express respect for their fellow citizens.  And, in not abiding 
by democratic laws, law breakers express disrespect for their fellow citizens.   
Thomas Christiano is broadly correct to maintain that “[t]he reasonably just state is 
engaged in a morally necessary activity in the sense that someone who fails to comply with 
the reasonably just state’s publically promulgated rules is normally violating a duty of 
justice to his fellow citizens.”273  We should not treat that statement as an inference from 
the reasonable justice of a state to the reasonable justice of any of its laws.  Rather, the 
reasonably just legal specifications of the state will be morally binding.  According to 
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Christiano, however, the authority of democracy has an alternative basis that relies on the 
value of equal respect.   
Christiano argues that “the principle of public equality grounds the authority of 
democracy.”274  According to the principle of public equality, “[e]ach human being has a 
fundamental and natural duty to treat other human beings as equals . . . .  But this duty is 
only fully realized among persons when each person attempts to treat others publically as 
equals.”275  As part of that duty, “each person has a duty to each other citizen to afford 
them a right to an equal say and to respect that equal say.”276  The first part of that latter 
requirement comes close to stating the PEC: each citizen has a right to an equal say.  The 
second part states the principle of equal respect for the judgment of others.  It seems 
uncontroversial that the PEC would follow from the former premises.  If political 
institutions are public, then denying any individuals an equal say would be to publically 
treat them as unequals or not to respect them as equals.  At the very least, that means that 
in a society where there are not equal rights of participation and equal voting, political 
institutions and/or those in power in that society would be violating a right that individuals 
have to an equal say.  Put differently, they would be violating the PEC.  However, it is not 
obvious the extent to which that duty falls directly on individual citizens.  If we both live 
under a despot, it is not clear how either of us could discharge a duty to the other to afford 
them a right to an equal say.  Neither of us have any say, and there is unlikely to be anything 
either of us could do to otherwise change matters.  What one can do, however, is not impose 
                                                          
274 Ibid., 232 (emphasis added). 
275 Ibid., 249. 
276 Ibid., 250. 
 
 
174 
their will on their fellow citizens.  In that limited sense they can sense, they can secure the 
equal say of their fellow citizens.  By contrast, within a democracy, a duty not to interfere 
with the democratic process, including voting procedures, would follow easily from the 
right to an equal say.  If I took your ballot out of a ballot box, then that would be a direct 
violation of your right to an equal say. 
 I want to focus, however, on what seem to be the connected duties to “treat others 
publically as equals” and “to respect th[e] equal say” of others.  According to Christiano, 
those duties explain why we have a moral obligation to comply with democratically-
produced laws.  Christiano explains those duties along the following lines: 
The basic idea then is that one owes it to others, by virtue of the principle 
of equality and the fundamental interests of each in having her judgment 
about justice accorded respect, to comply with the decision of the majority 
about how to establish justice.277 
He explains that citizens who do not comply with democratic laws “affirm[] a superior 
right to that of others in determining how the shared aspects of social life ought to be 
arranged.”278  In doing so, “[o]ne is putting one’s judgment ahead of others’ and in the light 
of the facts about judgment and the interests in respect for judgment, one is in effect 
expressing the superiority of one’s interests over others.”279 
 Here I want to address two broad problems with such a view.  The first is with the 
notion of a duty of respect.  The second has to do with resting the authority of democracy 
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on a basis other than the moral responsibility or task of the state.  Resting a duty to obey 
the law on the duty to respect one’s fellow citizens is problematic.  That is because the duty 
of respect, like any attitude-centric duty, is inherently indeterminate.  There are enumerable 
ways in which we can show respect for others.  Here are several (not all) possibilities for 
how to interpret a duty of respect, not all of which would demand compliance with the law.  
First, a requirement of respect could be a requirement only that one has a certain type of 
attitude toward the object of respect.  Such a duty does not require an individual to act in a 
particular manner; it simply requires them to have a certain type of mental state, 
specifically an attitude of respect.  We might imagine a person faced with a legal decision 
emanating from a democratic procedures saying, “I respect the decision, the effort that 
went into it, and all of my fellow citizens, but I am going to do what I think is right for all, 
including myself.”  In which case, the person has the requisite mental attitude, and perhaps 
that he express that attitude in some way, but the requirement that he have that attitude 
does not give him reason one way or the other to follow the law.  
There is a second, moderate possibility.  The moderate duty of respect would 
require that one at least regard the object of respect as having some sort of practical 
relevance, as carrying some sort of deliberative weight, in one’s deliberations about what 
to do in the face of democratic decision.  This is commonly how we understand the 
normative import of requests between individuals in morally valuable relationships, for 
example, a friendship.  Take a person making a request of their friend.  In the normal case, 
a friend, as a matter of respect for his friend, is obligated to give some consideration to his 
friend’s request to do something, perhaps even substantially weighty consideration.  But 
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respect does not require that the friend ultimately act on the request to the exclusion of all 
other considerations.  Nor is it the case that the friend automatically does anything wrong 
by not going along with what his friend requests.  The request (even if communicated more 
like an order) does not automatically obligate.  Along such lines, requiring respect for 
democratically created law could mean that one is required to consider a democratically 
generated law as carrying (significant) weight in one’s deliberations.  So we can imagine a 
person saying, “I see your point about the fact that this law was the majority decision of 
my fellow citizens, and that fact weighed heavily in my deliberations, but ultimately other 
moral considerations compel me to do otherwise.”  There likely will be cases in which that 
consideration tips the balance in favor of following the law.  But that will not be true in all 
cases.  All that is required is that the citizen takes the law into consideration in deciding 
what to do.280 
Finally, we could interpret the duty of respect to require that a person abide by 
democratic law.  Only if one follows the law does one show adequate respect.  This last 
idea brings us to the claim that democratic procedures have the capacity to generate moral 
obligations.  It is that version of respect that respect-based theories must satisfy if equal 
respect is supposed to ground a duty to comply with democratic laws.  The difficulty is that 
if there are other existing avenues for respecting one’s fellows as equals, then it is not 
obvious on what basis we would require this interpretation of the duty of respect.  Exactly, 
why does the citizen need to show that much respect?  Without more argument the duty of 
                                                          
280 Such a view need not even compel the individual to follow the law when it provides a 
sufficiently weighty reason.  All that is required is that it be considered in one’s 
deliberation, not that one deliberates correctly. 
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respect is indeterminate with respect to the different ways in which the duty can be 
discharged. 
Before discussing one final difficulty with respect-based views, it will be helpful to 
look at another view that focuses on equal respect.  In Law and Disagreement, Jeremy 
Waldron aims to present “a philosophy of law that pays something more than lip-service 
to the ideal of self-government; a philosophy of law which indeed puts that ideal to work . 
. . in its account of the nature of law, the basis of legitimacy, the task of interpretation, and 
the respective responsibilities of legislatures, citizens, and courts.”281  Notwithstanding that 
goal, the view that Waldron goes on to present is perhaps more important for its attempt to 
apply the lessons of philosophy of law, especially lessons about the nature of legal 
authority, in the other direction, to thinking about the moral authority of democratic 
decision making.  Under the heading of what, borrowing from Rawls and Hume,282 he calls, 
“the circumstances of politics,” Waldron develops a number of points discussed in earlier 
chapters about the need for law in the face of reasonable disagreement:  “[T]he felt need 
among members of a certain group for a common framework, decision, or course of action 
on some matter, even in the face of disagreement about what that framework, decision, or 
action should be, are the circumstances of politics.”283  As I argued earlier, that need is not 
                                                          
281 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 9. 
282 Within the circumstances of justice, Rawls includes inter alia: that individuals live in 
proximity in time and space, that individuals have similar physical and mental capacities, 
that there is moderate scarcity of resources, that individuals have different life plans, and 
that individuals have different philosophical, religious, political, and social doctrines.  
Thus, Waldron’s circumstances of politics are just a more narrow version of Rawls’s 
circumstances of justice.  Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 126-30. 
283 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 102. 
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just felt; it is a real moral need to secure equal freedom.  Democratic authority, according 
to Waldron, is justified in some manner by the fact that we live in the circumstances of 
politics, and there is a necessary moral task to complete.   
Now, one might criticize the authority of democratic decision making in a manner 
comparable to how one might criticize the authority of law: That a law is a valid law or 
that a law garnered a majority of the votes are just social facts that seem to be arbitrary 
from the moral point of view.  How can a social fact defeat one’s considered judgment 
about, or the independent moral merits of, the required course of action?  Earlier I urged 
that the fact of reasonable moral disagreement admonishes confidence in one’s ability to 
determine the singular moral merit of any given action.  Waldron shares that view and 
defends democratic law making, specifically majoritarian voting procedures, against the 
charge of arbitrariness by highlighting their ability to resolve moral disagreement in the 
circumstances of politics:  
Society needs a mechanical procedure precisely because recourse to a 
substantive procedure would reproduce, not resolve, the decision-problem 
in front of us.  What seems like the majoritarian obsession with statistics is 
. . . the tribute that politics plays to the reality that social problems and 
opportunities confront us in our millions, not in the twos and threes with 
which moral philosophers are comfortable.  And what seems like its 
impersonality is really a commitment to equality—a determination that 
when we need to settle on a single course of action and we disagree about 
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what to do, there is no reasonable basis for our decision-procedures to 
accord greater weight to one side than to the other in the disagreement.284 
There are two points to unpack here.  The first deals with the positivity of democratic 
procedures, the second with the value of equality.  First, democratic procedures are morally 
important because they channel moral disagreements through a process that results in a 
decisive majoritarian decision that does not reproduce the disagreements that it functioned 
to resolve.  Waldron is emphasizing the moral importance of the legal positivity of 
majoritarian democratic procedures.  Democratic processes cannot resolve moral 
disagreement about the substantive merits of a candidate course of action if after the 
democratic process takes its course, individuals simply could continue to act according to 
their own ex ante assessment of the substantive merits of a course of action.  Resolution is 
achieved because we can ascertain the required course of action simply by tallying votes.  
It should be recalled that democratic procedures and democratically produced laws are not 
uniquely positive.  As I explained earlier, all laws, by virtue of the fact that their validity 
is determined by social facts, have the capacity to resolve reasonable disagreement because 
the existence and content of a law is not determined by one’s reasoned moral assessment.   
Waldron’s second point is that democratic majoritarian procedures also apparently 
express a commitment to equality.  At this point, it is not clear exactly how majoritarian 
procedures are unique in that respect.  If there is no reasonable basis to accord greater 
weight to one side of a debate rather than the other, then it is unclear why the side that 
carries a majority of votes should prevail.  I will return to that point in the final section.  In 
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any case, at this point Waldron’s point about equality is consistent with the PEC described 
earlier.  We can say that no matter what positive “mechanical” process is used to come to 
final decisions, no side within a reasonable debate within a democracy has any more than 
an equal right to decision-making power.   
Nonetheless, Waldron goes on to develop his moral task account partially in terms 
of the moral importance of equal respect.  He sums up the view as follows: 
 [A]n account of majority decision cannot itself explain the authority of 
legislation (in [a] constraining sense).  That explanation must come 
primarily from our sense of the moral urgency and importance of the 
problems we must address—the things that ought to be done and must be 
done by us together, in our millions, if they are to be done at all. . . . The 
appeal of majority decision is that it not only solves the difficulty [the 
circumstances of politics] generate, but it does so in a respectful spirit.  
Thus, its constraining authority consists of the fact that it allows us to 
address in these circumstances those problems that are deemed important 
and compelling.  The two, then—constraint and respectfulness—combine 
to make a particular demand on each citizen . . . that he should not insist 
unreasonably on what appears to him to be the right solution to the urgent 
problems we face, if the result of such insistence is likely to be that the 
problems we face do not get any sort of solution at all.285 
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The view presented can broadly be described as an attempt to explain why laws that 
issue from democratic legislatures and/or majoritarian decision making are morally 
binding.  It attempts to explain the moral authority of democratic legal procedures. 
There are two components to Waldron’s argument.  The first has to do with the ability of 
democratic processes to resolve “important and compelling” moral problems.  The second 
has to do with the virtue of “respectfulness.”   
Despite being on the right track in a number of respects, the view faces difficulties.  
First look at how Waldron presents the moral-task component of his argument.  He says 
that no citizen should “insist unreasonably on what appears to him to be the right solution 
to the urgent problems we face, if the result of such insistence is likely to be that the 
problems we face do not get any sort of solution at all.”286  Obviously, it would be 
unreasonable—even evil and against one’s duty—for any individual citizen to insist on not 
complying with the law if the immediate and foreseeable result of that failure to comply 
would be a failure of a collective solution to an urgent moral problem.  In such a 
circumstance, the citizen has a moral obligation to go along and not to insist on what he 
regards as the morally required course.  The problem is that the individual citizen is rarely, 
if ever, in a circumstance where his individual compliance is marginally necessary to 
discharge any of our collective responsibilities.  Recall an earlier discussion about Hume’s 
instrumental defense of the general moral obligation to obey the law: “If the reason be 
                                                          
286 Ibid.  Presumably the citizen cannot insist reasonably on what appears to be the right 
solution either.  Waldron’s account is supposed to show that the law is preemptive even in 
the face of reasonable disagreement.  The reasonable citizen is the primary target, not the 
unreasonable citizen.  An account of political authority must explain why the law is binding 
notwithstanding that the citizen has a view that is not unreasonable. 
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asked of that obedience, which we are bound to pay to government, I readily answer, 
because society could not otherwise subsist . . . .”287  But, contra Hume, society never hangs 
in the balance like that and nor do most moral tasks that require collective action.  It would 
be a highly unusual, even tragic, circumstance for the solution to an urgent and necessary 
moral problem, one that normally stems from the collective needs of millions of people, to 
hang on the compliance of any particular individual.  In fact, it is the nature of collective 
action problems generally that they do not have that sort of structure, which is why such 
problems call out to be addressed in ways other than an appeal to the individual importance 
of the actions of any particular individual.288  Any moral task argument that rests on the 
instrumental necessity of any particular citizen’s conformity to law faces the same problem 
that Hume faces.  This is especially problematic for Waldron because, by his own 
admission, what is paramount to explain the authoritativeness of majoritarian procedures 
is not that they are democratic but that they resolve urgent moral tasks.  In Chapter Three 
I urged that the need to discharge our collective responsibilities in a fair manner can address 
the concern about inconsequential non-compliance.  
Waldron does not say anything about equal distributions of responsibility, but he 
places heavy emphasis on the value of equal respect in democratic procedure.  Perhaps 
                                                          
287 Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” 481.  Similarly, Hume writes, “society cannot 
possibly be maintained without the authority of magistrates, and that this authority must 
soon fall into contempt where exact obedience is not paid to it. The observation of these 
general and obvious interests is the source of all allegiance, and of that moral obligation 
which we attribute to it.”  Ibid., 480. 
288 In fact, it is the failure of this assumption that motivates defenses of political authority 
as a mechanism to solve coordination problems.  It is in part because any given individual 
is not marginally necessary that the collective must be coordinated. 
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respect can bridge the gap in the argument.  There are two objects of respect on Waldron’s 
account.  First, the achievement of the democratic process in resolving necessary moral 
tasks collectively is an object of respect.289  And second, the process respects the persons 
who are afforded an equal vote in the democratic process because they have an equal right 
to participate and their divergent views are not silenced.290   The upshot seems to be that 
by respecting the democratic process, one is satisfying a duty to respect one’s fellow 
citizens.  At this point, we are where we left off earlier.  The difficulty is that a duty of 
respect is inherently indeterminate, as there is no straightforward inference from a duty to 
respect to a duty to obey the law.   
I want to note a broader problem with respect-based views of political obligation.  
Even if the duty of equal respect could adequately explain why individuals have a moral 
obligation to follow democratically produced laws, the duty of respect cannot explain why 
democratically produced laws are coercively enforceable.  Following Kant, I earlier argued 
that force is only permitted to secure equal freedom.  However, duties of respect do not 
implicate the freedom of others.  If I disrespect you, for example by insulting you, I have 
in no way hindered your freedom.  Although individuals should respect others, they cannot 
be forced to do so or punished for failing to do so.  The duty of respect therefore cannot 
account for the coercive nature of political institutions, democratic or otherwise.  For that 
additional reason, the duty of respect fails. 
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None of this is to say that duties of respect are not violated when individuals do not 
abide by the law in democratic society.  If democratic laws secure equal freedom, then we 
have obligations to follow those laws.  If we break those laws, then we violate our 
obligations and the rights of others.  Disobeying such laws expresses disrespect, but that is 
because lawbreakers are violating the moral rights of others.  The problem is with deriving 
duties to obey from duties to respect.  On respect-based views, the obligation to obey the 
law is in some way derivative of the duty of respect.  Such views put the cart before the 
horse.   
6.4 - Moral Tasks, Epistemic Value, and Normative Consent 
For some, the authority of democracy is to be grounded in its special instrumental 
and epistemic capacity to bring about just outcomes.  That may or may not be true as an 
empirical matter but instrumental concerns are completely relevant in the moral task 
framework.  But we should not get carried away.  A primary example is David Estlund’s 
“epistemic proceduralist account of democratic authority.”291  Estlund argues that the need 
to resolve certain urgent moral tasks in ways that are epistemically respectable, fair, and 
entitled to consent can ground the authority of democracy and the obligation to obey.292  
He argues that democratic states “serve urgent collective tasks with institutions that can be 
publicly seen to have some decent tendency (better than or at least nearly as good as any 
                                                          
291 Estlund, Democratic Authority, 136.   
292 Estlund describes moral task accounts along the following lines: “urgent task theory 
holds that some tasks are morally so important that there is a natural moral duty to obey 
the commands of a putative authority who is well positioned to achieve the task if only 
people will obey.”  Ibid., 132. 
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other and also better than random) to produce good or correct decisions.”293  There are 
“great humanitarian problems” that must be addressed, and the duty to obey laws issuing 
from the democratic process is a species of duty “to contribute to the solution of great 
humanitarian problems.”294  Although those urgent collective tasks can generally be 
resolved without all citizens participating, each citizen nonetheless has a duty of fairness 
to participate. 
Democratic processes are important to political legitimacy insofar as such 
processes are epistemically respectable and such processes do not draw “invidious 
comparisons” between possible participants in the process.  The latter point is that citizens 
are not pre-judged as wiser or less wise in a way that affects their rights to participate.295  
                                                          
293 Ibid., 137.  I will leave to the side the objection that epistemic proceduralism confuses 
practical authority with theoretical authority.  The former creates reasons for action, while 
the latter merely creates reasons for belief.  Although it might be foolish to ignore the 
claims of a theoretical authority, say a scientist, one is not morally bound to believe a 
theoretical authority.  On a theoretical model, a failure to comply with democratic law is 
not a moral failure but an epistemic failure that would open the individual up to the kinds 
of criticism that are appropriate for epistemic failures. 
294 Ibid., 145.  
295 Ibid., 12.  There is an ambiguity in Estlund’s view when it comes to prohibition against 
invidious comparisons.  Estlund rejects the authority of a counsel of learneds because 
“there are possible qualified objections to it.”  Ibid., 49.  Specifically, such a counsel would 
be formed on the basis of invidious comparisons among people: some are wiser than others.  
The prohibition against invidious comparisons is supposed to defeat expertise-based 
accounts of authority, such as that provided by Raz.  The problem is that Estlund is explicit 
that qualified acceptability is only relevant to the issue of the legitimate use of force; it is 
not relevant to whether someone has a moral power.  Ibid., 134.  Raz’s account is about 
legitimate authority, not the use of force.  So, we cannot reject Raz’s account on the ground 
that it makes invidious comparisons because the presence of such comparison is not 
supposed to be relevant to the authority issue.  Moreover, while the PEC and the prohibition 
against invidious comparisons seem similar, it is unclear the extent to which they can be 
treated as similar because invidious comparisons are not relevant to the issue of authority 
in Estlund’s view. 
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The prohibition against invidious comparisons would equally follow from the PEC.  No 
individual is to have anything but an equal right to decision-making power, regardless of 
any impression that some are morally smarter than others.  Insofar as that constraint is in 
part derived from the fact that individuals reasonably disagree, there is no basis upon which 
to designate some as wiser than others. 
On Estlund’s account, the democratic process, where that includes majority voting 
procedures, has a better-than-random epistemic capacity to hone in on the correct solutions 
to our humanitarian problems.  Thus, complying with a democratic law is a fair 
instrumental contribution toward an end that the democratic process identifies as morally 
compelling.  This would contrast with a system of anarchy according to which individuals 
themselves choose what course of action to take aside from whether it is mandated by the 
democratic process.  The democratic process will have the capacity to create binding moral 
obligations insofar as it is “more likely to promote substantive justice than the anarchic 
arrangement, and [is] also better than a random procedure for choosing decisions.”296  The 
democratic process has the capacity to do that because it pools the wisdom of the citizenry 
through the voting process much like a market pools the wisdom of potential buyers to 
assign prices to goods in a market.297    
An initial concern is that even if democratic processes are better than random and 
better than any alternative institutional arrangement, we cannot infer that democratic 
processes are morally binding in all cases.  That would be what we need to ground anything 
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that looks like a general moral authority to impose obligations.  In addition, to say that 
democratic procedures are simply better than a number of bad alternatives is not a robust 
defense of democracy.  Estlund admits as much.298  But according to him, it is not that 
democracy merely performs better than a decision process that chooses randomly (e.g., a 
coin flip).299  Rather, democratic processes are much better than a random procedure and 
very reliable when it comes to avoiding “primary bads”: “war, famine, economic collapse, 
political collapse, epidemic, and genocide.”300  Since democracy is much better than 
random at avoiding primary bads, Estlund continues, we can infer that it is also at least 
better than random at determining what justice requires more generally.301   
That argument is unconvincing.  First, it seems only to have the potential to justify 
compliance with the law in cases where primary bads are at stake.  One might just concede 
that if there is a risk of famine that is somehow dependent on certain political decisions, 
then those decisions should be made according to binding democratic processes.  However, 
one might suggest that such high stakes cases are exactly the sort of cases where we do not 
want decisions to be democratically made.  Second, in cases where primary bads are not at 
issue, Estlund has not provided an argument that would explain why a decision maker 
whose deliberative capacity is better than a coin flip has any reason to go along with the 
democratic decision rather than their own assessment of what course of action to take.  It 
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just seems completely contingent whether democratic institutions will outperform other 
arrangements and/or deliberative individual deliberative citizens faced with what to do. 
Those more specific concerns are part of a more general concern about the 
epistemic proceduralist account of authority.  This is a difficulty that we have seen faces 
any account that relies on the idea that one institutional arrangement is comparatively better 
than others.  The account is simply an account of the justification of democratic procedures, 
not their legitimacy.  Even if democratic procedures can bring about better results and/or 
solutions to our collective problems, we need a way to translate that into an account of the 
legitimacy of democratic law. 
I think Estlund is sensitive to that broader concern.  As he notes, even if we can 
have duties to contribute to the solution of humanitarian problems, “something more would 
be needed to explain why I would be obligated to follow orders, to do what I am told 
because I am told.”302  That problem is resolved by what Estlund calls, “normative 
consent.”  Democratic processes must and will he thinks garner normative consent.  
According to Estlund, “[n]ormative consent names a moral obligation, when there is one, 
to consent to proposed new authority.  It is . . . morally equivalent to a promise to obey.  In 
the context of [the state of nature] it would be a moral obligation to consent to the proposed 
new authority.”303  If an individual has an obligation to consent and does not do so, then 
their non-consent is void.  The moral situation therefore is as if  they had consented. 
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Recall our discussion in Chapter Four of consent theories in the context of moral 
task accounts.  One version of the moral task account of political authority (Murphy) argues 
that the authoritative state is necessary to resolve certain collective moral tasks and that in 
virtue of that need individuals reasonably can, should, or must consent to the state having 
authority over them.  In such an account, actual consent is necessary for authority.  
Normative consent, however, does not require actual consent.  One normatively consents 
insofar as one would have an obligation to do so.  If one consents to democratic authority, 
then obedience is required.  If an individual has an obligation to consent but fails to consent, 
their non-consent is nullified anyway and they have given normative, but not actual, 
consent to be bound.  Thus, normative consent is normatively equivalent to a promise to 
obey.   
The existence of an important moral task that must be resolved in a fair manner can 
ground the authority of epistemically respectable democratic processes if one would also 
be obligated to promise to obey such processes:   
[n]ormative consent theory proposes that in the case of some urgent tasks, 
but not others, those who are commanded would, if asked, be wrong not to 
consent to the commander’s authority for these purposes.  The wrongness 
of refusing consent, rather than urgency itself, would be the explanation for 
why some urgent tasks ground authority and others do not.304  
Estlund’s account of normative consent is problematic.  The problem is that normative 
consent is entirely superfluous, and Estlund offers no good reasons to conclude otherwise.  
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Estlund’s account aside, I have already provided a general account of the conditions under 
which the state can possess legitimate political authority.  In this chapter, I added the 
additional requirement of the PEC.  With that in mind, we might ask what additional 
theoretical work could be done by adding the concept of normative consent.  Put 
differently, if the fact that an individual does not consent has no normative consequences 
anyway, why would there be a superfluous obligation to consent in the first place?305  Given 
that the lack of consent is nullified because of the moral necessity of resolving moral tasks 
fairly, the latter argument should already directly establish the moral obligation to obey 
authority.   
Estlund is aware of that problem too:  
[A] formidable objection is that the duty to consent already depends on prior 
moral facts, which might as well be taken as the moral basis for the authority 
itself, as well as for the duty to consent.  The direct authority objection 
claims that the consent-requiring facts are already authority-establishing 
facts.  This objection . . . claims that the facts are already a sufficient moral 
basis for authority.306   
So, why the detour?   
                                                          
305 One might argue that even if normative consent is doing no normative work, it might 
be doing dialectical work in a theoretical conversation with consent theorists.  Perhaps, 
normative consent permits us to engage with consent theorists on their own terms without 
looking like we are begging the question.  In the end, however, I doubt a consent theorist 
would be persuaded by the idea that non-consent can be voided. 
306 Ibid., 130. 
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Estlund offers two reasons, neither of which work.  First, he maintains that “[m]oral 
agents possess a special kind of freedom from each other’s authority.  It cannot simply 
befall us, but can only arise subject in some way to our own will.”307  However, normative 
consent countenances obligations that “simply befall us” insofar as it does not require 
actual consent to political authority.  Such obligations would only be subject to our own 
will insofar as we actually choose them or consent to them.  So, normative consent does 
not even address that supposed problem.   
Second, Estlund argues that consenting, like promising, can have value independent 
of the value of the reason for which you consent.308  For example, doctors take an oath — 
they make a promise — never to do harm.  They also have an independent moral obligation 
never to do harm.  According to Estlund, there is moral value both in doctor’s taking an 
oath and in their abiding by the obligation not to do harm.309  The point is that oath taking 
has some moral value independent of the moral value of the obligation to do no harm.  We 
need not be exact about what that independent moral value is.  Perhaps there is intrinsic 
moral value in a public expression of one’s commitment to satisfy one’s obligations, or 
there might be instrumental value insofar as people are more likely to do things when they 
promise.  In any case, the problem for Estlund is that normative consent does not generate 
that sort of moral value absent an actual promise or an actual act of consent.  And, even if 
it could bring about some extra moral value, that fact would not address but would confirm 
                                                          
307 Ibid., 151.  This route is a bit perilous.  The consent theorist is going to agree with 
Estlund here and say that the requisite connection to the will is actual consent. 
308 Estlund calls this a “commitment task.”  Ibid., 152-56. 
309 Ibid., 151-54. 
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the fact that there is already a sufficient moral basis for political authority provided by the 
moral task argument. 
6.5 - Specificationism and the Indeterminacy of Equality of Authority 
 I want to end this discussion of the relationship between authority and democracy 
by addressing the status of the principle of bare majority rule and bringing the discussion 
back to specificationism more generally.  That the account I have offered can distinguish 
between the legitimacy of non-democratic rule and democratic rule is an important 
outcome.  We might ask whether the account can also distinguish between different kinds 
of democratic arrangements, including those that do without the principle of majority rule.  
Does the PEC decisively choose among different specifications of democracy?  One 
concern about egalitarian conceptions of equality-based conceptions of democracy is that 
such views are indeterminate with respect to what form democracy is to take.310  Given 
what I have said thus far about specificationism, reasonable disagreement, and equality, 
such indeterminacy is a virtue of the account.  It suggests yet another place in which 
effective legal institutions are necessary to specify relationships of equal freedom.  What I 
want to argue here is that our folk understanding of democracy, which regards the principle 
of bare majority rule as sacrosanct, is just one specification of a system of political authority 
that satisfies the PEC. 
                                                          
310 As Christiano explains, “[s]ome have wondered whether the kind of egalitarian 
argument . . . could not just as well some system in which decisions [are] made by lotteries 
wherein each person had an equal chance to affect the outcome.”  Christiano, The 
Constitution of Equality, 108 (citing David Estlund, “Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: 
The Epistemic Dimension of Democratic Authority,” in Philosophy & Democracy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 69-91.). 
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 Theories of democratic equality in the literature tend to fall into one of three 
categories: 
1. Equality in Influence 
2. Equality in Opportunity for Influence  
3. Equal Chance to Influence.  
Equality of Influence requires not that one have an equal right to choose to have an equal 
influence but that one in fact have an equal influence.311  The most basic idea would be 
that legitimacy turns on whether everyone actually participates in the democratic process 
in an equal way (e.g., everyone must vote, everyone donates the same amount to 
campaigns).312   
Equality in Opportunity for Influence demands not equal actual influence of 
democratic decision making but an equal opportunity to choose to have influence.  Such a 
view would include any of the variety of views that require equality in the resources 
individuals either posses or have the (formal) opportunity to procure, with which they can 
participate in the process (or not by choice).  Theories might demand equality in any one 
or a number of resources.  So, a theory might only demand equality in opportunity to 
influence with a vote, such that all have an equal right to vote.  But there are other possible 
resource equality metrics: money permitted for political use, including personal or 
                                                          
311 We might include any account that requires unanimous agreement on the outcome too.  
But that would run afoul of the requirement that reasonable disagreement and that the need 
for authority be taken seriously. 
312 Such a view would be more likely to emerge from a Self-Rule Model of democracy, but 
there could be other reasons to demand complete participation.  Anyhow, it is not on its 
face inconsistent with the PEC or anything I have argued thus far. 
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campaign expenditures; information; time to participate in political discussion and 
deliberation; equal access to political officials; and so on.   
Finally, Equal Chance to Influence would cover a variety of lottery-based 
democratic institutions.  The most rudimentary form involves giving each citizen an equal 
chance to be the individual who decides on a common policy for a given period of time.  
For example, a democratic state might enter each citizen into a lottery with an equal chance 
of winning the position of king of the country and the exclusive power to legislate (perhaps 
within constitutional limits), for a given period of time.  Or, such can be done to choose 
representative or government officials more generally.313  Another form of lottery system, 
which is a hybrid with a equality in voting system, would be a point voting system.  With 
this system, citizens vote and each alternative is assigned a chance of winning that is 
proportionate to the number of votes tallied for each alternative.  For instance, if candidate 
A carried fifty-one percent of the vote, then candidate A would be given a fifty-one percent 
chance of winning in a subsequently held lottery to determine the winner.  Thus, receiving 
the majority vote in the initial election does not mean that one wins; it just means the 
majority winner ends up with a better chance of winning the lottery.314 
                                                          
313 For a justification of lottery-based institutions over our current representative system, 
see Alexander A. Guerrero, “Against Elections: The Lottocratic Alternative,” Philosophy 
& Public Affairs 42, no. 2 (2014): 135-78. 
314 Another way to think of it is in terms of placing votes in a hat.  With Bare Majority 
Rule, all votes are placed into a hat and then counted.  The majority wins.  With Point 
Voting, instead of counting the votes, a single vote is chosen randomly from the hat and 
that vote decides the outcome.  So the majority position still has a higher chance of being 
selected, but the majority is not necessarily decisive since the minority choice could be 
selected. 
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All of the options I just described are consistent with the PEC, meaning no one ends 
up subject to the private authority of another because any person has an equal right to 
authority as anyone else.  Of course there may end up being differences in such views with 
respect to how effective they are over time and whether they sufficiently meet the 
substantive threshold for legitimacy in practice.  Such issues are more for political science 
than political philosophy.  My point here is to address the concern that any of these views 
in some sense violates the PEC or is otherwise less favorable in consideration of the PEC. 
The primary criticism against views that demand fewer equalities in resources (e.g., 
equal votes but not equal political contributions) is that such views, in demanding only 
formal equality, permit individuals or coalitions of individuals to buy or otherwise 
manipulate political officials for their own private gain.  That is obviously a problem, but 
it is not a problem because anything like the PEC is violated.  Instead, we see that political 
officials and a certain subset of citizens are using their power for obvious personal gain 
and using others for personal gain.  That would be prohibited by the fact that the state’s 
task is to secure equal freedom, not the private interests of the rich.  The real question is 
whether there is any problem with an individual investing unequal resources in advocating 
for a particular political decision because they reasonably believe that to be the best way 
to secure equal freedom for all.  The PEC would not reject that possibility insofar as a 
commitment to equality in authority is a commitment to affirming the equal moral capacity 
and right of all individuals to make binding decisions. 
With respect to lotteries, we can offer a similar response.  Against lotteries, 
Christiano maintains that “the kind of equality realized by lotteries is thinner than the 
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equality realized by a system of ordinary voting.”315  With respect to the ruler-for-x-days 
scenario, he urges that it “precludes a huge amount of negotiation and deliberation.”316  It 
is unclear why that is the case, as any institutionalization of equal freedom would not 
prohibit negotiation and deliberation.  Instead, we might see the lottery as specifying a 
robust commitment to equality: no matter who is picked, they have as much a right to do 
the job as I do.  Christiano offers a similar complaint against point-voting lotteries, as he 
concludes that they offer a thinner version of equality because they take away the chance 
that any individual’s vote will be decisive in determining the outcome of the election.317  It 
is unclear why the issue of whether an individual’s vote can be decisive is relevant from 
the standpoint of resolving moral disagreement consistent with equality.  To be sure, there 
is little chance that any individual’s vote will be decisive in most any democratic 
arrangement.  We clearly should not care that much about that.  But more importantly, a 
commitment to equality in the face of reasonable moral disagreement amounts to refusing 
to insist that one’s say be decisive by contrast with that of any of one’s other fellow citizens.  
What is special about point-voting lotteries is that they give minority viewpoints an extra 
opportunity to carry the day, which surely cannot be inconsistent with a commitment to an 
equal right to an equal say. 
The upshot of this discussion is that various theories of democratic equality are 
really various specifications of legitimate democratic arrangements.  Insofar as such 
                                                          
315 Christiano, The Constitution of Equality, 108-11. 
316 Ibid., 110. 
317 Ibid., 111. 
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arrangements are adequately effective at securing equal freedom and credibly seeking to 
do so, they are legitimate, and we must work within their reasonable terms. 
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CHAPTER 6 - PARTICULARITY PROBLEMS 
 It is a common position or assumption that there exists a special moral tie or bond 
between an individual and their own state, or an individual and their own political 
community.  As Anna Stilz casts the position, “we think a citizen or resident ought to take 
her membership to have a kind of moral salience, one that marks this particular relationship 
as a source of special duties.”318  Beyond being a substantive commitment, defensible or 
not, we might also think that the positing of a special moral relationship is a necessary 
condition for any adequate theory of political obligation or political authority.319  For, as 
some theorist think, a political obligation, by its very nature, just is a special moral bond.  
As Simmons explains, “[P]olitical obligation is the moral bond which ties an individual to 
one particular political community or set of political institutions in a special way.”320  Thus, 
we might inquire into the extant to which a theory of legitimate political authority must 
posit a special moral relationship between an individual and their own state, or an 
individual and their political community of citizens.  In the literature, all of those issues 
have been discussed under the heading of “particularity” or the “particularity problem.” 
In this final chapter I want to discuss several issues related to particularity.  First, I 
will discuss how discussion of how the idea of particularity evolved in the literature.  Next, 
                                                          
318 Stilz, Liberal Loyalty, 3. 
319 For this position, see Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, 30-31; 
Green, The Authority of the State, 227-28; Perry, “Political Authority and Political 
Obligation,” 29. 
320 Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, 155.  Green describes the issue 
in comparable language: “Political obligation is not just some general duty to humanity 
which requires compliance with governments, but rather a special moral relationship 
between a citizen and the state.”  Green, The Authority of the State, 228. 
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I will explain that particularity is not a univocal concept but instead refers to several related 
but different kinds of special moral relationships a citizen may be said to have with their 
own state or their own fellow citizens.  I will explain that particularity of political authority 
ought not be confused with particularity of obligation, political or otherwise.  The larger 
point generated by that distinction is that being subject to the authority of a particular state 
does not imply that one’s political obligations cannot or do not extend beyond state borders.  
Finally, I will end by discussing how my own moral task account addresses the particularity 
problem.  I will argue that particularity arises primarily as a consequence of the limited 
effective control that states are capable of having over the lives of discrete groups of people.  
Because effectiveness is reasonably localized, as are a number of justice-related moral 
problems, it makes sense that political authority is localized and particular.  Accordingly, 
considerations of effectiveness ought not be denigrated as merely practical or contingent 
considerations that are not morally relevant.321   
6.1 - The Origin and Nature of the Particularity Requirement 
The “particularity requirement” was first articulated by Simmons in 1979 in the 
course of a wide-ranging and powerful critique of the most prominent theories of political 
obligation.  Simmons articulate the issue in the following manner: 
What precisely are the sorts of moral requirements in which a theory of 
political obligation is interested? . . . I do want to suggest that we are only 
                                                          
321 Dworkin, for example, complains that such an argument “fails to capture the intimacy 
of the special duty.  It fails to show how legitimacy flows from and defines citizenship.” 
Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 193. 
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interested in those moral requirements which bind an individual to one 
particular political community, set of political institutions, etc. . . . [W]hile 
is may seem innocuous on the surface, this “particularity requirement,” as I 
shall call it, will exclude many traditional attempts to answer questions 
about political obligation.322 
Since then, theorists have rightly assumed that any successful account of political 
legitimacy or political obligation must account for some sort of special normative 
relationship between individuals and their own political communities.323  For example, 
Green identifies “particularity” as a criterion for any successful account of a general 
obligation to obey the law, describing it as meaning that “[c]itizens are normally bound 
only to the laws of their own state.”324  The apparent consequences of that requirement for 
theories of political legitimacy and political obligation, according to Green, are “wide-
ranging, for most ordinary moral reasons do not respect the boundaries of states in the 
appropriate way.”325  Thus, defenders of the state cannot just give up the particularity 
requirement because to do so would be to “assert that persons are, in the moral sense, 
stateless.”326  Later, I am going to focus on the conceptual dissimilarities in how 
particularity is described by theorists.  For now, I want to focus on how Simmons 
                                                          
322 Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, 30-31. 
323 See, e.g., Perry, “Political Authority and Political Obligation,” 29; Wellman and 
Simmons, Is There a Duty to Obey the Law?, 34-46; Green, The Authority of the State, 
227-28; Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, 31-35. 
324 Green, The Authority of the State, 227. 
325 Ibid., 228. 
326 Ibid. 
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articulated the idea in the context of his criticism of natural-duty accounts of the obligation 
to obey the law. 
 In articulating the particularity problem, Simmons’s primary target was Rawls’s 
natural duty of justice account of the obligation to obey the law.  Recall that Rawls argued 
that the obligation to obey the law, and political obligation more generally, are derived 
from the natural duty to support just institutions.  According to Rawls, individuals have a 
fundamental and non-voluntary natural duty of justice “to support and to comply with just 
institutions that exist and apply to [them].”327  That duty “also constrains us to further just 
arrangements not yet established, at least when this can be done without too much cost to 
ourselves.”328  The primary virtue of the natural duty account is that it does not rest political 
obligation on any sort of voluntary (or even involuntary) act or transaction, including 
consent or receipt of benefits, on the part of an individual before they could be bound to 
follow the law.  The state does not condition exercises of its authority or the enforcement 
of its demands on the existence of such transactions.  As Rawls makes clear, “[e]ach is 
bound to these institutions independent of his voluntary acts, performative or otherwise.”329 
The particularity requirement, however, disqualifies the natural duty of justice as  a 
sufficient account of the obligation to obey the law:   
While it [might] follow[] that I have an obligation to support my 
government, it does not follow that there is anything special about this 
obligation.  I am equally constrained by the same moral bond to support 
                                                          
327 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 115. 
328 Ibid. 
329 Ibid. 
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every other just government. . . . If political obligation and citizenship are 
to be related . . . , we need a principle of political obligation which binds the 
citizen to one particular state above all others, namely that state in which 
he is a citizen.330 
Rawls, of course, did not think that the natural duty of justice was particular in nature.  That 
duty “hold[s] between persons irrespective of their institutional relationships; [it] obtain[s] 
between all as equal moral persons.”331  So, the duty will require one to contribute in some 
way, within reason, to supporting just institutions that exist beyond the borders of one’s 
own state without regard to one’s institutional relationship with one’s own state or fellow 
citizens.  But, there is the rub.  The duty to obey the law is particular in nature, which means 
one is only required to obey the laws of one’s own state insofar as that is where one is 
located, and not the laws of some other state.  Rawls offers no explanation of how we are 
to derive a particularized duty to obey the laws of one’s own state from a non-particularized 
duty to support just institutions wherever they might be located and wherever one might 
be located.   
The concern can also be framed a different way.  If the duty to obey the laws of a 
just state is how one is supposed to support just institutions, it should follow that one can 
and must follow the laws of all just states no matter where they are located and no matter 
where one is located.332  It is not enough to simply state or assume that some institutions 
                                                          
330 Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, 31-32. 
331 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
332 One might object that we do in fact have obligations to follow the laws of other states 
insofar as we are located in those states.  That is surely so, and that has to be accounted for 
by any theory of the legitimate authority of the state.  Some laws are binding for anyone 
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apply to us and others do not, because the issue of which apply to us and which do not is 
the basic issue that needs to be explained.333 
The basic point is that the natural duty of justice alone does not offer any account 
of why one’s relationship with one’s own state or one’s own laws is special.  That basic 
point also seems to extend to other accounts that rely on what seem like more generalized 
moral requirements or moral reasons: “More general moral duties . . . , such as duties to 
promote justice, justice, equality, or utility, cannot explain (or justify, or be) our political 
obligations, for such duties do not necessarily tie us either to one particular community or 
to our own community.”334  The idea is that those values, insofar as they are to be promoted, 
are to be promoted wherever and for whomever they can be promoted. 
 Christiano therefore faces a similar difficulty in trying the rest particularity simply 
on the value of equality.  As explained in the previous chapter, Christiano contends that 
“each has a duty to comply with their own democratic institutions since these institutions 
                                                          
within the state’s border and some laws are binding only for residents or citizens of a state.  
The difficulty is that a theory needs to account for why states cannot issue directives across 
borders.  For example, assume that New York State passes a law requiring all citizens of 
the U.S. to pay a tax to New York regardless of where they reside.  Assume New York is 
just and is seeking support.  A particularized theory of legitimate authority should be able 
to account for why that law is not binding for individuals outside of New York but could 
be binding for residents of New York.  
333 Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, 147-48 (“[O]f course, it is easy 
enough to answer simply that the political and legal institutions of each country ‘apply to’ 
people residing permanently within that country; and this seems probably to be what Rawls 
had in mind.  But perhaps our answer here is too easy.  For one still feels inclined to ask 
why, if this is all ‘application’ amounts to, the mere application of a just institution should 
be thought to bind us to comply with it.”). 
334 Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, 68. 
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are necessary to treating their fellows publicly as equals.”335  That presumably is also a 
kind of natural duty.  With respect to the particularity requirement, Christiano maintains 
that one must abide by the law’s of one’s own state because “one would be treating one’s 
fellows publicly as inferiors” if one were “to support the construction of democracy in 
other parts of the world” in lieu of complying with one’s own institutions.336  That 
argument, however, is problematic for reasons similar to those noted earlier.  First, it 
imports the notion of “one’s fellows,” the very notion that needs to be explained.  Second, 
the response, following Simmons’s charge, is that equality should demand not just that one 
not treat one’s fellow citizens as inferiors but that one not treat one’s fellow world citizens 
as inferiors either.  The problem is not to explain why one should not support justice or 
equality elsewhere in the world instead of complying with the law.  The problem is first to 
explain why equality does not also demand that one’s comply with and support laws in 
other parts of the world in addition to those of one’s home state.  And, second, to explain 
how the non-particular value of equality or the duty not to treat others as inferiors could 
generate particularized duties.  The duty not to treat others as inferiors alone does not seem 
to be particular in nature.  So, at best, Christiano’s argument must be supplemented. 
 Before delving deeper into the particularity requirement, it should be noted that 
natural-duty accounts surely get some things correct.  For example, the natural duty of 
                                                          
335 Christiano, The Constitution of Equality, 250.  There is one thing to note.  It is unclear 
how this squares with Christiano’s contention that our political obligations, at least in the 
case of what he calls “inherent authority,” are owed to the legislative assembly and not 
directly to our fellow citizens, as would be the case with authority construed instrumentally 
on his account. 
336 Ibid. 
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justice seems to capture the broad scope of our political obligations or reasons considered 
in the abstract regardless of how we might account for how it is that a state’s laws can be 
morally binding.  First, minimally, it is at least true that we have a duty not to undermine 
just institutions.  If a state is not violating rights and doing its job according to the terms of 
our best moral theory of the state, justice as equal freedom for example, surely one has an 
obligation not to undermine such a state.  That should hold true of any political entity 
whether or not it’s one’s own.  And, it should hold true whether or not it turns out that a 
voluntary transaction is necessary to ground a state’s legitimacy or authority over those 
subject to it.  Such a duty is not special in any way.  Therefore, as a U.S. citizen, I have a 
duty of non-interference in the administration of just institutions in the U.S.  But Chinese 
citizens have the same duty of non-interference with respect to just political institutions in 
the U.S.  That obligation is discharged by not interfering, for example, by not supporting 
jihadists seeking to undermine just political institutions at home or abroad. 
Second, it is quite reasonable to think that we can have a natural duty to support 
just institutions abroad, at least insofar as that can be done through an effective and 
reasonable system of shared responsibility, and such support is needed.  As a U.S citizen, 
I have a duty to support the just political institutions of the U.S.  The nature of that support, 
whether through following the law or not, is a separate matter.  Yet, it is reasonable to think 
that one can have a duty to support just institutions outside the U.S. where those institutions 
require support.  If there are just political institutions outside the U.S. that require support, 
then I can have obligations to support those institutions.  Of course, the nature of that 
support and the manner in which that requirement is to be discharged is debatable.  
 
 
206 
However, it is reasonable to think that one’s political obligations do not end at the border 
of one’s state.  I will return to this point below. 
Finally, although not explicit in Rawls’s discussion of the natural duty of justice, 
we all have political obligations not to support governments that are unjust or illegitimate, 
wherever they may be.  I cannot send money to North Korea to fund prison camps for 
political dissidents.  In this way, the political institutions of other states are not distinct 
from those institutions in one’s own state.  One would equally have a duty not to support 
such institutions in one’s own state.   
All of these non-particular natural duties of justice bind in light of the moral 
necessity of political institutions that secure freedom wherever that task exist.  As I have 
argued to this point, political institutions are morally necessary to specify and protect the 
equal freedom of human beings.  Our political rights and responsibilities derive in part 
from that basic point.  Regimes that discharge that mandate should not be interfered with.  
Regimes that require support in securing that mandate must be supported.  Regimes that 
ignore that mandate must not be supported. 
6.2 - The Particularity in Transactional and Associative Accounts 
The difficulty that the particularity requirement creates for natural-duty accounts is 
generally recognized.  By contrast, transactional and associativist accounts are often 
regarded as fairing better than natural-duty accounts when it comes to the particularity 
requirement.337  Transactional accounts contend that our political obligations arise from 
                                                          
337 E.g., Wellman and Simmons, Is There a Duty to Obey the Law?, 110. 
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certain sorts of voluntary undertakings or agreements, including consent and receipt of 
benefits.  Whereas associativist accounts explain those obligations as arising from one’s 
participation or membership in certain sorts of valuable social groups.  However, it is not 
clear why those accounts fair any better than natural-duty accounts when it comes to 
particularity. 
Begin with transactional theories.  There are no principles internal to those theories 
that would limit the quantity or quality of one’s transactions, and therefore obligations, 
with various states or political communities.  Presumably one could consent or promise to 
be bound by the laws of any number of states absent some sort of antecedent moral 
requirement that one not do so.  In which case, there need not be anything particular or 
special about one’s relationship with any particular state.338  Similarly, as benefits and 
people can travel across borders, one can accept benefits from any number of states.    
Likewise, with associativist accounts.  One can associate or participate in social 
groups in any number of states.  There are no principles internal to associative theories that 
would reasonably limit the quantity or quality of one’s participation within, and therefore 
obligations within, various states.  For example, on Dworkin’s theory of associative 
obligation “the members of a group must by and large hold certain attitudes about the 
responsibilities they owe one another [and] . . . must regard the group’s responsibilities as 
special, holding distinctly within the group, rather than as general duties its members owe 
equally to persons outside it.”339  On its face, the primary difficulty with the view has to 
                                                          
338 Fair play accounts based on the idea of reciprocity and receipt of benefits have similar 
problems insofar as benefits travel across borders but authority and obligations do not. 
339 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 199. 
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do with how an individual’s (or a group’s) attitudes with respect to one’s obligations 
generate bona fide enforceable political obligations.  Setting that worry aside, however, 
surely one could hold such attitudes toward and within a number of different political 
associations just like one could hold such attitudes within a number of different friendships. 
Insofar as there are cases in which we legitimately do have special relationships 
within more than one state or political community, there is an additional worry that arises 
for some associativist accounts that use membership or participation as a constraint on 
more general moral values.  The problem can be seen in the context of states nested within 
states, a common institutional arrangement.  For the sake of explication, let’s focus on 
Dworkin’s account.  Recall that Dworkin urges that such special responsibilities are 
grounded in moral obligations of equal concern for the well-being of those in the group, in 
contrast with those who do not share membership in the group.340  If those conditions are 
met in a political community, like friendships and families, special obligations will arise 
amongst and between members of the political community.  Those obligations do not 
extend to outsiders.  Thus, as a citizen of the U.S. with associative political obligations, on 
Dworkin’s account, one’s must credibly be part of a community that practices equal and 
special concern for other members of the U.S.  That concern should extend to the citizens 
of New Jersey because those individuals are members of the U.S.  The difficulty is that at 
the same time, the account should also explain the particularity of the obligations one has 
within one’s own state of the U.S.  For example, a Pennsylvania citizen would presumably 
have special responsibilities of equal concern with respect to Pennsylvania citizens and the 
                                                          
340 Ibid., 199-200. 
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laws of Pennsylvania.  A citizen of Pennsylvania therefore will be part of a Pennsylvania 
community that practices equal but special concern for Pennsylvanians.  In light of that, 
surely one must also not have equal concern for the citizens of New Jersey.  But, that 
conflicts with one’s U.S. membership responsibilities and perhaps our basic intuitions 
about the actual scope of our political obligations.  It is unclear how to resolve that 
inconsistency, which is problematic insofar as it is commonplace to be a part of political 
authority structures that are nested within each other.  Particularity concerns not just one’s 
special relationship with one’s own nation but also one’s own state or municipality.341 
The difficulty raised for Dworkin by the case of nested legal systems connects with 
a broader problem with how political theorists think about the issue of particularity.  There 
is a tendency to think about particularity and political obligation more generally in 
nationalist terms.  So the issue of particularity would be framed in terms of whether our 
political obligations, those connected with distributive justice for example, are limited by 
national borders rather than extending beyond those borders to global citizens generally.  
Those are obviously important issues.  But when we are thinking about moral obligations 
to follow the law and the moral authority of law, we need to be sensitive to the more 
familiar features of modern legal systems.  Hart maintained that the paradigm instance of 
a legal system was the “modern municipal legal system.”342  Surely, the same can be said 
for modern state and federal legal systems as well.  The point is that individuals in modern 
                                                          
341 Of course, practical concerns would limit the number of states that one could transact 
or associate with.  Those concerns, however, limit the domain of one’s political obligations 
no more than the personal-cost constraint in Rawls’s natural-duty account and instrumental 
concerns more generally.   
342 Hart, The Concept of Law, 79. 
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societies are subject to a number of nested systems of law that are interrelated in complex 
ways.  So a complete account of the particularity of political authority should address 
particularities wherever they exist.  And, particularities do not exist just at the national level 
between a nation state and members of a nation.  They also exist between an individual and 
their local municipality and their local state.    
6.3 - Types of Particularity 
Unfortunately, discussions of particularity in the literature have failed to make clear 
several conceptual distinctions.  The core idea behind the particularity requirement is the 
idea of a special relationship or special bond.  There is a special relationship insofar as the 
relationship described between an individual and “their own” legal system or fellow 
citizens, and not between an individual and citizens or legal systems more generally.  That 
issue is not limited to the more familiar question of whether one has a special relationship 
with one’s country or nation.  Particularity is a requirement wherever there are political 
structures that distinguish between insiders and outsiders.  As noted, that distinction plays 
out at all levels of government. 
What sort of moral relationship are we talking about?  There are several candidates 
that could define the special relationship captured by the particularity requirement.  Here I 
want to focus on two candidate relationships from the literature that might satisfy the 
particularity requirement.  These particularities employ some of the basic Hohfeldian 
elements and relationships discussed in previous chapters.   
The first species of particularity is particularity of authority and most directly 
addresses the scope of the state’s authority, and the scope of the state’s jurisdiction over 
 
 
211 
persons, actions, and property.  In which case, a state’s authority is particular insofar as it 
only has authority over a particular class of people and that class of people is subject to 
that state’s authority.  As was explained in Chapter One, built into that are a variety of 
relationships.  At the very least, it means that the state has a power-liability relationship 
with a particular class of people within a particular territory.  The point is that the state 
only has the moral power to change the moral situation of a particular class of individuals 
through its legal directives.  Correlatively only individuals in that particular class are liable 
to have their moral situation changed by that state, and, therefore, only individuals in that 
class are morally obligated to comply with the laws of that state.   
The particularity of authority is emphasized by Green and Perry.  As Green explains 
the particularity requirement in this sense, he explains that “[c]itizens are normally bound 
only to the laws of their own state.”343  And, Stephen Perry, following Green, maintains 
that the particularity condition “states that an obligation to obey the law must arise only for 
the directives of a citizen’s (or subject’s) own state, and not for the directives of other 
states.”344  Accordingly, this understanding of the relevant special relationship focuses on 
the state’s political authority as exercised through the legal system. 
The second species of particularity I will call particularity of political obligation.  
That notion most directly addresses the scope of the state and its subjects’ obligations and 
to whom those obligations are owed.  To say that one’s political obligations are particular 
is to say that one only owes one’s political obligations to particular states or political 
                                                          
343 Green, The Authority of the State, 227. 
344 Perry, “Political Authority and Political Obligation,” 21. 
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communities.  To satisfy this particularity requirement there must be a basis for the 
conclusion that one’s political obligations are owed to one’s own state or one’s fellow 
citizens rather than states or people more generally.  What we are describing then is a 
correlative claim-obligation relationship rather than a power-liability relationship.  
Particularity of obligation imports the idea of to whom are one’s political obligations owed, 
which is distinct from the question of who can impose an obligation on whom. 
Some theorists seem to be exclusively focused on particularity of obligation when 
they discuss particularity.  Simmons generally frames particularity in terms of a special 
bond, by which he means an obligation:  “[P]olitical obligation is the moral bond which 
ties an individual to one particular political community or set of political institutions in a 
special way.”345  That notion is then leveraged, as we have seen, to challenge the 
particularity of natural duties to support just political institutions: 
While it follows that I have an obligation to support my [just] government, 
it does not follow that there is anything special about this obligation.  I am 
equally constrained by the same moral bond to support every other just 
government. . . . [W]e need a principle of political obligation which binds 
the citizen to one particular state above all others, namely the state in which 
he is a citizen.346   
                                                          
345 Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, 155. 
346 Ibid., 31-32.  In later work, Simmons frames the issue in the same way: “We can 
understand why our government’s being just might establish a moral bond to support it, 
but not why this would establish a bond to support it over other just governments.”  
Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, 47. 
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Anna Stilz follows Simmons in that regard.  Stilz articulates particularity as the idea 
“that there is a special bond or obligation that ties the citizen or resident to her state, and to 
her compatriots, and not to others, and requires her to support these people and these 
institutions and not others.”347  She therefore also links particularity with the debate 
between cosmopolitans and nationalists about the scope of our political obligations:  
“Cosmopolitans have argued that . . . we ought to hold that special obligations of citizenship 
are fundamentally incompatible with a liberal theory of justice.  On the cosmopolitan view, 
then, the particularity assumption cannot be justified . . . .”348  Thus, an moral theory of the 
particularity of one’s obligations would explain how one’s political obligations are only 
owed to the citizens of one’s own legal unit, whether that be a nation, a state, or a 
municipality.349 
I have articulated the above distinction because at best it is often not clearly 
articulated in the literature and at worst it is often confused.  For example, after Green 
states, “Citizens are normally bound only to the laws of their own state,” he explains: 
This condition seeks to capture the directionality common to political 
obligation and other special obligations.  Just as promising creates duties to 
                                                          
347 Stilz, Liberal Loyalty, 6.   
348 Ibid., 9.  Dworkin also seems to understand the problem this way.  Dworkin, Law’s 
Empire, 193. 
349 A theory of political-obligation particularity could instead be articulated in terms of a 
particularized moral priority. So, one might argue that we do owe obligations to the citizens 
and states of the world more generally but that political obligations to one’s own state or 
fellow citizens take priority over any such worldly obligations. 
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particular persons only and not to the world at large, political obligations 
bind them to certain states only.350   
That blends issues of authority and issues of obligation.  Moral powers, while relational, 
are not directional like moral obligations.  The existence of a moral power does not entail 
anything about to whom one’s obligations are owed, whether those obligations are the 
product of an exercise of a moral power or not. 
 Simmons has also contributed to confusing the two issues.  For example, in his 
earliest statement of “the problem of political obligation,” he says that “a political 
obligation is a moral requirement to support and comply with the political institutions of 
one’s country of residence.”351  Aside from focusing exclusively on countries rather than 
other legal units, combines both the issue of particularity of authority and particularity of 
obligation under the single heading of political obligation.  In later work, he continues to 
blend the issue of obedience, which is connected to the moral power to impose duties, with 
the scope of our general political obligations: 
Political obligations are felt to be obligations of obedience and support 
owed to one particular government or community (our own), above all 
others.  Citizen’s obligations are special ties, involving loyalty or 
commitment to the political community in which they were born or in which 
they reside.  More general moral duties . . . , such as duties to promote 
justice, justice, equality, or utility, cannot explain (or justify, or be ) our 
                                                          
350 Green, The Authority of the State, 227. 
351 Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, 29. 
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political obligations, for such duties do not necessarily tie us either to one 
particular community or to our own community.”352   
Here is another example of shifting quickly between particularity of obligation and 
particularity of authority: 
[E]ven if you had perfectly general duties to promote justice and happiness, 
. . . these duties would require of you that you support all such states, 
providing you with no necessary reason to show any special favoritism or 
unique allegiance to your own state, and providing none of those states with 
an special right to impose on you additional duties.353  
Yet, the two kinds of particularities ought not be confused. 
Drawing the distinction permits us to recognize examples where the scope or 
particularity of legitimate political authority ought not to be confused with the scope of our 
legitimate political obligations.  First, as emphasized in our discussion of natural-duty 
accounts, some of our political obligations are not particular in that they are not only owed 
to those with whom we share a nation.  Some of our political obligations — obligations 
that are within the state’s legitimate authority to enforce — are owed to individuals residing 
beyond the borders of one’s nation.  For example, a federal tax to pay for aid to build 
schools in Niger is fundamentally owed to those individuals in Niger who require schools, 
not the U.S. government or one’s fellow citizens in the U.S.354  The Niger government does 
                                                          
352 Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, 68. 
353 Ibid., 137. 
354 I say fundamentally because those the U.S. government’s responsibility to provide aid 
is fundamentally grounded in the need to secure freedom for the people of Niger.  But, 
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not have the legitimate authority to impose a tax on citizens of the U.S. for that purpose.  
But, the U.S. government has that power.  On the other hand, the U.S. government does 
not have the authority to impose similar obligations on individuals in Niger.  Nonetheless, 
it may have the capacity and responsibility to support and secure a school-building program 
in Niger.  The example shows that the particular class of people subject to a state’s authority 
need not coincide with the class of people to whom our political obligations are owed.  
While a state’s authority may be limited to its own citizen’s, the same limit need not be 
placed on the class of people to whom our political obligations are owed. 
Second, when we look at federalist systems that have nested authority structures, 
like the United States, we also see scope distinctions.  Return to thinking about the 
relationship between the citizens of New Jersey and the citizens of Pennsylvania.  In one 
sense, Pennsylvania citizens have a particular relationship with their own state.  
Pennsylvania has authority over Pennsylvania residents.  At the same time, it is not as if 
Pennsylvania citizens do not have political obligations to New Jersey residents.  In fact, 
those obligations are generally discharged through federal law as a result of exercises of 
federal authority.  The point is that being a part of a particularized authority relationship 
does not preclude having political obligations that extend beyond the territorial borders of 
that authority. 
6.4 - Task Efficacy, Justice, and Particularity 
                                                          
insofar as the U.S. government’s responsibility is a collective responsibility of U.S. 
citizens, individual U.S. citizens will have duties of fairness to share in that responsibility. 
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Before discussing more about why it is important to draw the distinction just made, 
it will help to outline how my own view addresses the particularity requirement.  I have 
argued that political authority is morally necessary to secure equal freedom.  Accordingly, 
any entity or organization that has the effective capacity to secure equal freedom has a 
responsibility to do so.  Along with that responsibility comes a host of enabling rights that 
constitute the state’s authority, including the power to impose obligations.  In turn, the state 
is tasked with specifying our political obligations in a way that is fair and consistent with 
the equal freedom of those subject to its authority.  One’s enforceable political obligations 
consist in whichever obligations emanate from the state’s exercise of its authority.  
The particularity of a state’s political authority is limited by the state’s 
effectiveness.  The basic idea is that the state’s authority is limited by its ability effectively 
to coordinate behavior to secure equal freedom.  If a state cannot effectively exercise it 
coordinative capacities over a particular people in a particular territory to solve the moral 
problems discussed earlier, then it has no or limited authority to make and enforce it 
demands.  But if a particular class of people in a particular territory will abide by its 
commands, then it both has the capacity and the right to exercise authority over those 
people in that territory. 
Notwithstanding, the scope of the state’s political authority, one’s enforceable 
political obligations can extend beyond the state’s borders.  The state, however, has a right 
and responsibility to specify and mediate those obligations.  Insofar as it can do so, it 
should.  The view then is comparable to David Estlund’s “think globally, act locally model 
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of political authority.”355  Global problems can be solved and global obligations can be 
discharged through localized and particular authority structures.   
In claiming that Rawls’s natural duty to comply with just institutions only “side-
step[s]” the particularity condition, Green says,  
We normally regard political institutions as applying to us only if they either 
exert real control over our lives or if we stand in a relation of moral 
obligation to them.  But the latter is the very problem at issue, and the former 
renders senseless the thought that there is some special, directional 
relationship involved.356 
Green is surely correct about the latter prong.  But in light of what I have argued, Green 
gives the former prong inadequate consideration.357  One of the core elements of legitimate 
political authority is the state’s capacity for effective control.  Only if the state is able to 
discharge its tasks of coordinating action and securing equal freedom can it do so with any 
claim to legitimacy.  And, if it does in fact possess effective control and discharges its 
obligation responsibly then this takes us pretty far toward a case for the legitimacy of its 
authority.  The particularity analysis, then, should begin with the question of the extent to 
                                                          
355 Estlund, Democratic Authority, 150 (emphasis omitted).  It should be noted that Estlund 
is not careful to distinguish between local authority and local obligation, but I take it that 
Estlund would accept the spirit of the view articulated here. 
356 Green, The Authority of the State, 227-28. 
357 This is not to suggest that Rawls made out his case or that defenders of Rawls have 
made their case.  Waldron argues that some principles of justice are localized.  My view is 
different.  My view says that because de facto effective control is range-limited, political 
authority is likely range-limited.  Theorists who emphasize effectiveness are Finnis and 
Perry.  See Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 250; Perry, “Political Authority and 
Political Obligation,” 68-69. 
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which a given state has the capacity for effective control.  The scope or the particularity of 
the state’s authority is then measured by that effectiveness.   
6.5 - Why the Distinction Matters 
It will be helpful to look at some accounts in which failure to draw the above 
distinction leads us in the wrong direction.  In “Special Ties and Natural Duties,” and other 
work, Waldron defends a Kantian natural-duty account that shares elements similar to the 
account presented here.358  Waldron’s natural-duty account aims to explain the idea that 
we owe a special allegiance to and have special ties with the particular state in which we 
reside. 
 The core of the account lies in Waldron’s distinction between principles of justice 
that are “range-limited” and those that are not.359  A range-limited principle of justice 
distinguishes between “insiders” and “outsiders.”  That is just another way in which to say 
that a moral principle is particularized.  Formally, a person is an insider with respect to a 
principle if she is a member of the set of persons whose conduct and interests the principle 
applies to.360  As a substantive matter, “an individual is within the range of a principle if it 
is part of the point and justification of the principle to deal with his conduct, claims, and 
interests along with those of any other persons it deals with.”361 
                                                          
358 Jeremy Waldron, “Special Ties and Natural Duties,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 22, 
no. 1 (1993): 3-30.  See also Waldron, Law and Disagreement; Waldron, “Kant’s Legal 
Positivism.” 
359 Waldron, “Special Ties and Natural Duties,” 13 
360 Ibid. 
361 Ibid. 
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Waldron’s overall point is that “a [citizen’s] special relation to the legal institutions 
of [his country] is largely captured by the fact that he is an insider with regard to the set of 
range-limited principles administered by those institutions.”362  The distinction between 
insiders and outsiders is “a distinction in principle. . . .  It is a difference in the content and 
structure of the natural duty, not a difference that depends on contingent facts and 
opportunities.”363  Correctly, Waldron notes that principles of justice do not administer 
themselves; rather, principles must be administered by institutions.364  That is the heart of 
what I have argued here, namely that the law is necessary to specify what counts as acting 
consistent with the freedom of others.  The state must administer and enforce those 
specifications. 
 Waldron offers two examples of range-limited principles.  The first example is that 
a principle of distributive justice may be range-limited in that only insiders have a right to 
distributive goods whereas outsiders do not.  That point captures the basic dispute between 
democratic egalitarians and cosmopolitan egalitarians.  Democratic egalitarians argue that 
distributive goods ought be distributed among citizens, rather than non-citizens, because 
the point of distributive justice is to establish just social relations amongst members of a 
democratic society.  In contrast, cosmopolitan egalitarians believe that distributive goods 
ought to be distributed globally beyond the bounds of any given society.365  Waldron’s 
                                                          
362 Ibid. 
363 Ibid., 19.  In this way, Waldron seems to follow Dworkin.  See Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 
193. 
364 Waldron, “Special Ties and Natural Duties,” 15. 
365 For a basic overview of versions of the dispute, see Stilz, Liberal Loyalty, 101-10; Tan, 
Justice, Institutions, and Luck, 87-99. 
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second example involves possible conflict that arises when individuals interact with their 
“near neighbors,” namely those who share a territory, which is “any area in which conflicts 
must be settled if any stable system of resource use is to be possible among inhabitants.”366  
These include the issue of the nature of our private rights and the terms by which we 
interact with each other, as well as disputes that arise between interacting individuals.367  
The scope of a territory can obviously change over time as the domain of expected human 
interaction expands.  Nonetheless, there is necessary task of justly “settling those conflicts 
that are immediately unavoidable.”368 
 Beyond being basically just according to range-limited principles, Waldron adds 
two further requirements before a political institution administering range-limited 
principles of justice will have a “claim on our allegiance.”369  First, the organization must 
be “capable of doing justice in the territory.”370  That is a basic effectiveness requirement, 
which I have already explicated.  Second, the organization must be “legitimate,” which for 
Waldron amounts to the claim that the organization is the “exclusive” organization 
administering justice.371  Justice could not be effectively coordinated and secured if 
competing organizations are mutually undermining.  In a sense, the latter requirement is 
redundant. 
                                                          
366 Waldron, “Special Ties and Natural Duties,” 15. 
367 The subject of Waldron’s second example was discussed in Chapter Two. 
368 Ibid. 
369 Ibid., 27. 
370 Ibid., 20. 
371 Ibid., 22.  It is unclear how the legitimacy requirement boils down to anything but the 
effectiveness requirement.  If there are two organizations competing for effective control, 
with disorganization and conflict being the result, then there is not one organization that is 
legitimate because there is not one organization that is effective.  
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As noted above, the scope of legitimate political authority and the scope of political 
obligation are not synonymous.  Although the state’s political authority might extend only 
over those over whom it has effective control, that assumption does not entail that the state 
or its citizens’ political obligations are owed only to such individuals.  Put differently, 
although authority might be “range-limited,” our principles of justice, or political 
obligations, need not be.  Thus, in a sense, Waldron’s view is the reverse of my own.  
Because effective control is range-limited, political authority is range-limited.  Principles 
of justice need not distinguish between insiders and outsiders, even though political 
authority seemingly must be range-limited to be effective.  Some problems of justice are 
local and some are global.  Local effective political authority has the capacity to address 
both. 
Note that the two examples Waldron offers are quite different in character.  The 
scope of our distributive obligations, however conceived, are not necessarily territorially 
localized.  And, disputes about distributive justice do not arise as an inevitable consequence 
of the interactions between individual’s living in close proximity with each other.  Such 
disputes are different than the disputes that arise from the interactions one has with the 
persons and property of those living in close proximity.  One’s rights concerning one’s 
front yard can only generate local problems, while distributions of resources are not so 
localized.  The distinction therefore is not really a distinction in principle but a distinction 
generated by geography.  Political authority that is range-limited and tasked with 
administering truly range-limited principles of justice (e.g., principles requiring local 
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property rules) can equally be tasked with administering principles of justice that are not 
so limited (principles requiring foreign aid to build property regimes in other countries).372 
 For the same reason we should not link the dispute between cosmopolitans and 
liberal nationalists with the particularity requirement, as Stilz does.373  The dispute between 
cosmopolitans and liberal nationalists is a dispute about the scope of our political 
obligations and whether justice traverses state borders.  A theory that explains why political 
authority is particular and localized need not demand that the scope of our political 
obligations also be localized.  Therefore, there is no reason to think, following Stilz, that 
“the particularity assumption cannot be justified” on the cosmopolitan view.374      
Before concluding I want to address some difficulties in Stilz’s own defense of 
particularity, as Stilz roughly makes the same Kantian argument that I have made with 
respect to legitimate political authority and the morally necessary role that it plays.  Stilz 
offers a quite different account of why one’s relationship with their own state is special.  
Stilz specifically dismisses arguments that appeal to “to salience, natural boundaries, social 
ties, or considerations of administrative effectiveness.”375  My own view presumably relies 
                                                          
372 Failure to grasp the distinction drawn here is comparable to the broader problem that 
Perry has identified as the “reverse-entailment” problem.  Reverse-entailment problems 
arise because “the existence of legitimate authority logically entails an obligation to obey, 
but an obligation to obey does not logically entail the existence of legitimate authority.”  
Perry, “Political Authority and Political Obligation,” 10.  We should distinguish between 
the obligations that are derived from our broader political ends and the nature of the role 
that political authority plays in serving those ends.  
373 Stilz, Liberal Loyalty, 9. 
374 Ibid.  Dworkin also seems to understand the problem this way.  Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 
193. 
375 Anna Stilz, “Why Does the State Matter Morally?,” in Varieties of Sovereignty and 
Citizenship, ed. Sigal R. Ben-Porath and Rogers M. Smith (University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2012), 261. 
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on the first and last considerations, and would not reject the other considerations outright.  
Instead, she argues that particularity is explained by “[t]he mere fact of [an individual’s] 
political history.”376  Such a history 
gives participants reasons to do their part in sustaining their particular state.  
The difference between my state and another equally just state isn’t that I 
am especially biased in favor of it, feel especially patriotic about it, or share 
its national culture (necessarily), but simply that I have been part of this 
practice, which gives me special reason to value and contribute to it.  This 
fact is enough to particularize my natural duty to a given scheme of political 
cooperation and gives me reason to do my part here rather than there.  And 
I think this fact is sufficient to make my concern to do my part in this 
particular state not an act of arbitrary favoritism but rather a rational 
response to a valuable relationship in which I have been involved.377  
Stilz is concerned to address several moral problems, including why one only has an 
obligation to obey the laws of one’s own state, why a U.S. citizen one should not set up a 
tax shelter in the Cayman islands, and why one should participate in the political process 
of one’s own state.378  The argument is reasonably interpreted as associative in character.  
Dworkin’s associative account, for example, is premised on the idea that we are part of “a 
                                                          
376 Ibid. 
377 Ibid. 
378 Ibid., 244-45. 
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history of events and acts that attract obligations.”379  It therefore may share some of the 
difficulties facing associative theories more generally.380 
 I will not rehearse those difficulties here but want to raise several concerns about 
Stilz particular account.  The first difficulty is that what Stilz has described are not 
particularized political obligations but rather particularized permissions.  The mere fact 
that some action is “a rational response to a valuable relationship” does not entail that that 
the action is obligatory or sufficiently valuable to obligatory.381  Nor would it even be 
sufficient to permit criticism of the person for failing to act in a manner that supported the 
relationship.  For example, take Stilz example of the person who domiciles himself in the 
Cayman islands to save money in taxes that can instead be paid to support just institutions 
in the Cayman islands.  Now, if the person decided against the Cayman plan, on Stilz 
account, we could say that the decision was a rational response to a valuable shared history 
with citizens of the U.S.  But, that does not mean that choosing the Cayman plan is not a 
rational response to something else of value.  For example, the man may want to support 
just institutions in the Caymans or support communities in the Caymans where he has 
shared histories with other.  All Stilz has accounted for is why the man would not be acting 
arbitrarily in choosing to domicile in the U.S. rather than the Caymans.  Therefore, the 
                                                          
379 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 197. 
380 For criticisms of associative accounts of political obligation, see Leslie Green, 
“Associative Obligations and the State,” in Dworkin and his Critics, ed. Justine Burley 
(Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 267-84, and Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, 65-92. 
381 This objection can also be framed in terms of Darwall’s charge that only second-person 
reasons can form the basis of claims by other persons.  See Darwall, The Second-Person 
Standpoint, 3-38. 
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value of shared history can be fairly easily outweighed by the value of some other personal 
pursuit. 
 In any event, it is unclear how the account does not yield odd results in more 
everyday cases.  For example, say a lifelong and politically active resident of Pennsylvania 
decides to move to New Jersey.  She simply wants a change.  Are we to say that she is in 
some sense subject to moral criticism?  That would seem to be absurd.  Instead, we value 
and protect personal choice such that the mere fact of choice in this circumstance makes 
the choice beyond reproach.  Moreover, where a person does make such a move across 
borders they immediately take on the legal obligations that apply to residents of the new 
state.  Their legal obligations do not wait for shared histories to develop.  Someone can live 
a long politically active life in Pennsylvania, but as soon as they become a resident of New 
Jersey, they incur New Jersey obligations.  There is no time lag for shared histories or 
practices to develop. 
In this Chapter, I have argued that it is important to be clear about the requisite 
relationship necessary to meet the particularity requirement.  There should be no 
requirement on a theory of political authority or an account of the obligation to obey the 
law that our political obligations are specially owed to our own fellow citizens.  However, 
it is a requirement that one be subject only to the laws of the state in which one is a citizen 
or in which one is physically located.  The broader ends of freedom and justice, local or 
global, largely require the institution of localized authority.
227 
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